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ABSTRACT 
My main intention in writing this thesis is to give a 
greater insight into Berkeley's philosophical concerns 
with eighteenth century science as expressed in de Notu. 
I have written this thesis in four parts, covering the 
scientific background, the philosohical background, an 
exposition of de Motu itself, and a more modern treatment 
of de Motu. 
In the scientific background I cover such topics as 
the relation between Descartes and Newton, Newton's 
achievement, Newton's position regarding such matters as 
the status of gravity and motion. 
In the philosophical background I discuss such 
matters as Berkeley's sources, the nature of 
Occasionalism, Occasionalism's alternative to realism, 
and Berkeley's divergence from Malebranche. 
In the third section I deal with Berkeley's anti-
realist construal of scientific language, his treatment 
of absolute space, his attack on Descartes causal 
paradigm, the meaning of scientific terms, the connection 
between explanation and realism (if any), and between 
cause and explanation. 
In the fourth section I compare and contrast Berkeley 
and Popper, discuss instrumentalism and its relation to 
explanation, Popper's muddled beliefs about Berkeley's 
philosophy of language and its implications for 
Berkeley's philosophy of science. I also discuss such 
topics as Berkeley's conception of explanation, the 
difference between Berkeley's and Popper's realism; and 
the the role of the scientific test. I will also defend 
instrumentalists and Berkeley from the charge that their 
view of scientific theories reduces them to mere 
computation rules. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
The aim of this thesis is, as the title indicates, to 
make the science and philosophy of Berkeley's de .Motu 
explicit and to make the ideas accessible to the modern 
reader. [DM. For an explanation of the coventions used 
in referring to the works of Berkeley, see the Key to 
Berkeley References on page 183.] 
In de .Motu, a scientific background is presupposed. 
There are two aspects to the scientific background: 
first, reference to specific scientific issues is made, 
eg, vis viva, force of percussion, absolute space, 
conservation of motion; second, reference to the work of 
specific natural philosophers is made, eg, Leibniz, 
Borelli, Torricelli, and, especially, Newton. Both these 
aspects are clear and near the surface of the text. This 
requires a considerable investigation into science, 
certain construals of which are criticized in de .Motu. 
Regarding the philosophical background there are again 
two aspects: first, reference to important conclusions of 
individual philosophers is made, eg, Democritus, 
Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz; second, 
though Berkeley never mentions him by name, the 
philosophical influence of Malebranche is everywhere 
apparent: it is especially discernable in Berkeley's 
treatment of causation and scientific terms. So it will 
be necessary to say something about Malebranche whose 
writings Berkeley clearly found so suggestive when he was 
a student at Trinity. This historical research takes up 
the first third of this thesis. 
It should not be thought - because I have treated the 
scientific and the philosophical backgrounds in separate 
sections - that there were in the seventeenth and 
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eighteenth centuries two correspondingly separate 
enterprises, namely philosophy and physics, each having 
exclusive membership - as is very much the case now 
Cexcept for the occasional maverick). In that period 
there was only philosophy practised by people calling 
themselves "philosophers"; it is a mere accident of 
history that some are remembered for what we now call 
"phi 1 osophy" and some for what we now call "science". In 
the period under discussion, they were all part of the 
one, single enterprise: increasing human knowledge. The 
subsequent split was perhaps inevitable, and for two 
reasons: first, specialization occurred because massive 
advances made it impossible for one person to be 
I 
competent in all areas; second, a sceptical attitude - in 
some metaphysical quarters at least - towards science as 
being a bearer of truth, tended to force people into 
taking sides. 
This division had not yet taken place when Berkeley wrote 
de Notu; it was still possible for someone to be an 
expert in both fields. It is not therefore surprising to 
note that it was one person who was behind the advances 
in metaphysics, mathematics and geometry, scientific 
methodology, epistomolgy, physics, etc - Descartes. This 
man, more than any other, is the father of the modern 
intellectual enterprise: I shall have something to say 
about him. 
The historical investigation successfully completed, we 
will be better able to understand de Motu, and a detailed 
analysis of it takes up the second of the first two 
thirds of this thesis. 
The method in the first two thirds of this thesis is 
historical; and, as far as possible, I attempt to 
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describe Berkeley in eighteenth century terms, which, 
once the meaning of his terms has been grasped, is quite 
easy. It is not my intention in the first two thirds to 
present Berkeley as a contemporary, nor my wish to impose 
a shape on Berkeley's thought such that he seems a 
disputant in a war currently being waged in the pages of 
the learned press. But then neither do I want to excuse 
Berkeley's views by placing them in the context of a 
philosophical dark age and say that given the period in 
which he was writing he could do no better. 
My aim then, to restate my opening sentence, is to make 
Berkeley's position clear; and to do it in such a way 
that I do not ascribe an opinion to him that he could 
never be brought to accept as a true description of his 
own position. 
In the final third of my thesis my method changes: here, 
I treat Berkeley as a contemporary, if not of myself, at 
least of Popper. This is not to revoke my earlier 
method: it is to some extent forced upon me, since it is 
the one Popper himself adopts in his articles on 
Berkeley. Furthermore, it just so happens that 
Berkeley's concerns are in part ours also: he too has 
interests in language and science. With respect to 
science, the language he employs is not so far removed 
from ours that it requires torturing before it can be 
shown to express a view of interest to the modern 
philosopher of science. 
-- 10 --
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Section 1: Introduction. 
In 1687 Newton published Philosophia Naturalis Principia 
Nathematica [Newton <1729)]. It remained the most 
notable event in the history of the physical sciences 
until Einstein published his Special Theory of Relativity 
in 1903 [Lorentz et al, <1923)] and his General Theory of 
Relativity in 1916 [Lorentz et al, <1923)]. In the 
Principia can be found the culmination of of the work of 
many men, spanning many hundered of years, who had spent 
their energies trying to comprehepd the system of world. 
Newton's achievement was to synthesize the work of his 
predecessors by creating an order out of the chaos of 
. 
notions and terms. Hitherto, scientists had spoken of 
gravity, levity, force, power, velocity, impetus, 
quantity of motion, mass, the centrifugal force of a 
revolving body, and the force of an impact, without ever 
having clear definitions of these terms and notions. 
Newton would radically simplify this state of affairs: he 
did this by selecting a number of statements which are 
evident or at least can be rendered plausible and which 
can serve as a starting points. These are preceded by a 
group of definitions in which the meanings of the other 
words used in the so-called axioms are defined with the 
aid of these terms which may be considered to require no 
further explanation. "Axioms", in this usage, is not to 
be understood as meaning a number of non-contradictory 
propositions that implicitly define the terms appearing 
in them nor as the basis for theorems to be deduced from 
them. Although Euclid's Elements had long served as the 
model for the systematization of a subject matter, its 
logical elegance was never achieved by Newton, partly as 
a result of his character and partly as a result of the 
nature of the subject matter. 
-- 12 --
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Section 2: Descartes and Newton. 
In the Principia, Newton adopts an extremely anti-
Cartesian stance: his aim is to oppose to the Cartesian 
philosophy, with its apriorism and its attempt at global 
deduction, another and rather different philosophy, a 
philosophy more empirical and at the same time more 
mathematical than that of Descartes, a philosophy which 
restricts itself to the effects, the phenomena, the 
surface of things, and which sees its goal in the study 
of the nature's mathematical frame, and the mathematical 
laws of natural forces. Or as Newton himself put it: 
the whole burden of philosophy ~eems to 
consist in this - from the phenomena of motions 
to investigate the forces of nature, and then 
from these forces to demonstrate the other 
phenomena. [Newton <1975), p XVII-XVIII.J 
But despite Newton's criticisms of Descartes' physics-
mathematical physics without mathematics - despite even 
Newton's failure to admit it, despite even "Error, error 
non est Geom", it seems reasonable to suppose that Newton 
found in Descartes valuable insights. After all, 
Descartes was the first to formulate a consistent set of 
rules of motion <they do, however, suffer from the rather 
serious defect of being wrong!); and Decartes' rational 
cosmology was an identification of celestial and 
terrestial mechanics - for the first time centrifugal 
forces had been seen in the heavens. It is only in 
Descartes, for example, that we find not only the clear 
assertion of the uniformity and rectilinearity of 
inertial motion, but also the explicit definition of 
motion as a "state." [Descartes <1983), p 52.] 
Descartes insists that it is a vulgar error to put motion 
and rest on different levels of being and to think that 
-- 13 --
Berkeley's de Hotu Martin Fearnley 
more power is needed to put in motion a body that is at 
rest than is needed to put at rest a body that is in 
motion. He is right: the ontological equivalence of 
motion and rest is at the very centre of the new 
mechanics. All this Newton tacitly recognizes by using 
Decartes' term "status." [Newton <1729), p 13.] 
It is precisely the institution of the concept of "status 
of motion" for actual motion that enables Descartes, as 
it was to enable Newton, to assert the validity of his 
first law or rule of motion. Actual motion is 
essentially temporal: a body takes a certain time to move 
from one place to another.place, and during that time, 
however short, the body is necessarily sdbjected to the 
action of forces "qui cogent it statuum suum mutare" 
("which compel it to change its state"). [Descartes, 
quoted in Koyre, <1965) p 69.] The status, however is 
connected with time in a very different way: it can 
either endure, or last only an instant. Hence a body in 
curvilinear or accelerated motion changes its status 
every instant because at every instant it changes either 
its direction or its speed; it is nevertheless every 
instant "in statu movendi uniformi ter in direc.turd' ("in a 
uniform state of motion in a given direction"). 
[Descartes, quoted in Koyre, <1965) p 69. J Thus a way of 
atomizing motion had been found which complemeted 
physical atomism. Descartes expresses the same notion 
clearly when he says that it is not the the actual motion 
of a body but its inclination, its "conatus", that is 
rectilinear. Newton, in Definition III, put it more 
briefly, using only the Cartesian formula "quantum in se 
est" ("as much as in it lies"). [Newton <1729), p 2.] 
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Newton and Descartes explain in very different ways how 
bodies persevere in their states. Newton does it by 
ascribing a certain "vis insita" to matter, that is, 
... a power of resisting, by which every body, 
as much as in it lies, continues in its present 
state, whether it be of rest, or of moving 
uniformly forwards in a right line. [Newton 
(1 729) ' p 2. ] 
This is taken from Definition III, the Latin original of 
which has been much argued over. This power or force 
Newton calls "vis inertiae." However, Newton himself 
admits - still in Definition III - that, 
it is resistence so far as the body, for 
maintaining its present state, opposes the force 
impressed; it is impulse, so far as the body, by 
not easily giving way to the impressed force of 
another, endeavors to change the state of that 
other. [Newton, <1729) p 2. J 
It is resistence if the body is at rest, impulse if it is 
in motion. But this distinction can only be an apparent 
one, since motion and rest, as Newton himself admits at 
the end of this section of the Principia, are only 
relatively distinguished. 
Section 3: Newton's Achievement. 
In Propositions I and II of Book I of the Principia, 
Newton first of all succeeds in proving that for all 
motions resulting from the operations of a central force, 
irrespective of the law which states how the magnitude of 
the force depends on the distance from the centre, 
Kepler's law of areas applies, and that conversely it 
also follows from the applicability of this law that the 
force is directed towards the centre from which the 
radius vector describing the areas has been drawn. From 
-- 15 --
Berkeley's de Motu Martin Fearnley 
the second of Kepler's laws of planetary motion it thus 
results that the planet is acted upon by a force directed 
towards the sun. Newton subsequently shows that if a 
material point describes an ellipse under the influence 
of a force directed towards one of the foci, the 
magnitude of the force is inversely proportional to the 
square of the distance from the centre of force, so that 
it can be concluded on the strength of Kepler's first law 
that the planents are attracted by the sun in accordance 
with this law. According to Newton's third law or axiom 
the planets must therefore attract the sun with an equal 
but opposite force. Newton now extends this result to 
all material bodies in the universe, and thus arrives at 
the formulation of the general principle of gravity, 
according to which every particle of matter attracts 
every other with a force whose magnitude is directly 
proportional to the product of the mass of these 
particles and inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance between them. It is now possible for Newton to 
treat all motions in the universe mathematically, while 
at the same time considering the effects of terrestial 
gravity to be a special case of general gravitation, so 
that the motion of falling bodies on the earth, and the 
motions of the planets about the sun, could be regarded 
as examples of the applicability of the same law. 
And this simplifying unity of conception of the physical 
universe that Newton attained - surely a remarkable feat 
by any standards - made it possible to reconcile what had 
hitherto been assumed to be wholly disparate phenomena, 
ie, the celestial and terrestial phenomena of motion, 
formerly believed antithetical, were now found to be 
subject to the same universal law of gravity. The 
natural motion of a free falling, heavy body and the 
enforced motion of a projectile or, in non-Aristotelian 
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language, the motion of bodies falling, rising or thrown 
to the earth and that of the planents could now be shown 
subject to the same universal law. Even those things 
that seemed to offer not a single point of comparison, 
such as tidal phenomena, were now seen to be examples of 
the same law. 
But note already the language employed in the this brief 
summary of the Principia: "acted upon by a force", 
"under the influence of a force", "force directed towards 
the centre", and "the action of forces" have all been 
used in this outline and all suggest that the forces in 
question are something over and above motion itself. Yet 
. 
all of them are quite natural ways of speaking in 
science. 
Section 4: Criticisms of Newton. 
To those natural philosophers who adhered to a Cartesian 
conception of mechanical science - and in this period 
surely many, if not most, did; adhered, that is, to a 
conception that admitted only explanations that were 
truly mechanical, namely physical ones based ·an the 
belief that the only real force was the force of impact, 
Newton's views seemed a relapse into the scholastic 
physics of qualities and powers, and into animistic 
explanations employing such terms as "antipathy" and 
"sympathy" . 
Descartes' continuing influence cannot be doubted; his 
physics received a popular exposition in the famous text 
book on physics written by Rohault, and published in 
1674. This book was translated'into Latin from the 
original French and appeared in England in 1682. It was 
widely accepted as the best general treatise on physics, 
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and was still available when Berkeley was writing de Notu 
in 1720 (ie, thirty-three years after the first edition 
of the Principia). In 1697 a new Latin translation of 
Rohault's book appeared in England by Samual Clarke; this 
in its turn was translated into English in 1723. These 
facts indicate the endurance of Cartesian physics - even 
in the face of severe Newtonian criticisms. 
Descartes' enduring contribution to physics is that he 
managed to free physics from explanations employing such 
terms as "antipathy" and "sympathy" and had taught 
scientists to consider the operation of every force as 
the effect of the motion of the material ,particles; 
henceforth, science would be truly mechanical. 
Furthermore, Descartes had invented systems to explain 
the motion of the earth round the sun and the fall of 
heavy bodies by the action of material particles which, 
when organized into vortices, drew any object placed in 
one, be it planet or satellite, nearer to its centre. 
But now Descartes' followers were asked to put all this 
to one side and to accept a theory that explained gravity 
as a mysterious,.· attractiv~ force mutually exerted -
without any intermediary mechanism- by two bodies and 
separated by empty space. In a sense this was even worse 
than scholastic physics: that at least had always 
rejected action at a distance. 
But the reaction was not entirely hostile: Newton's 
critics agreed that he had found that the moon moves as 
if the same cause that causes weight or heaviness on 
earth also causes the motion of the moon; and they even 
went so far as to agree with Newton in assigning the same 
cause to the motion of the planets around the sun, and of 
satellites around planets. But there were limits, as we 
can see from the following passages from Huygens: 
-- 18 --
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I have nothing against the vis_centripeta, as M 
Newton calls it, by which he makes planets 
gravitate towards the sun and the moon towards 
the earth [it isJ known by experience that there 
is in nature such a manner of attraction or 
impulsion. Indeed nothing prohibits that the 
cause of this vis centripeta towards the sun be 
similar to that which makes the bodies that we 
call heavy descend towards the earth. 
quoted in Cohen C1980) p 79.] 
[ Huygens, 
Huygens could see well enough that there must be some 
cause acting on the planets preventing them from flying 
off at tangents according to the law of inertia. But 
planetary motion apart, attraction was something else: 
Concerning the cause of the tides given by M 
Newton, I am by no means satisfied [by itJ, nor 
by all the other Theories that he builds upon 
his principle of attraction, which to me seems 
absurd. [Huygens, quoted in Cohen C1980) p 
80.] 
No beating about the bush here; and furthermore: 
That is something I would not be able to admit 
because I believe that I see clearly that the 
cause of such an attraction is not explicable by 
any of the principles of mechanics, or of the 
rules of motion. Nor am I convinced of the 
necessity of the mutual attraction of whole 
bodies, since I have shown that, even if there 
were no earth, bodies would not cease to tend 
towards a centre by that which we call gravity. 
[Huygens, quoted in Cohen (1980) p 81.] 
On reading the Principia, Huygens was forced to admit 
that "Vortices [have been] destroyed by Newton", and 
thought that this was a considerable advance. But he 
eventually substituted for the destroyed Cartesian 
vortices a new kind of vortex so that the effect of 
gravity might still be explained by matter and motion, 
according to the principles of the mechanical philosophy. 
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It seemed to-many like Huygens that at the bottom of the 
Principia there was a metaphysical position akin to that 
espoused by the peripatetics with their talk of occult 
forces: terms such as "force", "gravity", and 
"attraction" seemed to function as the scholastic 
"powers" and "qualities" had. But were these not the 
very same sort of terms as those assidulously removed 
from scientific discourse by such men as Descartes, 
Malebranche <the Search is full of anti-Aristotelian 
abuse); and in England by Francis Bacon. I doubt if 
Newton's critics failed to recognise the importance of 
many of his results - as we have seen Huygens was no 
exception - but they refused to believe that these 
results had a physical basis. 
Berkeley was to question this need: since science could 
do all that was wanted without one, why be troubled by 
misleading and irrelevant questions, which fall outside 
the scope of physics anyway? 
But had Newton's critics fully grasped the contents of 
the Principia? 
Section 5: Newton's Position (i). 
It is well known that Newton did not believe that gravity 
was an "innate, essential and inherent property of 
matter"; indeed, in 1679 he had made attempts to explain 
gravity by mechanical means, ie, by the motions of either 
subtile matter or an etherial medium. He did not pursue 
these speculations for some time and he asked Richard 
Bentley, in a letter of 1692, not to ascribe to him that 
Epicurean notion: 
It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter 
should, without the mediation of something else 
which is not material, operate upon and effect 
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other matter without mutual contact, as it must 
be if gravitations, in the sense of Epicurus, be 
essential and inherent in it. And this is one 
reason why I desired you would not ascribe 
innate gravity to me. That gravity should be 
innate inherent, and essential to matter, so 
that one body may act upon another at a distance 
through a vacuum, without the mediation of 
anything else, by and through which their action 
and force may be conveyed from one to another, 
is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no 
man who has in philosophical matters a competent 
faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. 
[Newton, in Thayer <1953>, p 54.] 
This notion was Epicurean because Epicurus had, 
laid down atoms, space and gravity, as the 
first principles of all things. The Universe, 
he taught, consisted of atoms or corpuscles, of 
various forms, magnitudes, and weights. 
[Chambers <1741); unpaginated edition.] 
These atoms became organized into various worlds or 
systems which from time to time collapsed leaving the 
constituents atoms to reform at some future date, 
without the intervention of any deity, or 
the interve~tion of any providence. [Chambers 
<1741); unp~ginated edition:] 
In Cicero's The Nature of the Gods, we find Velleius' 
summary of the Epicurean position: 
Our master [ie, EpicurusJ has taught us that the 
world was made by a natural process, without any 
need of a creator: and that this process, which 
you say can only be effected by divine wisdom, 
in fact comes about so easily that nature has 
created, is creating, and will create, worlds 
without end. But as you cannot see how nature 
can do this without the intervention of mind, 
you follow the example of our tragic playwrights 
and take refuge in a divine intervention to 
unravel the intricacies of your plot. You would 
have no need of such divine handiwork, if you 
would only consider the infinite immensity of 
boundless space in all directions. The mind may 
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plunge into space and in thought traverse it far 
and wide, yet never find that further shore 
where it may come to rest. In this immensity of 
breadth and lenght and height there swarms the 
infinite power of atoms beyond number. And 
although they move in a vacuum, they cohere 
amongst themselves, and then are held together 
by mutual attraction. Thus are created all the 
shapes and forms of natrue, which you imagine 
can only be creaed by some divine blacksmith 
with his anvil and his bellows! [Cicero <1972), 
p 91.] 
The consequence of all this is that God, if he exists at 
all, exists in haughty detachment, far removed from any 
involvement with the mundane: in any case, it could look 
after itself. 
Yet Bentley, in spite of Newton's admonitions, could 
write that, 
a constant Energy [is] infused into matter 
by the Author of all things. [Bentley, in 
Cohen (1958), p 363.] 
And that, 
... Gravity may be essential to matter ... 
[Bentley, in Cohen (1958), p 363.] 
As for Newton himself, he does not - at least in the 
Principia - express his own views about the nature of 
gravitation; nor did he tell his readers that action at a 
distance without mediation was an impossibility, and that 
bodies could not in this sense attract each other. But 
he did explain that the forces of attraction and 
repulsion dealt within natural philosophy, forces by 
which bodies either approach one another or recede from 
one another are not to be taken as causes of such 
movement, but as "mathematical forces", the cause of 
which is unknown. This remark is clearly echoed in 
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Berkeley's de Notu, <see for example de Notu, paragraph 
22). As Newton says in Definition VIII of the Principia: 
I . . . use the words attraction, impulse, or 
propensity of any sort towards a centre, 
promiscuously, and indifferently, one for the 
other; considering those forces not physically, 
but mathematically... [Newton <1729), p 5. J 
That statement seems clear and unambiguous and so it is: 
it is the use he makes of ideas contained in it that make 
Newton's thoughts subtle and sophisticated- not to 
mention difficult to understand. So, the forces with 
which he is dealing are mathematical, that is, in so far 
as they can be treated mathematically, he can deal with 
them. But he does not care or even enquire, at least in 
the Principia, what they are in themselves, what either 
their true nature or their true causes might be: 
"Hypothese non fingo" <"I feign no hypothese"). Newton 
confines himself to an investigation of the manner in 
which these forces behave, of what can seen and measured. 
It is odd therefore, given Newton's repeated and decided 
pronouncements on the matter, that he was interpreted as 
positing action at a distance by an attractive force 
residing in bodies. ~ 
An example of this misunderstanding can be seen in a 
letter written to Hartsoeker by Leibniz in 1711: 
If you allege only the will of God for it, you 
have recourse to a miracle.... For example, if 
any one should say, it is God's will that a 
planet should move round in its orb without any 
other Cause of its Motion, I maintain that it 
would be a perpetual miracle: for by the nature 
of things, the planet going round tends to move 
from its orb along the tangent, if nothing 
hinders it; and God must constantly prevent it, 
if no natural cause does .... 
[Those], who own that gravity is an occult 
quality, are in the right, if they mean by it 
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that there is a certain mechanism unknown to 
them, whereby all bodies tend towards the centre 
of the earth. But if they mean that the thing 
is performed without any mechanism, by a simple 
primitive quality, or by a law of God, who 
produces that effect without using any 
intelligble means, it is an unreasonable occult 
quality, and so very occult, that 'tis 
impossible it should ever be clear, tho' an 
angel should undertake to explain it. [Leibniz, 
quoted in Koyre <1965) p 141.] 
Section 6: Newton's Position (ii). 
Cotes, while preparing the Principia for its second 
edition in 1713, corresponded with Newton, seeking, among 
other things, clarification of the problems mentioned at 
the end of the previous section. In 1712/13 he wrote to 
Newton enclosing for approval his outline of the preface. 
Cotes suggested that the difference between Newton's 
method and Descartes' should be made clear by showing 
that Newton proceeded by demonstrating or deducing from 
the phenomena of nature the principle this phenomena is 
based on (the principle of universal gravity), and that 
he did not merely assert it. 
based on, 
The demonstration will be 
a) the first law of motion <the law of inertia) 
which states that moving objects will move 
in a straight line if no force acts upon 
them; and on, 
b) the observed fact that planets do not move 
in straight lines, but in curves. 
The planets are acted upon by a force, 
... which Force may ... not improperly be called 
centripetal in respect of ye revolving bodies, 
and attractive in respect of the Central. 
[Newton (1975), p 392.] 
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Cotes however met with a difficulty: 
in the first Corollary of the 5th 
Proposition [of Book IIIJ I meet with a 
difficulty, it lyes in these words Et cum 
attractio omnis mutua sit I am persuaded they 
are then true when the Attraction may properly 
be so called, otherwise they may be false. You 
will understand my meaning by an Example. 
Suppose two Globes A & B placed at a distance 
from each other upon a Table, & that whilst A 
remains at rest B is moved towards it by an 
invisible Hand. A bystander who observes this 
motion but not the cause of it, will say that B 
does certainly tend to the centre of A, & 
thereupon he may call the force of the invisible 
hand the centripetal force of B & the Attraction 
of A since the effect appears the same as if it 
did truly proceed from a proper & real 
Attraction of A. But then I think he cannot by 
virtue of this Axiom [the mutual actions of two 
bodies upon each other are always equal] 
conclude contrary to his sense & Observation 
that the Globe A does move towards the Globe B & 
will meet it at the common centre of Gravity of 
both bodies. This is what stops me in the train 
of reasoning by which I would make out as I said 
in popular way Your 7th Prop. Lib III. I shall 
be glad to have Your resolution of the 
difficulty, for such I take it to be.... For 
till this objecton be cleared I would not 
undertake to answer any one who would assert 
that You do Hypothesim fingere, I think You seem 
tacitly to make this supposition that the 
Attractive forces resides in the Central Body. 
[Newton, <1975), p 392. J 
Newton's reaction to all this is rather interesting; he 
first enlightens Cotes about the meaning of the word 
"hypothesis"; tells him that attraction is not a 
hypothesis but a truth established by induction, and that 
the mutual attraction of bodies is a case at the third 
fundamental law or axiom of motion: 
Sr 
I had yours of Feb 18th, & the Difficulty you 
mention wch lies in these words [et cum 
Attractio omnis mutua sit] is removed by 
considering that as in Geometry the word 
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Hypothesis is not taken in so large a sense as 
to include the Axiomes & Postulates, so in 
Experimental Philosophy it is not to be taken in 
so large a sense as to include the first 
Principles or Axiomes wch I call the laws of 
motion. These Principles are deduced from Phae-
nomena & made general by Induction: wch is the 
highest evidence that a Proposition can have in 
this philosophy. And the word Hypothesis is 
here used by me to signify only such a 
Proposition as is not Phaenomenon nor deduced 
from any Phaenomenon but assumed or supposed 
wthout any experimental proof. Now the mutual & 
mutually equal attraction of bodies is a branch 
of the third Law of motion & how this branch is 
deduced from Phaenomena you may see in the 
Corollaries of ye Laws of Motion, pag. 22. If a 
body attracts another body contiguous to it & is 
not mutually attracted by the other: the 
attracted body will drive the other before it & 
both will go away together wth an accelerated 
motion in infinitum, as it were by a self moving 
principle, contrary to ye first law of motion, 
whereas there is no such phaenomenon in all 
nature. [Newton (1975), p 275.] 
The third law states that every action has an equal and 
opposite reaction, and is formulated in the Principia 
like this: 
Law III. To every action there is always 
opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual 
actions of two bodies upon each other are always 
equal, and directed to contrary parts. 
Whatever draws or presses another is as much 
drawn or pressed by that other. If you press a 
stone with your finger, the finger is also 
pressed by the stone. If a horse draws a stone 
tied to rope, the horse <if I may say so) will 
be equally drawn back towards the stone; for the 
distended rope, by the same endevour to relax or 
unbend itself, will draw the horse as much 
towards the stone as it does the stone towards 
the horse and will obstruct the progress of the 
one as much as it advances that of the other. 
If a body impinges upon another, and by its 
force change that motion of the other, that body 
also (because of the equality of the mutual 
pressure) will undergo an equal change, in its 
own motion, towards the contrary part. The 
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changes made by these actions are equal, not in 
the velocities, but in the motions of the 
bodies; that is to say, if the bodies are not 
hindered by any other impediments. For, because 
the motions are equally changed, the changes of 
velocities made towards contrary parts are 
inversely proportional to the bodies. [Newton 
(1729)' p 13 f. ] 
Newton's reply is, it appears, to direct Cotes to 
appropriate sections of the Principia where Cotes will 
find all the clarification he needs. But as a matter of 
fact, Newton did not stop there: he made certain 
additions to the text, which are not mentioned in his 
correspondence with Cotes. Newton adds to the text of 
the third law; in the Scholium to the laws he adds a 
paragraph in which he argues that it is not only magnets 
and iron that attract each other in conformiti with the 
third law but also the earth and its parts; he also 
changed the wording of Proposition V, and added to it a 
corollary in which the mutual character of attraction is 
again asserted. Here is what he wrote in the Scholium 
that concludes Section XI of Book I: 
I here use the word attraction in general for 
any endevour what ever, made by bodies to 
approach to each other, whether that endevour 
arise from the action at the bodies themselves, 
as tending to each other or agitating each other 
by spirits emitted; or whether it arises from 
the action of the ether or of the air, or of any 
medium whatever, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, in any manner impelling bodies 
placed therein towards each other. In the same 
general sense I use the word impulse, not 
defining in this treatise the species or 
physical qualities of forces, but investigating 
the qualities and mathematical proportions of 
them; as I observed before in the Definitions. 
[Newton <1729), p 192.] 
Note that both "impuse" and "attraction" are to be 
interpreted as being devoid of any reference to the means 
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of there pro~uction. Newton, for whom impulse is the 
only acceptable mode of action for a physical force, 
gives "impulse" a neutral meaning so as not to concede 
anything to the Cartesians: both "impuse" and 
"attraction" are to be understood as having only a 
mathematical meaning. It may be noted in passing that in 
the fifth section of de Notu, Berkeley makes a similar 
move when giving his solution to the problem of whether 
causal explanation is the more fundamental explanation to 
which all other explanations have to be reduced if they 
are to count as explanations at all. 
all explanations have to be causal? 
Section 7: Newton's Position (iii). 
In other words: Do 
Cotes did not debate these points further with Newton; 
but I do not think we can conclude on that basis that 
Cotes was convinced: if anything he believed he was right 
when he made the above points, but blundered in treating 
gravity as a supposition or hypothesis. And surely Cotes 
was rigth when he pointed out that it is only if bodies 
do act upon on other that it can truly said of them that 
they really attract on another; and he was right when he 
suggested that Newton's whole reasoning was based on that 
very assumption. Indeed, if a body pulls or draws, it is 
drawn or pulled by it and just as strongly. On the other 
hand, if a body is only pushed towards another, then the 
action and reaction take place between the pushing and 
the one pushed, and not between the latter and the one 
towards which it is pushed: their reaction is just not 
mutual. If for instance we assume that the planets are 
deflected from their rectilinear path not by means of 
something which binds them together in the way a string 
prevents a whirling stone flying off at a tangent, but 
by, eg, some external force such as a Cartesian vortex, 
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then we can ·conclude that the sun will nat be pushed 
towards the planets. 
It could be said, as it was by Leibniz in "Tentamen de 
Matuum Caelestium Causis", that "the planets are 
attracted by the sun" [Leibniz, quoted in Kayre <1965), 
p 279]: but it would be wrong to say that the attraction 
was mutual. Newton's experiments with magnets and iron 
had shown him that the third law is valid in the case of 
magnetic attraction; from this he rightly concludes that 
magnets really act upon iran. Cotes would have said that 
this was a genuine case of "attraction properly sa 
called." The planets present us with rather a different 
problem: we do nat know if they really do attract one 
another - we have no way of measuring the farce, if any, 
involved; attractive farce maybe the result the result of 
pressure or impulsion. All we know is that they are 
subject to centripetal farces, that is , they do not fly 
of at a tangent. By asserting that the forces involved 
are mutual merely because the law that says all 
attraction is mutual is true and as such is contained in 
the third law, Newton was arguing in a circle. If Newton 
did nat commit such an elementary mistake, and surely he 
did nat, then his reasoning can only be explained if we 
accept Cates' criticisms and admit that Newton's "attr-
action" was the name of same sort of real farce, though 
nat necessarily a physical one, by which farces really 
acted upon each ather by means of same immaterial link, 
and that this farce was somehow connected with these 
bodies and was proportional to their masses. This indeed 
would be "attraction properly sa called." 
None of this appears directly in the Principia, in which 
Newton constructs the system of Books I and II from a 
purely mathematical standpoint, in terms of a series of 
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imagined systems or constructs whose physical reality or 
lack of reality was not at issue at that stage of the 
inquiry. Later, he found that certain forms of the basic 
construct led to an agreement with the phenomena to an 
extent that gave him confidence that the construct was 
capable of prediction and retrodictions, that is, capable 
of explanations of known phenomena, and even of new and 
as yet unknown effects which were later confirmed by 
observation. Finally, his mathematics was applied to 
natural philosophy - with amazing results. This is the 
view of I B Cohen [Cohen C1980) p 110f], and it is also 
very much the view of Berkeley who held that scientists 
use a construct - like those used by geometers, 
constructs whose reality was never assumed - which, when 
applied to the system of the universe, enabled the 
scientists to understand the phenomena of terrestial and 
celestial motion. CCf de Motu, pargraphs 38 and 39.) 
In private, Newton struggled on and off for years with 
the problem of gravitational phenomena. To the second 
edition of the Opticks <published in 1717), Newton added 
"Query 31", from which the following quotations come; 
Newton can be seen wrestling with the problem: 
Have not the small particles of bodies certain 
powers, virtues, or forces by which they act at 
a distance?... For is is well known that bodies 
act one upon another by the attractions of 
gravity. [Newton, in Thayer (1953), p 159f.] 
However, 
How these attractions may be performed, I do not 
here consider. What I call "attraction" may be 
performed by impulse, or by some other means 
unknown to me. I use the word here to signify 
only in general any force by which bodies tend 
toward one another, whatsoever be the cause. 
[Newton, in Thayer C1953), p 160f.J 
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This is the offical theory and close to what Newton said 
in the Pricipia. But in the closing pages of the 
"Queries", Newton seems less than completely sure of his 
official theory: 
It seems to me further that these particles have 
not only a vis inertiae, accompanied with such 
passive laws of motion as naturally result from 
that force, but also that they are moved by 
certain active principles, such as is that of 
gravity . . . . These principles I consider ... as 
general laws of nature by which the things 
themselves are formed, their truth appearing to 
us by phenomena, though their cause be not yet 
discovered. [Newton, in Thayer (1953), p 176f.J 
None of Newton's mechanical models worked, and at the 
time of writing to Bentley he was forced to conclude 
that, 
Gravity must be caused by an agent acting 
according to certain laws, but whether this 
agent be material or immaterial I have left to 
the consideration of my readers. [Newton, in 
Thayer (1953), p 54.) 
One wonders if occasionalism was ever entertained by 
Newton: there is, of course, no way of knowing whether it 
was, but occasionalism certainly provides for the 
Principia a referent for the term "attraction properly 
so called." In section 8, I will consider the extent to 
which Newton thought that God was the cause of 
gravitational phenomena; this question will also demand 
attention when I come to consider the famous exchange of 
letters between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. [Alexander 
<1956).] 
Cotes' only error, then, was to assume that this 
conception was a hypothesis made by Newton in order to 
permit him to subject attraction to the provisions of the 
third law, whereas for Newton attraction is an 
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empirically ascertained and demonstrated fact of which 
only the cause is unknown: but it is definitely not a 
hypothesis. Cotes seems to have understood this 
perfectly; his only mistake was to take attraction to be 
a supposition - but he became convinced that attraction 
was a property of bodies and even an essential one. For 
this last belief he was taken to task by Clarke to whom 
he submitted the draft preface. Cotes replied that he 
only wanted to indicate that as we do not know what 
matter really is, we may ascribe to it all kinds of 
properties which by experience we learn it has: 
For I understand By Essential Propertys such 
propertys without which no other belonging to 
the same substance can exist: and I would not 
undertake to prove that it were impossible for 
any of the other Propertys of Bodies to exist 
without even Extension. [Cotes, quoted in 
Koyre, <1965) p 282. J 
Cotes corrected his text to say that attraction was a 
primary property of bodies: 
Since,then, all bodies, whether upon earth or in 
the heavens, are heavy, so far as we can make 
any experiments or observations concerning them, 
we must certaily allow that gravity is found in 
all bodies universally. And in like manner as 
we ought not to suppose that any body can be 
otherwise than extended, movable, or 
impenetrable, so we ought not to conceive that 
any body can be otherwise than heavy. The 
extension, mobility, and inpenetrability of 
bodies become known to us only by experiments; 
and in the very same manner their gravity 
becomes known to us. All bodies upon which we 
can make any observations, are extended, 
movable, and ~mpenetrable; and thence we 
conclude all bodies, and those concerning which 
we have no observations of, to be heavy also, 
If anyone should say that the bodies of bodies 
of the fixed stars are not heavy because their 
gravity is not yet observed, they may say for 
the same reason that they are neither extended 
nor movable nor impenetrable, because these 
properties of the fixed stars are not yet 
-- 32 --
Berkeley's de Hotu Martin Fearnley 
observed. In short, either gravity must have a 
place among the pri~ry qualities of all bodies, 
or extension, mobility, and impenetrability must 
not. And if the nature of things is not rigthly 
explained by the gravity of bodies, it will not 
be explained by their extension, mobility, and 
impenetrability. [Cotes, in Newton (1729), p 
XXVI; italics mine.] 
The italicized section of that extract gives the 
impression that despite Clarke's and Newton's correction, 
Cotes believed that "gravit~· should be given an 
essentialist interpretation or, at least, that the 
argument in Newton's text warranted that concluson. 
Surely it does not: it is part of our understanding of 
the concept "body" that it includes that of "extension"; 
it is not part of our understanding of the concept of 
"body" that it also includes that of "gravity." It is 
just a matter of fact, if it is, that all objects tend 
towards one another in accordance with the inverse square 
law; but it is manifestly not just a matter of fact that 
all objects are extended. It is surely conceivable that 
two objects in close proximity do not tend towards each 
other; it is inconceivable that an object could be 
extensionless. 
Section 8: Atheism Vanquished. 
It is evident that while one remains a supporter of 
atomism and mathematical philosophy, that is, while one 
believes that matter is nothing other than what entirely 
and adequately fills space, one cannot include forces, 
repulsive or attractive, in the essence of body because 
this is already fully determined by extension, hardness, 
impenetrability, mobility, etc. This being so, it 
provides a basis for those with religious, or even just 
theistic, convictions to attack the Epicurean materialism 
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of Lucretius, Hobbes and even Descartes: All held that 
the cosmic system was the result of the chance collisions 
of atoms and that gravity was an innate force of matter 
and as such responsible for gravitational phenomena. 
Descartes did not believe that gravity was such a force 
but held that God was not responsible for ordering the 
universe into a cosmos but only for sustaining it in 
being. 
But a number of questions now become acute, namely, How 
did the cosmic system originate? Why did the planets, 
once formed, not fall into the Sun? Why is the position 
of each orbit relative to the Sun not different to what 
it in fact is? In short: If the cosmic system does not 
have the necessary resources, who or what does? In the 
first series of Boyle Lectures, delivered in 1692, 
Richard Bentley - helped by Newton, who wrote a number of 
letters to Bentley <while the last two lectures were 
being prepared for the press) elucidating some of the 
theological consequences of the Principia - came to the 
conclusion that it must be God. 
Bentley was to show that if gravity had been the only 
force active at the moment of creation, the planets of 
the solar system would have fallen into the Sun. 
Therefore, a specific intervention of some force must be 
assumed to be responsible for preventing the planets 
plunging to their doom and for placing them in their 
respective orbits. Again, when the spacing of the orbits 
is considered, it is clear that no principle of science 
could determine the relations of the distances, except 
that "the Author of the system though it convenient." 
Bentley seemed to Newton to be on the right track when he 
argued that the operations of gravity over empty space 
could only mean that the agent was constantly guiding the 
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planets according to certain laws. Clearly, this agent 
must have volitions, and must be very skilled in 
mechanics and geometry. Bentley called it "God"; Newton 
did not object. In the General Scholium, first published 
in the second edition of the Principia <ie, in 1713, more 
than twenty years after the correspondence between Newton 
and Bentley) Newton wrote, 
planets and comets will constantly persue 
their revolutions in orbits given in kind and 
position, according to the laws [of planetary 
motion] ; but though these bodies may, indeed, 
continue in their orbits by the mere laws of 
gravity, yet they could by no ·means have at 
first derived the regular position of the orbits 
themselves from those laws. [Newton C1729), 
p 543.] 
A nice point that, disentangling matters of fact from 
matters of method. And, 
This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, 
and comets, could only proceed from the counsel 
and dominion of an intelligent and powerful 
Being. And if the fixed stars are the centres 
of other. like systems, these, being formed by 
the like wise counsel, must be all subject to 
the dominiDn of One; especially since the light 
of the fixed stars is of the same nature with 
the light of the sun, .and from every system 
light passes into all the other systems: and 
lest the system of the fixed stars should, by 
their gravity, fall on each other, he hath 
placed those systems at immense distance from 
one another. [Newton <1729), p 544.] 
But, as we saw, Bentley wrote something that implied that 
he thought that gravity was an inherent property of 
matter, implicit in the very substance, a sort of occult 
quality. We also saw the severity with which Newton put 
Bentley straight: under no circumstances could gravity be 
deemed to have a material existence. But this oversight 
notwithstanding, Bentley was now in a position to 
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conclude that mutual gravitation can operate at a 
distance only because it was simultaneously regulated by 
the agent and not by the system itself. This is what 
both Bentley and his era wanted: "a new and invincible 
argument for the being of God." It was wanted because it 
repudiated the atheism affected during the Restoration by 
coffee house and tavern wits - who got a pretty severe 
pasting at the hands of Jonathan Swift. <It is surely 
not without significance that Berkeley and Swift were 
both Irish, both ousiders in a corrupt society and 
friends of one another.) The principle source of this 
atheism was Hobbes who had been attacked for his impiety 
by the orthodox for forty years. But to the guardians of 
Christianity it seemed that the tide of atheism had not 
yet been checked; Bentley's achievement was to show that 
the new science, in particular the natural philosophy of 
Issac Newton, was not only no threat to the Christian 
religion but was also the basis for a demonstration and 
certain proof of the existence of God. Thus, the new 
wisdom was accommodated and too severe a change averted; 
what the era wanted after a century of unprecedented 
civil, religious, and intellectual turmoil was peace of 
mind, a period of stability, of consolidation and a 
chance to build on the revolutionary foundations. But 
revolution itself had come to end. 
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Section 1; Introduction. 
In the "Scientific Background" I considered the 
scientific kowledge relevant to my inquiry; I must now 
turn my attention to philosophy and explore the ideas 
which Berkeley found suggestive and those which he was 
combatting. I have already touched on some of these 
ideas; this is unsurprizing since the previous part, 
being an introduction to the science of de Notu, 
determined that the contents should also reveal somthing 
of the philosophical concerns of de Notu because it was, 
after all, the philosophy of that science that pre-
occupied Berkeley. The sort of questions he found 
pressing are, for example, What is the cause of 
gravitational phenomena? What are the limits of 
mechanistic explanation? What is an explanation anyway? 
What is the role of God? What is the status of 
theoretical terms? I now wish to investigate the source 
of the ideas Berkeley used to answer these questions; in 
some cases the investigation will continue to the end of 
this thesis - in a sense they are what this thesis is 
about. The ones I want to look at now are those that 
derive from occasionalism, for without doubt the 
occasionalism of Malebranche exerted a considerable 
influence on Berkeley's philosophy of science. 
Berkeley found Malebranche very instructive - de la 
Recherche de la Verite [Malebranche <1980a)J offered a 
solution to Berkeley's main concern regarding science: 
How to admit its usefulness without at the same time 
conceding that it truely described a reality behind the 
phenomena of our every day experience? Berkeley's 
feelings were that many people - not just scientists -
were choosing either science or religion because they 
thought that science and religion were mutually exclusive 
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alternatives.: it was Berkeley's intention that such a 
choice does not have to be made. Behind this concern lay 
the greater concerns of metaphysics, religion, and 
morality: these and these alone dealt with the truth. 
Note, for example, the full title of the Principles: A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 
wherein the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the 
Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and 
Irreligion, are Inquired into. This was first published 
in 1710, ie three years before the second edition of the 
Principia and its attempt, in the General Scholium, to 
reconcile science and religion. 
An equally important concern was for the correct 
philosophical method; this is more than a nod in· 
Descartes' direction: from clear and distinct perceptions 
being the basis of all right science we move to the clear 
and distinct use of language as the basis of a correct 
philosophy of science. 
Section 2: Berkeley's Sources. 
Berkeley read Malebranche's Search [Malebranche <1980a)J 
sometime between 1700 and 1704, that is, when he was a 
student at Trinity College, Dublin. Berkeley probably 
read it in Thomas Taylor's translation, the second 
edition of which had been published in 1700 [Taylor 
<1700)). Luce, in his Berkeley and Halebranche [Luce 
(1967)), notes that some of Berkeley's phrases are the 
same as those that Taylor uses: eg, "outness" for "des 
dehors"; "illustration" for "eclaircissment"; "mediums" 
for the signs of distance, all seem to derive from 
Taylor's translation. There are many references, direct 
and indirect, to Malebranche in Berkeley's Philosophical 
Commentaries. [PC. For details of the conventions I 
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have us~d i~ referring to the works of Berkeley, see 
GEORGE BERKELEY in References and Bibliography.] 
Berkeley, while accepting much of what Malebranche says 
about secondary causes, does not accept Malebranche's 
thorough-going occasionalism. Malebranche believed that 
God is the cause of the determinations of our wills as 
well as the cause of events in the world. Not so 
Berkeley: 
We move our legs our selves. 'tis we that will 
their movement. Herein I differ from 
Malebranche. [PC, p 304.] 
Berkeley's belief that minds were the only genuine causal 
agents, is one he makes important use of in de Xotu. The 
motion of objects cannot be caused by other moving 
objects (because objects are causally inefficacious); 
therefore a mind must cause such movements; we do not 
cause it ; therefore, there must be a mind which does -
call ·it "God". This is Berkeley's version of the 
argument for occasionalism. 
The basic point made by Malebranche is this: there is no 
power or force in bodies which accounts for their motion. 
He argued as follows: we lack a clear idea of the 
supposed power or force in bodies; nor can the 
examination of an idea of a body reveal under what 
circumstances it will move or in what way it will move 
other bodies. We observe only a constant and regular 
conjuction of events, not a necessary connection between 
them. Furthermore, since nothing can move a body that 
God wills to be at rest or impede or alter the movement 
of a body that God wills to be in motion, bodies 
themselves are inefficacious. And since there is a 
necessary connection between the volition of an 
omnipotent being and the execution of that volition, God 
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is the true cause of motion in bodies, and the action of 
his will is their moving force. So, when one ball 
strikes another and the latter moves, God is the real or 
true cause of its motion. Since God acts, not at random, 
but in accordance with the general laws of motion which 
he as enacted, the impact of the first ball may be called 
the occasional or secondary cause of the second ball's 
movement. 
Malebranche's inflence on Berkeley is clearly 
discernable: 
And, 
The cause of all natural things is onely God. 
Hence it is trifling to enquire after second 
Causes. [PC, p 290.] 
Those may be more properly be Called occasions 
yet Cto comply> we may term them Causes. but 
[sic] then we must mean Causes yt do nothing. 
EPC, p334.] 
Both of these quotations give a clear indication of the 
direction in which Berkeley's mind was moving in the 
early seventeen hundreds. 
Berkeley, while accepting some of Malebranche's 
arguments, developed them to more radical conclusions. 
As we saw, Malebranche believed that material things are 
inert, powerless things: they, and whatever else may 
exist, depend on God. Berkeley thought that this 
contention could and should be pressed further; for if it 
is true, then what useful role is left to either material 
substance or material things in the divine scheme things? 
The question is not now: Whether there is anything 
distinct from spirit and idea? But: Whether there are 
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certain ideas in God's mind which direct him how and in 
what order to produce ideas of sense? Ideas produced, 
much after the same maner as a musician is 
directed by the notes of music to produce that 
harmonious train and composition of sound, which 
is called a tune; [Principles, p 99.] 
According to Berkeley, this is all that remains of the 
notion of matter once it has become dead, inert occasion 
for our ideas. 
Berkeley's conclusion needs no mention: but it is 
interesting to cons~der the fact that in adopting this 
conclusion he may have been influenced by Pierre Bayle's 
Dictionary [Bayle <1710)]; of special interest in this 
resect is the article "Zeno of Elea". Remark F of this 
article deals with the impossibility of extension and 
motion. 
There is no extension, therefore there is no 
Motion. The Consequence is good, for what hath 
no Extension takes up no room, and what takes up 
no room cannot possibly pass from one place to 
another, nor consequently move. [Bayle <1710), 
p 3077.] 
According to Bayle this was "incontestable", hence the 
thing to do was to prove that there is no extension and 
that would be enough to prove that motion is impossible. 
So an important part of this Remark was devoted to 
proving that there is no extension: 
extension cannot be composed either of 
Mathematical Points, of Atoms, or Parts 
divisible in infinitum. [Bayle <1710), p 3077.] 
Mathematical points were easily dispensed with: 
several nullities of Extension joined 
together will never make an Extension. [Bayle 
<1710), p 3077.] 
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Regarding Epicurean atoms, which were characterized as 
extended and indivisible, Bayle observed that any atom of 
any extent, no matter how small, will have a left side, a 
right side, an upper and a lower side; it is therefore, 
... a conjunction of distinct bodies; and I may 
deny of the right side what I affirm of the left 
side. [Bayle <1710), p 3078.] 
Now, since the left and right side are not in the same 
place they must be separable: 
... and therefore the Indivisibility of an Atom 
is meerly Chimerical. [Bayle <1710), p 3078.] 
Bayle concluded: 
If therefore there is such a thing as extension, 
its parts must be divisible in infinitum. 
[Bayle <1710), p 3078.] 
Therefore no two points could touch because for any two 
parts there must be an infinite number of parts between 
them; hence no two parts could touch, and so there can be 
no extension since extension requires immediate contact 
of parts. This does not seem the best that Bayle could 
have said; he could have said, simply, that if there is 
an infinite number of parts between any two parts, then 
motion is impossible because in order to move one would 
have to cross an infinite number of parts and so on ad 
infinitum. However, it is doubtful that there is such a 
thing as an actual infinite between any two parts as 
Bayle supposed. Bayle continued: 
But on the other side, if they cannot be 
divisible in infinitum we must conclude that the 
existence of extension is impossible, or at 
least incomprehensible. [Bayle <1710), p 3078.] 
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This follows. from the fact that whatever cannot be 
divided cannot be composed of parts; therefore it cannot 
have a left side, nor a right side, etc. 
extended. 
Hence it is not 
We can see in these considerations a possible source for 
Berkeley's worries about atomism, infinity, extension and 
motion. Bayle's comments in Remark H of the same article 
are also of some interest: for example, 
The proofs which reason furnishes us, of the 
existence of matter, are not evident enough to 
furnish a good demonstration on that head. 
[Bayle <1710), p 3078.) 
To arrive at this conclusion Bayle employed two 
principles: Nature does nothing in vain; and, It is vain 
to do by several means what can be done by fewer with the 
same ease. These principles imply that, whether bodies 
exist or not, God could exite in us all the perceptions 
which we have of an external world, without using bodies 
as his instruments; "bodies" is here understood to mean 
extended and coloured objects that exist independently of 
perceiving minds and are like the ones we perceive. We 
have no way of proving from the evidence of our senses 
that there are no such bodies outside our minds. 
Bayle commented on Descartes' appeal to the 
trustworthiness of God, that he does not deceive us 
regarding the existence of bodies. According to Bayle, 
Descartes provided no demonstrative reason, since not 
only must God's existence and trustworthiness be 
demonstrated, but also that he has assured us that there 
are bodies, and this he has not done. God would not be a 
deceiver if there were no bodies; in that case the error 
would be ours, not God's. Bayle's appeal to the divine 
economy would doubtless have caught Berkeley's eye. 
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<Berkeley refers to Bayle in the Philosophical 
Commentaries where he argued that Bayle's arguments work 
against bodies but not against space (PC, pp 283 and 
290].) An appeal to divine economy would, if true, rule 
out the creation of a useless material realm: useless 
because God could create our sensations without the 
interposition of objects as the occasion of them. 
Section 3: Method: On Being Clear and Distinct. 
Berkeley began both de Hotu and the Principles with a 
brief treatment of language and the errors mistaken views 
about words can and do cause. Malebranche did not do 
this: he began the Search with a treatment of the cause 
and nature of error, reserving until later such treatment 
of words as he will give. But the parallel is clear: 
both authors began with a treatment of the cause of 
erroneous thinking and its cure. For example, in the 
context of a discussion about the importance of clear and 
distinct ideas, using the relative terms "pure" and 
"impure" as his examples, Malebranche wrote, 
Philosophers should refrain fLom saying that 
matter is "pure" or "impure" unless they know 
exactly what they mean by these words, for one 
should never speak without knowing what one is 
saying, ie, without having distinct ideas corre-
sponding to the terms one is employing. Now, 
had (the scholastics] affixed clear and distinct 
ideas both these words, they would see that what 
they call pure is often quite impure, and what 
seems impure is often quite pure. (Malebranche 
<1980a), p 83. J 
The important lesson here is We must reason only on the 
basis of our clear ideas. In physics, a body must be 
thought of as extended, divisible, numerable and mobile; 
and this will make it possible to treat natural phenomena 
both mathematically and geometrically, that is, 
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mechnically. · Henceforth, science must avoid all accounts 
of natural phenomena employing the Aritotelian 
terminology of what Malebranche called, 
those lovely words: genus, species, act, 
potency, nature, form, qualities, cause in 
itself, and accidental cause. [Aristotles'sJ 
followers have trouble in understanding that 
these words signify nothing, and that they are 
no more learned than before just because they 
are heard to say that fire dissolves metals 
because it has a dissolving faculty. 
[Malebranche C1980a), p 443.] 
What clear ideas correspond to those terms? According to 
Malebranche, none: the only ideas that correspond are 
vague ones of cause and being in general; are they are 
used tautologically, as in the above example of the 
dissolving faculty of fire. In Elucidation Twelve, 
Malebranche wrote, 
it is especially in matters of physics that 
we take advantage of vague and general terms 
that do not call up distinct ideas of being or 
modes. [Malebranche C1980b), p 642.] 
Malebranche went on to give as an example the way the 
scientists use the term "gravity" and similar terms 
which, 
call up the idea of neither a being nor a 
mode. They are terms devoid of all sense, which 
wise people ought to avoid. [Malebranche 
C1980b), p 643. J 
Echoes of this remark can be found in de Notu, paragraphs 
3, 4, 6, 7 and 23. 
Malebranche wrote, 
Later, in his next paragraph, 
It seems to me that this is certain and easy to 
understand. Yet most men speak freely of all 
things without troubling themselves to examine 
whether the terms they use have a clear and 
distinct meaning. [Malebranche C1980b), p 643.] 
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Again, echoes of this remark can be found in de Hotu, 
paragraphs 1 and 3. 
Malebranche concluded this Elucidation by reflecting that 
it is only because we use a term thoughtlessly many times 
that we come to think of it as being perfectly 
understood; this belief was espoused by Berkeley in de 
Hotu, paragraph 7. 
The elimination of all this metaphysical baggage from 
physics does not render it useless because in physics, 
it is necessary to admit only notions common 
to all men, ie, the axioms of geometers and the 
clear ideas of extension, figure, motion and 
rest. [Malebranche (1980a), p 484.] 
In passing, Malebranche met the objection that the 
essence of matter is not extension: surely it does not 
matter one way or the ather provided our conception of 
the world is similar to the one we perceive - even if it 
is not made of matter "of which we know nothing, and 
about which they nevertheless make so much fuss." 
[Malebranche (1980a), p 484.] And what matters most of 
all in this respect is: 
We should only be careful that the reasonings we 
make about the properties of things are in 
agreement with our sensations of them, ie, that 
what we think is in perfect agreement with 
experience, because in physics we try to dicover 
the order and connection of effects with their 
causes, either in bodies, if there are any, or 
in our sensations, if they do not exist. 
[Malebranche (1980a) p 483.] 
Much of what is contained in these two passages will be 
familiar to anyone reading de Hotu, especially paragraphs 
22, 28, 31, 49 and 71. It is fair to say that Berkeley 
is arguing for the truth of these paragraphs, especially 
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paragraph 49· which sums up so much of what Berkeley has 
to say in de Xotu, paragraphs 35 to 42. 
Section 4: What is Occasionalism? 
What then is the doctrine of occasionalism? It can be 
defined as the doctrine that things or events are caused 
only by God, never by other things or events. Ont his 
view apparent causes are what God uses as the occasion 
("occasional causes" ,ie, instruments) for creating their 
apparent effects. For example, when one ball strikes a 
second and this one moves, God is the real cause of the 
second ball's motion - the first ball is just the 
occasion or instrument of motion in the second ball; this 
understanding of "occasional cause" Berkeley captured 
when he explained it as: 
something that is observed to accompany, or 
go before it, in the ordinary course of things. 
[ DM, p 98. J 
The view occasionalists opposed is the view that causal 
agents have within themselves the power to bring about 
change, to make a particular event inevitable. 
Occasionalists argued that there are no such powers in 
nature but only regularity, as defined above. This 
regularity is the work of God, who has, it is true, 
linked phenomenal events together; but he has not done it 
by creating any linking-entities between them. 
Malebranche replaced the notion of causal power with the 
scientific notion of law: 
All natural forces are therefore nothing but the 
will of God, which is always efficacious. God 
created the world because He willed it ... ; and 
he moves all things, and thus produces all the 
effects that we see happening, because He also 
willed certain laws according to which motion is 
communicated upon the collision of bodies; and 
because these laws are efficacious, they act, 
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whereas. bodies cannot act. There are therefore 
no forces, powers, or true causes in the 
material, sensible world; and it is not 
necessary to admit the existence of forms, 
faculties, and real qualities for producing 
effects that bodies do not produce and for 
sharing with god the force and power essential 
to Him. [Malebranche <1980a), p 448-9.] 
It is clear from this passage that Malebranche was 
rejecting the opinion of those who held that between God 
and phenomenal events there is a layer of forces or 
qualities and that it was these that were the proximate 
cause of the events perceived: to understand 
occasionalism more fully it is necessary to know 
something of this opinion, which it rejected. 
Section 5: What Occasionalism is Not. 
This view, which dominated seventeenth and eigtheenth 
century European thought, presented the world not as a 
mere random assemblage of parts but as a structured and 
coherent whole: it was a world view amplified and to some 
extent created by scientists. According to this view, 
events are consequences of general laws, eg, the motion 
of the earth round the Sun is explained by Kepler's three 
laws; these in turn are explained by yet more general 
laws, such as gravity and inertia. Finally, these basic 
laws which govern bodies are explained as the immediate 
effect of God's will: bodies attract one another, Why? 
Because God so wills it. Cudworth, trying to escape 
mechanism without falling into occasionalism, wrote, 
Wherefore, since neither all things are produced 
fortuitously, or by the unguided mechanisms of 
matter, nor God himself may reasonably be 
thought to do all things immediately and 
miraculously; it may well be concluded, that 
there is a plastic nature under him, which, as 
an inferior and subordinate instrument, doth 
drudgingly execute that part of his Providence, 
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which consists in the regular and orderly motion 
of matter. [Cudworth; quoted in Jammer <1957), 
p 151.] 
In his The Immortality of the Soul, Henry More came to a 
similar conclusion: this plastic nature, this spirit of 
nature is 
a substance incorporeal, but without sense 
and animadversion, pervading the whole matter of 
the universe, and exercising a plastic power 
therein according to the sundry predispositions 
and occasions in the parts it works upon, 
raising such phenomena in the world, by 
directing the parts of the matter, and their 
motion, as cannot be resolved into mere 
mechanical powers. [More (1659); quoted in 
Jammer, p 151f.J 
In his Enchiri di on Netaphysi cum, More concluded "Nam sic 
mobilia omnia moventur a Deo" ("for in this way are all 
moving objects set in motion by God" J. [More <1671); 
quoted in Jammer, p 152.] 
Similar views are found in some of Newton's followers; 
witness Cotes in his preface to the second edition of 
Principia: 
Without all doubt this world, so diversified 
with that variety of forms and motions we find 
in it, could arise from nothing but the 
perfectly free will of God directing and 
presiding over all. 
From this fountain it is that those laws, which 
we call the laws of Nature have flowed, in which 
there appear many traces indeed of the most wise 
contrivance, but not the least shadow of 
necessity. [Cotes, in Newton <1729), p XXXII.] 
In short particular events are effects of nature's laws, 
and those laws are the effects of God's will, whose 
vicarious power is somehow embodied in plastic nature; 
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such a view .can even be detected in some of the works of 
Newton himself: 
The main business of natural philosophy is to 
argue from phenomena without feighning 
hypotheses, and to deduce causes from effects, 
till we come to the very first cause, which 
certainly is not mechanical; and not only to 
unfold the mechanism of the world, but chiefly 
to resolve these and such like questions. What 
is there in places almost empty of matter, and 
whence is it that the Sun and the planents 
gravitate towards one another, without dense 
matter between them?... To what end are comets, 
and whence is it that planets move all one and 
the same way in orbs concentric, while comets 
move. all manner of ways in orbs vey eccentric 
and what hinders the fixed stars from falling 
upon one another? [Newton in Thayer <1953), p 
156.] 
For Newton the answer must be God because whatever non-
dense matter is, it must be, at least by implication, 
something God supplies. But, be this as it may, 
"vicarious power", "plastic nature", and "non-dense 
matter" are precisely the sort of terms the 
occasionalists were to oust from science and philosophy. 
Section 6: The Occasionalists' Question. 
The question raised by the occasionalist philosophers, 
men such as Malebranche, de la Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx, 
was If God's will is responsible for nature's laws, and 
those laws cause particular events, is it not now being 
supposed that these basic laws constitute something which 
intervenes between God's will and particular events? 
And, more importanly, what purpose could such a layer 
serve? The proposals we have seen say, in effect, that 
there are causal intermediaries between God and the 
world, ie, that there are forces or powers or a plastic 
nature created by God and that this intervening layer 
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determines all events. Hence gravitational attraction is 
a result of a gravitational force or some power embodied 
in this plastic nature, and so on. 
Descartes and his followers, men such as those listed 
above with the addition of Rohault and Huygens, had 
opposed this view of force and powers on the grounds that 
we can have no clear and distinct idea of them, save the 
abstract one that "they are the cause of" whatever 
effects they are postulated to explain. Moliere's well 
known example of such an occult power is opium's 
dormitive power: we have no immediate are independent 
knowledge of this power other than that we know it is the 
cause of the effects it purports to explain. It tells us 
no more than that opium has the power to put us to sleep: 
that much we knew already. 
If that was the best science could do, then it was as 
guilty as scholasticism had been of concocting empty 
explanations. The Newtonians, that is such men as Cotes, 
Bentley, Clarke, Whiston, Derham, Horsley, and Baxter 
incurred much criticism for their belief in gravity: 
surely this was the occult force par exellence. In 
fairness it must be admitted that some of Newton's 
followers did deserve such criticism because they were 
misinterpreting Newton; but Newton himself was quite 
clear about where he stood on the matter: as we have 
seen, he states repeatedly in the Principia that gravity 
is not an occult force or quality but an effect whose 
cause is unknown to him. 
Section 7: Rival Views of Causation. 
There were in Malebranche's view two concepts of nature 
competing with one another. One has it that nature, 
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plastic or otherwise, is a dynamic storehouse of force, 
powers and efficacious secondary causes: 
ordinary philosophy furnishes [atheists] 
with enough to blind themselves and to support 
their mistakes, for it speakes to them of 
certain impressed virtues, of certain motor 
faculties, in short, of a certain nature that is 
the principle of motion in each thing; and 
although they have no distinct idea of this 
thing, they are complacent enough, because of 
the corruption of their hearts, to substitute it 
for the true God, imagining that it causes all 
the wonders we see. [Malebranche <1980a), p 
466, J 
The other view has it that phenomena, though behaving in 
a perfectly uniform and regular manner, are connected by 
the temporal relations of before and after; but we must 
not allow ourselves to be deceived by this fact: 
Finally, because God resolves from all eternity 
to create certain things in a certain time, one 
could also say that these times would be the 
causes of the creation of these beings; just as 
one claims that a ball collides with another is 
the true cause of the movement it communicates 
to it, because God willed through His general 
will, which causes the order of nature, that 
when two bodie~ collide such a communication of 
motion occurs. There is therefore only one 
single true God and one single cause that is 
truly a cause, and one should not imagine that 
what preceeds an effect is its true cause. 
[Malebranche <1980a), p 451.] 
The notion that a correct anylysis of causation involves 
its being analysed into the temporal relations of before 
and after was shared by Berkeley and is clearly expressed 
in de Hotu, paragraph 71. It is clear that both men 
believed that the true cause of an effect was not some 
earlier event, but God. 
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Malebranche held that the idea of cause involved not the 
idea of force or power at all, but the idea of necessary 
connection: if one event occurs, so must the other. Such 
a connection is not found to exist in nature between any 
two events, but it is found to exist between God's will 
and the motion of bodies, 
since the idea we have of all bodies makes 
us aware that they cannot move themselves, it 
must be concluded that it is minds which move 
them. But when we examine our idea of all 
finite minds, we do not see any necessary 
connection between their will and the motion of 
any body whatsoever.·.:··. 
But when one thinks about the idea of God, ie, 
of an infinitely perfect and consequently all 
powerful being, one knows there is such a 
connection between His will and the motion of 
all bodies, that it is impossible to conceive 
that He wills a body to be moved and that this 
body not be moved. [Malebranche (1980a), p 
448.] 
What is found is that a certain type of of event is 
invariably linked to another type of event in accordance 
with the temporal relations of before and after. What 
type of event are so linked is not given a priori but is 
discovered a posteriori and proved experimentally 
wherever possible - rendered certain by induction as 
Berkeley and Newton would say; but the only element 
common to all pairs is the temporal relation of before 
and after. God does not will that this particular event 
follows some other event; instead, God rules all things 
by a few general volitions; eg, he has a general volition 
to the effect that every body will tend to move in a 
straight line; that every body at rest will remain at 
rest, etc. 
According to Malebranche, neither our senses nor our 
reason give us any idea of causal power: our senses 
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reveal no transfer of moving force; our reason 
demonstrates that the characteristics of body contain 
nothing that suggests to us any idea of power: 
When I see one ball strike another, my eyes tell 
me, or seem to tell me, that the one is truly 
the cause of the motion it impresses on the 
other, for the true cause that moves bodies does 
not appear before my eyes. But when I consult 
my reason I clearly see that since bodies cannot 
move themselves, and since their motor force is 
but the will of God that conserves them 
successively in different places, they cannot 
communicate a power they do not have and could 
not communicate even if it were in their 
possession. For the mind will never conceive 
that one body, a purely passive substance, can 
in any way whatsoever transmit to another body 
the power transporting it. (Malebranche 
(1980b). p 660. ] 
It will be obvious when we come to inspect de Motu itself 
that Berkeley found such passages as the one just quoted 
highly suggestive, offering him a way of refuting 
scientific realism, while at the same time giving God a 
fundamental role in the philosophy of science. 
Section 8: The Occasionalist' Solution. 
The solution the occasionalists offered as a way of 
preventing the reintroduction of occult forces into 
science was to suppose that God's will is identical to 
the fundamental laws of natural science, but not their 
cause: 
And, 
the study of nature is false and vain in 
every way when true causes are sought in it 
other than the volitions of the Almighty, or the 
general laws according to which He constantly 
acts. (Malebranche <1980b), p 662.] 
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God does everything in all things. and nothing 
resists.Him. He does everything in all things, 
His volitions produce and regulate all 
motion,... [ Malebranche <1980b), p 664. J 
On this view, particular events are explained by general 
laws, but these laws are not now supposed the mysterious 
effects of the divine will, but the most general of God's 
volitions: 
God does not multiply His volitions without 
reason; He always acts through the simplest 
ways, and this is why He uses the collision of 
bodies to move them, not because their impact is 
absolutely necessary for their motion, as our 
senses tell us, but because with impact as the 
occasion for the communication of motion, very 
few natural laws are needed to produce all the 
admissible effects we see. [Malebranche 
C1980b) I p 663.] 
But there are no intermediaries falling between God's 
will and the world of phenomenal events: 
there is only one true cause because there 
is only one true God; that the nature or power 
of each thing is nothing but the will of God; 
that all natural causes are not true causes but 
only occasional causes .... 
We must therefore say that only His will can 
move bodies if we wish to state things as we 
conceive them and not as we sense them. The 
motor force of bodies is therefore not in the 
bodies that are moved, for this motor force is 
nothing other than the will of God. Thus bodies 
have no action; and when a ball is moved, 
collides with, and moves another, it 
communicates to it nothing of its own, for it 
does not itself have the force it communicates 
to it. Nevertheless, a ball is the natural 
cause of the motion it communicates. A natural 
cause is therefore not a real cause but only an 
occasional cause. [Malebranche <1980a), p 448.] 
So instead of saying, "The apple fell because it was 
drawn towards the earth by a force directly proportional 
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to the product of the masses of the earth and the apple, 
and inversly proportional to the square of the distance 
between them," we should say, "On the occasion of the 
apple's, God wills that it is drawn towards the earth at 
a rate directly proportional to etc, etc." In the first 
case, we attribute the fall to some mysterious force; in 
the latter, we attribute it to the immediate effect of 
God's will, now identified with the most general of 
nature's laws. 
The question posed by the occasionalists was: What need 
has an all powerful God for such occult intermediaries as 
the above mentioned forces, powers and even, for that 
matter, secondary causes if all the effects that can be 
observed are ultimately the product of his will? 
Secondary causes, defined in Ephraim Chamber's 
Cyclopaedia as being, "those which derive the power, and 
faculty of acting, from a first Cause," [Chambers <1741)] 
seem especially open to occasionalist criticism. 
Berkeley may have been well aware of this fact - the 
definition continues: 
Such causes do not properly act at all; but are 
acted on: and therefore are improperly called 
Causes: of which kind are all those that we call 
Natural Causes. [Chambers <1741).] 
And so the occasionalists, mindful of Ockam's Principle, 
answered their question with the reply that God has no 
need of such things at all. And, it may be added, since 
they are unnecessary, we need not postulate them; this 
amounts to saying that they do not exist at all. I take 
this to be one of the main points that Berkeley is 
arguing for in de Hotu. 
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Section 9; Source of Our Mistaken Views about Causation. 
So where does our idea of causal efficacy come from? We 
know that bodies cannot move themselves; we also know 
that there are two fundamental sorts of things, minds and 
bodies; hence, given the foregoing, we should conclude 
that the origin of motion should be minds. Vle are misled 
into believing that there are such things as secondary 
causes by the fact that we always observe one event to be 
invariably preceede by another; and this invarience we 
never see violated. 
Because all natural phenomena follow one another in 
predictably regular patterns, we are prone to suppose 
that the events that follow are produced by those that· 
invariably preceed them. But the connection is not a 
necessary one: 
A true cause is one such that the mind 
perceives a necessary connection between it and 
its effect. Now the mind perceives a necessary 
connecton only between the will of an infinitely 
perfectly being and its effects. Therefore, it 
is only God who is the true cause and who truly 
has the power to move bodies. (Malebranche 
<1980a), p 450.] 
As we have seen, Malebranche supposed that the number of 
God's general laws to be few, and that by their 
collective operation they produce all the events occuring 
in nature. Hence God's will is the sufficient and 
necessary condition of the occurance of any event; but 
when we suppose the existence of forces, powers, and 
secondary causes, we do something for which there is no 
need: talk of forces, etc will only entagle us in 
unnecessary problems relating to occult forces. Clarity 
and economy of thought demand that all talk of secondary 
causes and forces be given an anti-realist construal. 
--58--
Berkeley's de Notu Martin Fearnley 
Section 10: God and Science - a Criticism. 
An objection brought against occasionalism was that it 
required God to intervene constantly in the workings of 
his creation: God, it seems, must be busy at every 
instant with the production of nature's effects. This 
objection was part of the greater controversy over 
whether religion was the only authoritative means of 
reaching the truth, which fact science must acknowledge; 
or, Is science an independent, though limited, means 
which religion must acknowledge? This.controversy had 
its modern originsin the works of Copernicus, Osiander, 
Galileo, and Bellarmine. If science could rid itself of 
religion and claim for itself a large degree of epistemic 
independence, it would then be in a position to say what 
is or is not in the world. Science would become a 
purveyor of truth and falsity; God would be edged off 
stage and the only forces would be the so-called 
secondary ones. The view seems to be that of science 
trying to come of age and of being stopped by religious 
orthodoxy: this is a travesty. The argument was at 
bottom about what could count as knowledge and under-
standing: Berkeley tried to accommodate both a 
metaphysical and a scientific view of understanding in 
the Principles and de Notu. Genuine understanding of the 
world requires knowledge of God's ends and purposes; 
science cannot supply this - it can only deal in 
increasingly more general concepts from which particular 
events are deduced and, as we shall see, by which they 
are explained. Berkeley was trying to accommodate these 
two concepts of explanation; but Leibniz and Clarke in 
the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence [Alexander <1956)] had 
no such intention. Leibniz held that Newton's Principia 
was non-explanatory: everything that science needs to 
know in order to understand why things happen, in the way 
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that they do, is present in nature. If this is not 
accepted, then recourse to miracles is necessary. 
Clarke, for his part, was quite unmoved: scientific 
explanation appeals ultimately to a few basic 
regularities whose explanation requires an appeal to the 
workings of the divine mind. The argument was about the 
grounds and limits of explanation: that explanation has a 
limit was not in dispute; what was in dispute was where 
exactly the limit is. Leibniz wanted to include in 
science things more properly belonging to theology and 
metaphysics; Clarke wanted to exclude such things, which 
exclusion will leave mechanics, mathematics, motion and 
geometry - these he thought would be all that is required 
in order to explain any natural phenomena. 
Does this mean that Newton had occasionalist leanings? I 
thimk it may, though Newton was careful to conceal the 
fact from the readers of the Principia. But it is clear 
from his refusal to accept ad hoc explanatory hypotheses 
and from his failure to generate a causal model relying 
solely on the three laws to explain gravity, that his 
only alternatives were to follow either Leibniz or the 
occasionalists: obviously only the latter was open to 
him. This is the source of the interest and the 
relevance of the Correspondence to this section. 
In the following extracts, the dispute is about the 
nature of miracles and about the status of scientific 
laws. Let Leibniz begin: 
If God would cause a body to move free in the 
aether round a certain fixed centre, without any 
other creature acting upon it: I say, it could 
not be done without a miracle; since it cannot 
be explained by the nature of bodies. 
[Alexander <1956), p 30.] 
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Berkeley might not have disagreed with this as it stands. 
However, he would certainly have balked at Leibniz' 
solution, namely, that God created the ultimate 
constituents of reality - monads - in such a way that 
they had from the moment of their creation the power and 
the tendency to develop spontaneously all their future 
states in succession according to God's initial plan, 
without any interaction with other things and without any 
further special action of God. This was the theory of 
the Pre-Established Harmony. This, according to Leibniz, 
ensured the regular, continued, uniform and continued 
operation of the universe. In his attempt to refute 
Leibniz' position, Clarke employed the notion of what it 
is for something to be usual; in other words, he attempts 
to show that a body's continued motion was not miraculous 
because it was perfectly usual and unremarkable. This is 
reminiscent of Malebranche's insistence, already noted, 
on clear and distinct conceptions, and it also looks 
forward to early passages in de Notu. It is worth noting 
that the Correspondence was published in 1717, and that 
de Notu was written in 1720. 
according to a law: 
Usualness is activity 
For a body to move in a circle round a centre in 
vacuo; if it be usual (as the planets moving 
about the sun,) 'tis no miracle, whether it be 
affected immediately by God himself, or 
mediately by any created power: but if it be 
usual, (as, for a heavy body to be suspended, 
and move so in the air,) 'tis equally a miracle, 
whether it be affected immediately by God 
himself, or mediately by any invisible created 
power. [ Alexander <1956) , p 35. J 
Missing the important point - even a monster's 
construction obeys the most general physical laws -
Leibniz replied, 
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The nature of a miracle does not at all consist 
in usualness or unusualness; for then monsters 
would be miracles. [Alexander <1956), p 43.] 
And continued in a later section, 
'Tis also a supernatural thing that bodies 
should attract one another at a distance without 
any intermediate means and that a body should 
move around without receding in the tangent, 
though nothing hinder it from so receding. For 
these effects cannot be explained by the nature 
of things. [Alexander <1956), p 43.] 
The phrase, "cannot be explained by the nature of things" 
indicates that Leibniz was an essentialist: for him, 
explanation must rest on the essential, ie, monadic, 
properties of objects, and ultimately by showing how the 
fact is in accord with the Pre-Established Harmony. So, 
on this view, a body's continued motion is explained when 
and only when this motion is shown to be the inevitable 
consequence of the body's essential properties. 
Clarke did not think that his own understanding of 
"miracle" committed him to the belief that monsters are 
miracles, if what he said about being unusual was true: 
usualness must be included in the notion of a miracle 
because if it were not, natural things, such as planetary 
motion would, indeed, be miraculous; but they are not 
miraculous because they are perfectly usual. That is, 
monsters can be shown to be in accord with the general 
laws of science, even though they are themselves rare 
effects. 
In a later passage, referring to a body in motion round a 
fixed centre, Clarke wrote, 
. . . the means by which two bodies attract each 
other, may be invisible and intangible, and of a 
different nature from mechanism; and yet, acting 
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regularly and constantly, may well be called 
natural, being much less wonderful than animal-
motion, which yet is never called a miracle. 
[Alexander <1956), p 53.] 
Leibniz would have none of Clarke's employment of 
"usualness" in the latter's clarification of "miracle" 
because if the difference between the miraculous and the 
natural is only apparent, sa that we call events 
miraculous only when those events are seldom seen, then, 
there will be no internal real difference, 
between a miracle and what is natural. 
[Alexander (1956), p 91.] 
Clarke said that he could nat understand what Leibniz 
meant by a "real internal difference". In the 
Correspondence, Leibniz defined the miraculous as that 
which surpasses the powers of creatures. But if a thing 
has something dane to it which surpasses its powers, it 
undergoes a state nat built into it at the moment of its 
creation. But haw can this be, if Gad, in choosing its 
states, ie, willing the possible world of which it is a 
member, incorporates at the moment of its creation, 
everyone of its future states? The only alternative is 
that it can have a state nat built into it to its concept 
and Gad can do what is impassible. 
It is nat known whether Leibniz received Clarke's fifth 
reply: it has nat been found among his surviving papers; 
but despite this, Clarke, at least in the published 
correspondence, allowed himself the last ward. With 
regard to an abject's continuing in a regular orbit round 
a fixed centre, he concluded his argument with these 
reflections: 
That this phenomenon is nat produced sans moyen, 
that is without same cause capable of producing 
such an effect; is undoubtedly true. 
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Philosophers therefore may search after and 
discover that cause, if they can; be it 
mechanical, or not mechanical. But if they 
cannot discover the cause; it is therefore the 
effect itself, the phenomenon, or the matter of 
fact discovered by experience, <which is all 
that is meant by the words attraction and 
gravitation,) nevertheless true? Or is a 
manifest quality to be called occult, because 
the immediate efficient cause of it <perhaps) is 
occult, or not yet discovered? ... if in some 
cases [a phenomenon] be not mechanically 
explicable, or be not yet discovered, what that 
something is; does it therefore follow, that the 
phenomenon itself is false? [Alexander (1956), 
p ll8f.] 
This is nothing if not perfectly orthodox Newtonianism: 
surely Newton was peering over Clarke's shoulder when it 
was being written- no talk here of gravity's being 
reified, or of the Principia's being given a realist 
interpretation. This is clear evidence that Berkeley's 
beliefs about Newton are not without distinguished 
precedent. 
Section 11: God and Essences - Further Criticism. 
Another objection to occasionalism can be stated thus: 
States of objects are real causes because they determine 
when, where, in what direction, etc, God is to act; this 
is to say that they determine the precise character of 
his actions. For example, given the impenetrability of 
two objects and that they collide, then their direction 
after the collision must be different to what it was 
prior to it and the resulting change in their direction 
makes one of the bodies the real cause of at least the 
determination of the change in the other. Bayle had 
suggested that either God would stop both bodies, since 
he had no decree concerning the case, and nothing can 
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exist without God's decree, or he would issue an 
appropriate decree on the spot. But neither alternative 
reaches the objection that given their impenetrability 
there is a necessary connection between the state of 
colliding bodies and some future state, whatever that 
state might be. Bayle replied that a real cause must be 
capable of actually producing the effect; and it is this 
and only this that is precluded from the notion of an 
occasional cause - but an occasional cause may still 
determine the real cause, God, to act and in only one 
way. 
What the above objection finally amounts to is that 
occasionalism is incompatible with essential 
characteristics of any sort because .to the extent that a 
thing has essential properties and ceteris paribus 
conditions can be met, it enters into necessary 
connections that limit God's actions, perhaps to a single 
possibility, thus qualifying it as a cause of what God 
produces. 
The weakness of this objection is that any chosen 
consequence may be derived from the conjunction of an 
initial premise and a ceteris paribus clause if the 
ceteris paribus clause is chosen with care. Another 
weakness is that the objection equivocates on the meaning 
of the word "necessary". On the one hand it is necessary 
that the universe behaves in a regular and law-like way -
necessary, that is, if people are going to be able to 
live in it. But does that mean that this or that 
specific law is necessary? If, for example, it is said 
that water could not have been otherwise than that it 
boiled at lOOOC rather that at 125°C unless compensatory 
changes were made in the material world, then an oblique 
appeal is being made to realism. The assumption is that 
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the world is·- more or less - as our theory says it is, 
and that facts about theories reflect facts about the 
world. Berkeley would perhaps say that necessity is a 
feature of language <if it's a feature of anything) not 
of the phenomenal world. Berkeley would cetainly say 
that God could do as he pleases regarding the temperature 
he decides water should boil; we, on the other hand, 
would have to make compensatory changes in our theory. 
If we consider the first alternative, we find that 
without regularity of some sort it would be, given the 
nature of the regularity to be found in this universe, 
useless to plow [sicJ, water, and dispose 
bodies to prepare them for what we hope will 
happen to them. EMalebranche <1980b), p 663.] 
Without some sort of regularity the Universe would be a 
chaos and we could not live in it. This is precisely 
Berkeley's point [see, for example, Principles, pp 86 and 
95-6]. And, further, I do not think Berkeley would have 
balked at denying that impenetrability was an essential 
characteristic of objects; rather, he would say that this 
concept is derived from the observed fact that bodies do 
not occupy the same place. Wheth~r Berkeley would in 
fact have agreed that an object need have no essential 
characteristics, including extension, is hard to say. 
Clearly, our concept of an object includes that of 
extension and this makes extension an essential 
characteristic; so when two objects meet something must 
happen and this seems to limit God. Perhaps Berkeley 
would have said that God need not have created extended 
objects: he could have created us in such a way that we 
dealt directly with the volitions of the divine mind, 
which are non-extended. This may seem a little fanciful, 
but it does offer a way out for Berkeley. 
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Section 12: Origins of Malebranche's Occasionalism. 
It is interesting to note that Descartes was the 
historical source of the ideas which both Newton and 
Malebranche found so suggestive and stimulating. It 
seems that behind de Hotu lie both Newton and 
Malebranche; behind them both lies Descartes, which say 
something of the extent of Descartes's influence- not 
for nothing is he called "the father of modern 
philosophy". He could also be called "the father of 
modern science". 
Although Descartes exerted great influence on 
Malebranche, he denied that occasionalism was true. Yet 
its origins can be detected in some of his early 
writings. This denial took the form of a declaration in 
favour of secondary causes, in whose existence Descartes 
firmly believed. Descartes believed that if God is the 
immediate cause of our sensations, there would be nothing 
to prevent us from thinking of him as a deceiver because, 
we clearly understand this supposed thing to 
be completely distinct, not only from God, but 
also from us or our mind. Moreover, we seem to 
see clearly that the idea of it comes from 
external things, which it perfectly represents; 
and, ... it is completely contrary to God's 
nature to be a deceiver. [Descartes (1983), p 
39.] 
There is more to this argument than there appears to be. 
The fact that our sensations incline us to believe that 
there are material objects whose nature is as we clearly 
and distinctly understand it to be does not in itself 
prove that material objects exist, or that God would be 
deceiving us if they did not. Rather, it is the fact 
that we cannot verify or refute this belief by using our 
reason that would make it a deception if it were untrue: 
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see Principles II, section lx. Many of the beliefs that 
arise from our senses are false according to Descartes 
but these can be known to be false: see for example 
Principles II, sections iii and iv. Yet Descartes could 
write to Princess Elizabeth that it would be contrary to 
God's perfection if something could happen uncaused by 
him: 
God is the universal cause of everything in 
such a way as to be also the total cause of 
everything; and so nothing can happen without 
His will. [Descartes <1970), p 180. J 
We have already noted Bayle's objection to this proof, 
namely that not only must Descartes first demonstrate 
that God exists and that he is trustworthy, but also that 
God has assured us that there are bodies. And this 
Descartes has not done; God would not be a deceiver if 
there were no material bodies: the mistake would be ours, 
not God's. Descartes came especially close to 
occasionalism in his treatment of the problem of the 
communication of substances; that is, the means by which 
a determinate substance communicates one of its modes to 
another such substance. This problem was not a problem 
just about the relation between mind and body, it was a 
problem also about the relation between minds and minds 
and between bodies and bodies. According to Descartes, 
all communication between bodies was by way of impulsion, 
that is, by either pulling or pushing. Now, since motion 
is a mode of a body at a certain time and because 
Descartes accepted the scholastic principle, "Accidentia 
non migrant e substantis in substantias" ("Modes do not 
go from substance to substance"), the question, "How can 
one moving object be the cause of motion in a second 
one?" became accute. If the motion qua mode is not 
numerically identical with the motion qua mode of the 
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second object how can the motion of the first be said to 
be the cause of the motion in the second? 
The translation which I call motion, is a thing 
of no less entity than shape: it is a mode in a 
body. The power causing motion may be the power 
of God Himself conserving the same 'amount of 
translation in matter as he put in it the first 
moment of creation; . . . but because this is not 
easy for every one to understand, I did not want 
to discuss it in my writings. I was afraid of 
seeming inclined to favour the views of thoses 
who consider God as a world-soul united to 
matter. [Descartes <1970), p 257.] 
It is easy to see why a number of thinkers thought that 
Descartes was an occasionalist. 
Section 13: An Important Divergence. 
This section will serve as an introduction to the main 
body of this thesis, namely my treatment of de Jtfotu 
itself. 
An important divergence between Berkeley and Malebranche 
was their conflicting beliefs about human action. 
Berkeley held that all spirits are capable of voluntary 
acts and hence are true causal agents. Malebranche 
denied this: God is the cause of both the determinations 
of our will and the movement of our bodies. 
We know that Malebranche held that causation involved a 
necessary connection and that the mind perceives such a 
connection "only between the will of an infinitely 
perfect being and its effects". Berkeley believed that 
human beings are responsible, some how or other, for the 
motion in their limbs: 
... That there is in [thinking things] the power 
of moving bodies we have learned by personal 
experience, since our mind at will can stir and 
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stay the movement of our limbs, whatever be the 
ultimate explanation of the fact. [DM, p 215-
6.) 
Quite what the "ultimate explanation of the fact" is, 
Berkeley never tells us. And in anycase, how is the view 
reconcilable with holding that bodies are mere 
collections of ideas and that God is the cause of those 
ideas? What does it mean to say that "our minds at will 
can stir and stay the movement of our limbs"? It appears 
to mean no more than that my volition is accompanied by 
certain internal sensations of muscular effort and 
certain visual and tactile sensations of my limbs in 
motion. According to Berkeley, a mind cannot be the 
cause of those muscular, visual and tactile sensations 
because God is the cause of them as he is the cause of 
all ideas of sense. It seems that Berkeley should say 
that minds cause their volitions: this would not remove 
the distinction between Berkeley's view of causation and 
Malebranche's, since it was Berkeley's aim to guarantee 
the liberty of the will - something that is assured if 
minds are able to determine their own choices. 
If Malebranche were right and Berkeley wrong, it would 
mean that we do nothing, that we are lifeless 
instruments, that God does everything in us, that he 
plies our minds and wills as a workman wields his tools 
which can have no motion except that given them by the 
workman. No room here for human agency, decision or 
choice, and this makes a nonsense of any morality; this 
is clearly a positon that is unacceptable to Berkeley. 
Berkeley makes the contrast between the efficacy of the 
human will and the inefficacy of objects an important one 
in de .Motu. According to Berkeley our only knowledge of 
force, effort, etc comes from human physical activity: 
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And, 
solicitation and effort or conation belong 
properly to animate beings alone. When they are 
attributed to other things, they must be taken 
in a metaphorical sense;... Besides, anyone who 
has seriously considered the matter will agree 
that those terms have no clear and distinct 
meaning apart from all affection of the mind and 
motion of the body. [DM, p 211.] 
While we support heavy bodies we feel in 
ourselves effort, fatigue and discomfort. 
p 211. J 
[ DM, 
This effort or force is not itself occult because while, 
Animal effort and corporeal motion are commonly 
regarded as symptoms and measures of this Occult 
quality, [DM, p211.J 
the terms "force", etc, 
have no clear and distinct meaning apart 
form all affection of the mind and motion of the 
body. [DM, p 211.J 
In other words the term "force" is not the name of some 
unobservable mental cause of human effort and human 
action; it is the name we give to human motion and to 
certain dispositions or attributes of mind. The term 
"force" in its non-metaphorical and concrete sense means 
no more than the effort involved in resisting, pushing, 
etc. When I make an effort pushing a heavy object, I 
experience force not as a cause but as an effect of the 
effort I make: "force" is the name I give to certain 
muscular sensations and to certain visual and tactile 
sensations of motion. This inner experience of force 
will be repeatedly contrasted with physical force which 
is nothing over and above a body's motion. It is useful 
for scientists to attribute force to objects in the same 
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way that we attribute agency to the human mind; this 
enables them to explain why one object can apparently 
push another one out of its way. This last remark 
contains the seeds of the problem which Berkeley was 
anxious to clear up in de Notu. 
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Section 1: Introduction. 
Every year the Academie Royal des Sciences ran an essay 
competition whose subject was a scientific topic: in 1720 
the subject of the essay was motion - in response, 
Berkeley wrote de Motu Sive Principia & Natura et de 
Causa CoJD1Ilunicationis Motuum. Berkeley's first editor, A 
C Fraser, found no evidence of the essay's being 
submitted. Possibly, Berkeley did not think it worth 
entering the competition: his anti-realist, pro-Newtonian 
views would not have endeared him to many scientist or 
philosophers on the continent at that time. It is 
somewhat ironic that the then permanent secretary, 
Bernard le Bovier de Fontanelle - a Frenchman and a 
Cartesian - would be the first biographer of Newton. In 
any event, the prize was won by M Crousaz, professor of 
philosophy at Lausanne. Because the competition was an 
international one, de Notu was written in Latin. It was 
published by Berkeley in Latin in 1721 but it was not 
translated into English until A A Luce did so for his 
1948 edition of Berkeley's complete works. 
Section 2: The Structure of de Motu. 
Berkeley's de Motu is written in seventy-two numbered 
paragraphs and divides naturally into five parts. The 
first part, paragraphs 1 to 18, deals with the construal 
of scientific language; the second, 19 to 34, with the 
origins of motion; the third, paragraphs 35 to 42, with 
mechanical principles; the fourth, paragraphs 43 to 65, 
with the nature of motion; and the fifth, paragraphs 66 
to 72, with the communication of motion. 
The first four parts form a coherent and structured 
whole; the third part is central and the first, second 
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and fourth parts relate to it directly. The fifth part 
does not so relate to it and seems to have been added as 
an afterthought. I have two reasons for saying this: 
a) the first paragraph of the fourth part 
<paragraph 65) is a summary of the preceding 
four parts, not just of part four itself; 
and, 
b) in the first four parts, Berkeley elaborates 
the thesis that explanation need not be 
causal, ie, need not involve impulsion. 
I do not think that a) is either problematical or 
controversial: it is, I think, clearly true. But b) is 
more complicated than that; as we have seen, _to many 
mechanical philosophers on the continent the thesis 
expressed in the first fou~ parts would be absurd - all 
explanation had to be in terms of impulsive causation and 
demonstrate that events were inevitable. Hence, in the 
fifth part, Berkeley argued that the account developed in 
the first four sections holds equally against the 
apparently unproblematic cases involving impulsion. Is 
this the reason why Berkeley did not submit de Notu, that 
the fifth part would have been unacceptable to the 
competion judges, all of whom, we may assume, were well 
schooled in Cartesian physics? I think that this is very 
probable; Berkeley knew he had not got a winning formula 
- after all, the Principles had already received ·an 
unsympathetic reception from continental critics. The 
reviewer in the Nemoires de Trevoux for May, 1713 said: 
Berkley [sic] ... has pushed without discretion 
the principles of his sect greatly beyond common 
sense, ... [Quoted in Bracken <1965), p 16; 
italics mine. J 
Things got worse; by 1718 Fenelon wrote, in his Oeuvres 
Philosophiques, 
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A philosophy directly opposite to [Spinoza's] 1 
has been taking its place for some years past. 
The English book of one Berkey [sic] 1 has 
published these new attempts at incredulity. 
The blasphemous of this sect say not that all is 
matter; they say all is spirit. [Quoted in 
Braken <1965), p 26.] 
No wonder Berkeley did not enter de .Motu in the 
competition! 
Section 3: The General Thrust of Berkeley's Argument. 
Berkeley begins the Principles with an analysis of 
language: he does the same at the beginning of de Motu, 
opening, and note the Baconian spirit of this emphasis, 
with this warning: 
In the pursuit of truth we must beware of being 
misled by terms which we do not rightly 
understand. That is the chief point.... It is 
not so difficult to observe, where sense, 
experience, and geometrical reasoning obtain, as 
is especially the case in physics. Laying aside 
all prejudice, whether rooted in linguistic 
usage or in philosophical authority, let us fix 
our gaze on the very nature of things. For no 
one's authority ought to rank so high as to set 
a value on his words and terms unless they are 
found to be based on clear and certain fact. 
[DM, p211.J 
Berkeley _is doing two things here. First, he is drawing 
our attention to the danger of assuming that there are 
theoretical entities corresponding to the theoretical 
names used in science, much as he had done in the 
Principles where he points out that abstract general 
names do not name abstract entities. Second, Berkeley is 
suggesting the possibility of a linguistic analogy with 
Descartes' clear and distinct ideas: if a clear and 
distinct understanding of terms such as, eg, "force", 
"gravity", "solicitation of gravity", "conatus", 
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"effort", "attraction", "dead force", and "living force" 
can be achieved, then muddles can be avoided. And of 
course if no such understanding is possible, then such 
terms must be eliminated. There is here a point of 
further comparison with the Principles: that, too, was 
written with the intention of eliminating muddles from 
human knowledge. When the terms have been reduced to 
"clear and certain fact", Berkeley will show that the 
above terms mean nothing over and above "motion", 
"moving", "moved" and "rest": a problem about theoretical 
terms becomes a problem about abstract ones. 
paragraph 3, Berkeley states his thesis: 
In de Notu, 
Besides, anyone who has seriously considered the 
mattter will agree that those terms have no 
clear and distinct meaning apart from all 
affection of the mind and motion of the body. 
[ DM, p 211. J 
Evidently, "effort" or "force" when used by physicists 
has a meaning different to the one it is when used by 
some one discussing human endeavour: such terms, he 
reminds us, 
belong properly to animate beings alone. 
When attributed to other things, they must be 
taken in a metaphorical sense. [DM, p 211.] 
What exactly this "metaphorical sense" is I will attempt 
to show later; but for the moment we should note the 
important point, which Berkeley is making, that even when 
applied to human mental activity a term like "force" does 
not refer to some occult mental item or entity, but to 
human dispositions and motion itself: 
Force ... is attributed to bodies; and that word 
is used as if it meant a known quality, and one 
distinct from motion, figure, and every other 
sensible thing and also from every affection of 
the living thing. But examine the matter more 
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closely and you will agree that such force is 
nothing but an occult quality. [DM, p 212.] 
And concludes that, 
Animal effort and corporeal motion are commonly 
regarded as symptoms and measures of this occult 
quality. [DM, p212.J 
Berkeley is saying, rightly in my view, that objects do 
not have dispositions to act; to say that objects have 
such dispositions is to speak metaphorically, and 
philosophers should avoid metaphor; the failure to 
observe this injunction results in "darkening works 
otherwise very learned" by a misconstral of scientific 
terms. How has this misconstrual come about? 
Section 4: Source of the Muddle. 
Berkeley's answer to the question asked at the end of the 
last section is that a number of physicists were guilty 
of making the referent of theoretical terms real 
substantial entities which are the cause and therefore 
the explanation of the observed phenomena: 
While we support heavy bodies we feel in 
ourselves effort, fatigue and discomfort. We 
perceive also in heavy bodies falling an 
accelerated motion towards the centre of the 
earth; and that is all the senses tell us. By 
reason, however, we infer that there is some 
cause or principle of these phenomena, and that 
is popularly called gravity. But since the 
cause of the fall of heavy bodies is unseen and 
unknown, gravity in that usage cannot properly 
be styled a sensible quality. It is, therefore, 
an occult quality. But what an occult quality 
is, or how any quality can act or do anything, 
we can scarcely conceive - indeed we cannot 
conceive. And so men would do better to let the 
occult quality go, and attend only to the 
sensible effects. Abstract terms <however 
useful they maybe in arguments) should be 
discarded in meditation, and the mind should be 
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fixed on the particulars and the concrete, that 
is, on the things themselves. [DM, p 2llf.] 
The basic import of this passage is right: physicists 
infer - infer to the best explanation - that the 
unobservable realm that they postulate to explain the 
observable realm is as their theory says that it is 
because their theory successfully explains the observable 
realm. This amounts to the claim that the unobservable 
realm is described truly by their theory; so, if we say a 
theory explains, we must also say it is true. 
Section 5: Against Inferring to the Best Explanation. 
Berkeley says, in effect, that to have good reasons for 
accepting a theory is not ipso facto to have good reasons 
for asserting that the entities, namely gravitational and 
impulsive forces, postulated by mechanics do exist as 
separate substantial entities. The realists had argued 
as follows: motion we experience as something originating 
within ourselves, that is, within us as a force that 
causes motion in our limbs; we infer that all motion, 
whether of animate beings or not, is also the result of 
such a force; regarding animate beings that are also 
articulate we can ask of them if their movement was 
forceful or not. Hence, in those cases involvng human 
beings, we can ascertain, independently of any inference, 
the truth of our belief that forces explain t-his or that 
human movement. The canons of rational inference, eg, 
consistency, simplicity, etc demand that we follow this 
rule everywhere, even when we cannot independently 
ascertain the truth of our inference; and this leads to 
scientific realism. If I say that real forces are 
responsible for the movements of your arm, then I must 
also say that real forces are responsible for the 
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movement of the moon. Berkeley blocks this by pointing 
out that their corresponding terms have, 
no clear and distinct meaning apart from all 
affection of the mind and motion of the body. 
[ DM, p 211. J 
And in any case, motion, being an object of sense, is 
caused by God. As we have seen, we are not obliged to be 
realists about scientific theories if we accept a theory 
as explanatory - being a scientific explanation is no 
great feat; in effect it amounts to no more than "talking 
with the vulgar". According to Berkeley, the analysis of 
scientific explanation reveals that the explanation 
involves an implicit appeal, via the explaining theory's 
fundamental principles or axioms, to known regularities. 
But no appeal need be made to unknown causal qualities or 
entities. Berkeley, in the third and fifth parts of de 
Notu, is concerned to show that to accept theory as 
explanatory does not require that I must accept that the 
entities postulated by it do exist. 
A more persuasive objection against Berkeley might go 
like this: I concede what you say about forces being 
nothing over and above motion, but that does not mean 
that I have to concede that objects themselves are unreal 
because surely I, can still say that if a moving object 
hits another object something must happen. Whatever 
happens must be a consequence of certain essential 
characteristics of the objects themselves; if I say this 
in the context of impulsive causation, then the canons of 
rational inference demand that I say this about all those 
events that I say can be explained. Regarding gravity, 
therefore, I must either postulate a causal mechanism for 
it or say it is an essential characteristic of all 
bodies. Firstly, Berkeley would object that this begs 
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the question; predictions claiming to demonstrate what 
must happen are parasitic upon descriptions of what does 
happen. Secondly, he might object that it is conceivable 
for objects not to gravitate towards one another. This 
is in the case of a universe whose only two objects are 
spinning round a common centre and prevented from moving 
towards that centre by tangential forces; but they can be 
spinning relative only to absolute space. But absolute 
space is an incoherent notion because the arguments for 
it make sense only if the distincton between it and 
relative space is assumed in the first place. 
It may be noted in passing that in one sense Berkeley 
admits that the scientist is right: something is 
responsible for the phenomana of gravity which we see, 
something that ~kes them happen. Berkeley's contention 
is that it is not the job of science to discover what it 
is; rather it is the job of theology and metaphysics. 
But some of the details of the passage quoted in the 
previous section are unclear: is it true that all non-
sensible qualities are occult? And is not Berkeley 
discussing theoretical terms, not abstract ones? 
Answering these questions will be the substance of the 
next section. 
Section 6: Elucidating the Terms. 
Regarding the first question the answer must be, at least 
for Berkeley, yes. 
Sennert in 1632: 
The following was written by Daniel 
Qualities are divided in respect of our 
knowledge into Manifest and Occult. The 
manifest are those which easily, evidently and 
immediately are known to us, and judged by the 
senses. So light in the Stars, and Heaviness 
and Lightness.... But occult or hidden 
qualities are those, which are not immediately 
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known to the senses, but their force is 
perceived mediately by the Effect, but their 
power of acting is unknown. So we see the Load-
Stone draw the Iron, but that power of drawing 
is to hidden and not perceived by the senses .... 
By our Senses ... we perceive Heat in the Fire, 
by means whereof it heats: but it is not so in 
those operations which are performed by occult 
qualities. We perceive the Actions but not the 
qualities whereby they are affected. [Sennert, 
quoted in Hutchison (1982), p 234.] 
Berkeley would doubtless accept the substance of this 
passage: qualities which are occult are insensible by 
definition. But he is also making a stronger claim, 
namely that occult qualities are unintelligible. Which 
is Berkeley more concerned with: the unintelligibility or 
the insensibility of occult qualities? He wants his 
arguments to be based on the unintelligibility of occult 
qualities, but surely occult qualities can be made 
intelligible - we now know why opium sends us to sleep. 
Gravity, too, would be made intelligible if someone could 
devise a causal mechanism that explained how 
gravitational phenomena came about. Berkeley is 
generalizing carelessly from the failure of physicists to 
construct a mechanistic model to the impossibility of all 
such models. In truth, Berkeley is making his esse est 
percipi principle do the work: that which cannot be 
sensed cannot ex~st and cannot do anything. Hence, 
insensibility gives the desired conclusion; but to 
convince his readers he conflates it with a thoroughly 
false and misleading argument about unintelligibility. 
This point is by no means as flippant as it may seem. 
Berkeley, it should be remembered, was writing with a 
continental reader in mind, and one therefore deeply 
schooled in the Cartesian principle of clear and distinct 
ideas and likely, therefore, to accept this sort of 
criticism of occult qualities, though not one employing 
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Berkeley's esse est pricipi principle. Furthermore, it 
should be remebered that the controversy between the 
Newtonians and those accusing Newton of re-introducing 
occult qualities into physics had just reached a zenith 
with the publication of the Leibniz-Clarke 
Correspondence. Leibniz and most philosopher-scientists 
rejected Newton's notion of gravity as unintelligible 
because he did not construct a mechanical hypothesis to 
explain it. Newton's response to this was: "Hypotheses 
non fingo" and promptly to demolish their vortical 
hypotheses by demonstrating that such hypothese did not 
have the appropriate observational consequences. To 
Newton, however, intelligibility of this sort was not 
essential provided gravity satisfied other criteria, 
notably that the phenomena had been reliably detected, 
accurately measured and admitted of mathematical 
presentation. Clarke, insisting that observed effects 
must be accepted, even if their causes are unknown, 
replied to Leibniz' charge that gravity is a "chimerical 
thing, a scholastic occult quality", with a rhetorical 
question which allows the possibility that gravity may 
have an occult cause: 
[Is) a manifest quality to be called ... occult 
because the immediate efficient cause of it 
Cperhaps) is occult? [Alexander C1956), p 119.) 
Clearly, an epistemic separation is being insisted on 
between a discussion of effects and a discussion of 
causes; it is being maintained that one can detect 
effects reliably, whether or not one knows what the 
efficient cause is. 
Berkeley was alive to the unintelligibility aspect of 
"gravity" when construed as some causally efficacious 
entity, and to the dangers of so construing it: 
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force, gravity, and terms of this sort are 
more often used in the concrete (and rightly so) 
so as to connote the body in motion, the effect 
of resisting, etc. But when they are used by 
philosophers to signify certain natures carved 
out and abstracted from all these things, 
natures which are not objects of sense, nor can 
be grasped by any force of intellect, nor 
pictured by the imagination, then indeed they 
breed errors and confusion. EDM, p 212.] 
Note how he weaves considerations of intelligibility and 
insensibility together. Furthermore, 
nothing enters the imagination which from 
the nature of the thing cannot be perceived by 
sense, since indeed the imagination is nothing 
else than the faculty which represents things 
either actually existing or at least possible. 
( DM, p 222. J 
But the real crux of the matter is yet to come: if the 
cause of gravity is forsworn, is not explanation forsworn 
also? Berkeley thought not, as we will see when we come 
to look at at what he wrote concerning mechanical 
principles, in the third part of de Hotu. But first we 
will see Berkeley's methods in action against some of the 
problems that were current when he was writing. 
Section 7: The Force of Percussion. 
The problem raised in de Notu, paragraph 9, and discussed 
further in paragraphs 10, 11 and 14, is the problem of 
how to measure the force of a hammer striking a nail; no 
matter how large the nail is, the hammer will always 
produce some noticeable effect. Yet if a heavy weight is 
placed on the nail, the weight would need to be very 
heavy indeed, if it is to produce the same effect. Is 
the weight the measure of the force? No, because if the 
nail receives a similar hammer blow, another similar 
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effect will be observed; but if the weight is taken off 
and replaced on the nail, no effect like the first will 
be observed. 
The source of Berkeley's interest in this problem is that 
its central issues- as articulated in Galilee's 
experiments [Galilee (1974)] -all impinge on Berkeley's 
central concern: the construal of scientific terms. 
Here, as always, the general import of Berkeley's 
treatment of this subject is that facts about theories do 
not entail facts about the world. 
This problem, known as "The problem of the force of 
percussion", had had its origins in the works of Borelli, 
Torricelli, Mariette and Huygens, all of whom had written 
about the problem. But historically the most important 
is Galilee. Galilee made and described several 
experiments, some actual and some thought, that were 
aimed at the discovery of the force of a body in motion. 
All his experiments revolved around the attempt to 
compare this force with the pressure of a weght at rest, 
hoping thereby to measure the force of percussion. 
Galilee's experiments regarding the force of percussion 
are described in "On the Force of Percussion" [Galilee 
<1974)], in which Galilee tries, unsuccessfully, to find 
"the means of finding and measuring its great force" 
[Galilee C1974), p 323]. A large part of the discussion 
is give over to proving this dictum: The force of 
percussion is infinitely great. Some of the experiments 
described are very elegant and include experiments with a 
water balance, a pile driver, two suspended spheres, and 
two weights joined by a chord and then hung over a 
triangular prism. Galilee's arguments are similar to 
those he employed in the proof of what is now known as 
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Newton's first law. In should be noted in passing that 
Galileo's concept of inertia is different to Newton's. 
Galileo wrote: 
all external impediments being removed, a 
heavy body being placed on a sherical surface 
concentric with the earth will be indifferent to 
rest or to movement towards any part of the 
horizon. And it will remain in that state in 
which it has onced been placed; that is, if 
placed in a state of rest it will conserve that; 
and if placed in movement towards the west, for 
example, it will maintain itself in that 
movement. [Galileo, quoted in Drake <1970), p 
251.] 
Note that this is a very limited account of inertia, 
unlike Newton's which is universal in its applicability. 
An experiment yielding the dictum is set up as follows. 
Two balls are suspended from the same point and in such a 
way that the distance between the centre of each and the 
point of suspension is the same; if the smaller if the 
two is allowed to fall along the arc of the circle which 
has as its radius the distance between the centre of the 
balls and their common point of suspension, then no 
matter how small the distance travelled, nor how great 
the difference in the weight of the two balls, the 
smaller ~ill produce some motion in the greater. The 
only weight capable of resisting such a percussive force 
would have to be infinitely great; hence the formula The 
force of percussion, however small, is infinitely great. 
Galileo soon became convinced that he could never 
counteract by a vis mortua (ie, a dead weight), the 
effect of an instantaneous impact. Perhaps the source of 
Galileo's problem is his belief in instantaneous changes 
of velocity which would require infinite forces to 
effect. 
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Section 8; Berkeley's Construal of the Problem. 
Berkeley's problem is to construe the dictum in such a 
way that the scientific enterprise is neither repudiated 
nor shown to be a metaphysical nonsense. 
According to Berkeley the dictum requires those who 
affirm it to suppose that gravity is a real and 
substantial entity distinct from motion and that 
gravitational phenomena are somehow the effect of this 
entity. This supposition is required because, 
a) the ball is stationary yet it resists a 
moving object; and, 
b) it must get this capability from something. 
Why Berkeley believed that gravity rather than inertia is 
be thought of as a real entity, distinct from motion and 
rest, is not clear. 
Because vis mortua is not itself an effect involving 
motion it cannot be, according to Berkeley, a force at 
all. Hence, there is no force for the percussive force 
to be proportional to; for there to be a proportion which 
is neither an infinite nor a zero magnitude requires the 
vis mortua to be something other than motion. I take 
this to be Berkeley's argument in de Notu, paragraph 10: 
there is no dead weight, nor any force at all, because 
there is no motion and force is nothing over and above 
motion itself. So vis mortua cannot be, by definition, a 
force. Furthermore, there can be no ratio of forces, if 
there is only one force. And so, argues Berkeley, vis 
mortua is a non-existent force and not merely a force of 
zero magnitude. That this is Berkeley's view can be seen 
from de Notu, paragraph 14: for_ the ratio to be infinite, 
a finite part must be shown to be contained in the whole 
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an infinite number of times. But the vis mortua/force of 
percussion is not such a relationship because it is a 
finite entity involving a finite movement. As Berkeley 
points out, the relationship is like that existing 
between a point and line: a geometrical point is 
extensionless and can be deemed to fit a line an infinite 
number of times. Berkeley's remark is close to Mach's: 
In reality, therefore, pressure [ie, vis mortua] 
is related to momentum of impact [ie, force of 
percussion] as a line is to a surface. [Mach 
(1893), p 402.] 
Section 9: A Missed Opportunity - Conservation. 
The problem of the force of percussion bears on another 
problem, which was current when Berkeley was writing, 
namely the controversy between the atomists and the 
conservationists. the atomists conceived the ultimate 
constituents of the universe to be perfectly hard and 
indivisisble atoms. That such a conception led to the 
belief in instantaneous changes of velocity and hence in 
infinite forces was cited by the conservatonists as an 
argument against the existence of atoms. It is striking, 
given his views about such entities, that Berkeley did 
not make some use of this argument in de Notu, paragraphs 
9 to 14. And it is even more striking that he did not 
further employ the same argument to attack the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, a 
theoretical basis for which is found in atomism. 
Berkeley does comment on a related problem, namely the 
controversy that existed among the conservationists 
themselves about what it was exactly that was conserved: 
was it quantity of motion or was it vis viva? 
The debate about whether it was qu_anti ty of motion or vis 
viva which was conserved, existed through the seventeenth 
-- 88 --
Berkeley's de Notu Martin Fearnley 
and eighteenth centuries, and principally involved 
Descartes <and his followers) and Leibniz (and his); at 
bottom the dispute was about, 
a) what were the effects produced by a moving 
body when stopped by either gravity or a 
collision? And, 
b) what is the correct measure of a force of a 
body in motion and does the total amount of 
this force in the universe remain the same? 
Descartes argued for the conservation of motion <what is 
now called "momentum") in the Principles, Part II, 36; 
Leibniz replied, arguing for the conservation of vis viva 
(related to what we now call "kinetic energy"), in "A 
Brief Demonstration of a Notable Error of Descartes and 
Others Concerning a Natural La~' [Leibniz C1969a)] and 
in "Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the 
Principles of Descartes." [Leibniz C1969b).] It is not 
known whether Berkeley read either of these works. 
Although it is known that "Critical Thoughts" was written 
in 1692, it is not known when it was published; "A Brief 
Demonstration" was published in the Acta Eruditorum for 
March 1686. Berkeley may have seen this; there is 
evidence in de Notu, paragraph 8, that he had seen at 
least one edition of the Acta: the reference seems to be 
to "Specimen Dynamicum" [Leibniz <1969c)J, which was 
. 
published in 1695. [See for example, p 436f of Leibniz 
C1969c). J 
The controversy is relatively easy to explain today; 
"force of a body in motion" is ambiguous because it can 
be taken to refer to either the momentum or the energy of 
a moving body, and both these quantities are in fact 
conserved. Leibniz sought some active principle that was 
conserved and which therefore prevented the running down 
and eventual halt of the universe. He found this in the 
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vis viva of matter which he measured by the product of 
mass and the square of the velocity; this is the 
conclusion Berkeley criticises in de Notu, paragraph 15. 
Descartes on the other hand insisted that quantity of 
motion, the product of mass and simple, non-vectoral 
speed was the quantity that was conserved. Thus Leibniz 
came close to stating the law of conservation of kinetic 
energy in mechanics, whereas Descartes came close to 
stating the law of the conservation of momentum. Huygens 
and others pointed out that momentum is only conserved 
when considered as a vector quality, and with this one 
correction the conservation of momentum was accepted by 
both sides in the dispute. 
easily accommodated. 
But vis viva was not so 
Section 10; Descartes and Conseryationism. 
Descartes starts his treatment of the conservation of 
motion in the Principles, Part II, 36: 
That God is the primary cause of motion; and 
that he always maintains an equal quantity if 
motion in the universe . 
. . . God Himself, who, in the beginning 
created matter with both movement and rest; and 
now maintains in the sum total of matter, by His 
normal participation, the same quantity of 
motion and rest as He ,placed in it at that time. 
[Descartes <1983), p 57f.] 
It is important to note that by "quantity of motion" 
Descartes does not mean "momentum", ie, the product of 
mass and velocity. Rather, he intends quantity of motion 
to be given by the product of size <or volume) and speed. 
This is, of course, a result of his view that extension 
is the essential property of matter. Thus the behavior 
of bodies should be determined entirely by their 
extension. Descartes' preference for speed over velocity 
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may be a consequence of his belief that the direction in 
which a body is said to be moving depends upon which 
other bodies are considered at rest. Therefore there is 
nothing in the body itself, which enables the body's 
direction of motion to be determined. Descartes 
continues: 
... although motion is only a mode of the matter 
which is moved, nevertheless there is a fixed 
and determinate quantity of it;... [Descartes 
(1983). p 58.) 
From the complete immutability of God's nature and the 
immutability and constancy of the way he acts, Descartes 
could deduce, or thought he could, the belief "completely 
consistent with reason" that, 
... solely because God moved the parts of matter 
in diverse ways when He first created them, and 
still maintains all this matter exactly as it 
was at its creation, and subject to the same law 
as at that time; He also always maintains in it 
an equal quantity of motion. [Descartes <1983), 
p 58.] 
While this may be "completely consistent with reason", it 
clearly does not follow. What follows. even on the most 
generous interpretation, is that the total quantity of 
something must remain constant. Quite what that 
somethi~g is, was the subject of the debate between 
Descartes' followers and those of Leibniz. 
Section 11; Leibniz' Criticism. 
In his criticism of the Principles, Part II, 36, Leibniz 
writes: 
CThe Cartesians] have given no demonstration of 
[the conservation of the quantity of motion), ... 
for no one can fail to see the weaknees of their 
argument derived from the constancy of God. For 
although the constancy of God may be supreme, 
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and he may change nothing except in accordance 
with the laws of the series already laid down, 
we must still ask what it is, after all, that he 
has decreed should be conserved in the series -
whether the quantity of motion or something 
different, such as the quantity of force. 
[Leibniz <1969b), p 393f.J 
Leibniz follows this with a detailed argument aimed at 
establishing that, 
... the quantity of motion is known to be the 
product of mass and velocity, while the quantity 
of force is, ... , the product of mass and the 
altitude to which it can be raised by force of 
its power, altitudes being proportional to the 
square of the velocities of ascent .... 
Meanwhile this rule can be set up: The same 
quantity of force as well as of motion is 
conserved when bodies tend in the same direction 
both before and after their collisions, as well 
as when the colliding bodies are equal. 
[Leibniz <1969b), p 395.] 
Leibniz' acknowledgement that the quantity of motion i~ 
conserved in the case of bodies that do not reverse their 
direction anticipates his own more general principles of 
the conservation of progress, which differs from 
Descartes' principle in considering the algebraic, not 
the arithmetic, sum of motions. 
Leibniz' conclusion in "A Brief Demonstration" can be 
best summarized as follows. Let d be the distance, g a 
gravitational constant, v the velocity, and t the time. 
According to the law of falling bodies, d = *gt2 , but v = 
gt; hence ~ = 2gd, or distances vary as the square of 
the velocities. More generally, Leibniz held that work 
accomplished, measured by the motion of a body through a 
horizontal distance, is proportional to a quantity of 
force accumulating through time and is therefore an 
integral or summation of successive initial impulses 
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whose effects in velocity are conserved and accumulated. 
It is therefore proportional to v"': rather than to v. 
One of the most obvious criticisms that can be-aimed at 
Le~bniz' law of the conservation of vis viva is the 
frequency with which it is apparently violated as in the 
case of inelastic collisions. Leibniz had enough faith 
in his theory to postulate in his correspondence with 
Clarke that motion was retained in the small parts of the 
distorted inelastic body: 
'Tis true, their wholes lose <some force) with 
respect to their total motion, but their parts 
receive it, being shaken internally by the force 
of the concourse. And therefore that loss of 
force is only in appearence. The forces are not 
destroyed but scattered among the small parts. 
The bodies do not lose their forces, but the 
case here is the same as when men change great 
money into small. [Alexander (1956), p 97-88.] 
This view is, in effect, the one that Roger Boscovitch 
developed in his Theoria Philosophia Naturalis 
[Boscovitch <1961)]. 
Section 12; Boscovitch. 
Leibniz' belief that an inelastic body's parts absorb the 
force lost when the body di~torted is the essence of 
Boscovich's theory. According to his theory all matter 
is composed of non-extended mass points; these points 
exert forces on each other which vary with the distance 
between them; at very short distances there is a strong 
force of repulsion which increases to infinity as the 
points are brought together, preventing them from coming 
into contact. As the distance is increased, the force 
alternates between repulsion and attraction and finally 
follows the inverse square law of gravitational 
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attraction for large distances. Boscovitch illustrated 
his theory with his famous curve: 
! Repulsion 
Attrution 
At certain distances where the forces change from 
repulsion to attraction the mass points will be in stable 
equilibrium. Boscovitcb called these distances "points 
of cohesion" (marked "c" on the diagram) and he used them 
to explain cohesion and the structure of matter. Such a 
theory elaborates Leibniz' and produces an explanation of 
bow the motion of bodies in collision can be "scattered 
among the small parts". 
There was no satisfactory model available for explaining 
and demonstrating the conservation of vis viva until 
Boscovitcb invented his system; but even be did not see 
the significance of vis viva to his theory. The law of 
conservation of energy bad to wait until the physicists 
of the nineteenth century established energy equivalents 
in a variety of phenomena and finally established the law 
on the basis of experimental evidence. 
Section 13; Berkeley's Clarification. 
This is the debate about which Berkeley argues, but be 
seems unaware of its full ramifications; nor does be 
participate as a physicist. In de Notu, paragraph 15, 
Berkeley is discussing this controversy. But what is not 
immediately clear is why the opinion of those who hold 
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that forces are proportional to the squares of velocities 
must suppose that "the force of the body is distinguished 
from momentum, motion, and impetus and without that 
supposition it collapses." [DM p 214.] So how does 
Leibniz' view, discussed earlier, require that motion and 
force be distinguished? Berkeley thought that the notion 
of a force being literally conserved or stored - this 
does seem to be how Leibniz thought of it - is repulsive 
since it requires "force" to be the name of a substance 
and something over and above motion itself. What makes 
the conservation of momentum attractive is that it does 
not involve this notion but only the product of two 
figures, ie, m and v <mass times velocity>. What 
Berkeley fails to comment on is whether vis viva must be 
treated in the way Leibniz did; could it not be 
legitimately treated as just a mathematical expression, 
just another mathematical hypothesis? 
Berkeley made no comment on the fact that Descartes' 
rules make no mention of force, but if he thought he had 
settled the dispute in Descartes' favour by eliminating 
Leibniz, he was surely mistaken. If he wants to be 
convincing, he has surely more work _to do. There is 
after all no reason to construe vis viva in the literal 
way in which Leibniz did. 
Section 14: What Does "Gravity" Mean? 
So far Berkeley has told us what "force" does not mean: 
qua abstract term it can mean nothing over and above the 
fact that an object is either moving, in motion, moved or 
at rest; this is true of "gravity" also. But what does 
"gravity" qua theoretical term mean? This is part of his 
answer: 
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Force, gravity, attraction, and terms of this 
sort are useful for reasonings about motion and 
bodies in motion, but not for understanding the 
simple nature of motion itself or for indicating 
so many distinct qualities. As for attraction, 
it was introduced by Newton, not as a true 
physical quality, but only as a mathematical 
hypothesis. CDM p 214.] 
In other words, scientific terms make calculation, 
predicting and explaining motion easier and more precise 
than would otherwise be the case; but they do not reveal 
the truth about motion or name any distinct entities 
causally responsible for motion. To achieve this 
simplicity and precision, a mathematical hypothesis is 
required. A mathematical hypothesis is the attribution 
of a force to an object, the supposition that forces 
reside in objects; this supposition enables the 
physicist to treat a body's motion in a mathematically 
useful way by assigning a number to it and hence give 
the body's mathematicized description a role to play in 
mathematical physics. It is just a methodological 
convenience. But for physics to work, it is not required 
that such forces actually exist; the force that does 
bring about the motion need not be enquired into, at 
least not by physicists. 
Berkeley draws a parallel between this method and the 
composition and resolution of direct forces into an 
oblique one by means of the diagonal and sides of a 
parallelogram. If the force is impressed along the 
sides, the motion will be along the diagonal of the 
parallelogram. But in fact no force is impressed along 
the diagonal. Berkeley is saying that gravitational 
phenomena may be the result of two or more forces; 
indeed, it may even be the result of a non-physical 
force. Of such devices, he says, 
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They serve the purpose of mechanical science and 
reckoning; but to be of service to reckoning and 
mathematical demonstrations is one thing, to set 
forth the nature of things is another. CDM 
p 214.] 
The remainder of Berkeley's answer is an attempt to block 
the objection that if this is true, then science can no 
longer give explanations, but must henceforth confine 
itself to describing what does happen. Berkeley does not 
complete his answer here but waits until the third part 
of de Hotu which deals with mechanical principles. For 
the moment his principle concern is to tell us what 
theoretical terms are not, and this he continues to do in 
the second part of de Hotu where he considers what the 
origin of motion can be and is. 
Section 15: What Can and Cannot Cause Motion. 
Early in de Notu, Berkeley writes, 
Solicitation and effort or conation belong 
properly to animate beings alone. When they are 
attributed to other things the must be taken in 
a metaphorical sense. CDM p 211.] 
How "metaphorical sense" is to be interpreted will be 
discussed when I come to deal with the third part of de 
Hotu; the non-metaphorical usage suggests that only a 
mind, a soul or a spirit can be the source of motion, and 
that a body cannot. This is the topic which he takes up 
now. 
In paragraph 21, Berkeley makes the time honoured 
distinction: 
. . . there are two supreme classes of things, 
body and soul. [DM p 215.] 
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The strategy in this part is clear: after reiterating the 
statement that all that is true about motion is what can 
be perceived about it, and that all things belong to one 
of two classes, he establishes that body is passive, our 
idea of it containing nothing in it that could be active 
or an origin of motion. Hence, the origin and cause of 
motion must be minds, soul or spirit, and the origin and 
cause of motion in the world is God. 
argument against body thus: 
Berkeley starts his 
All that which we know to which we have given 
the name body contains nothing in itself which 
could be the principle of motion or its 
efficient cause; for impenetrability, extension, 
and figure neither include nor connote any power 
of producing motion; nay, on the contrary, if we 
review singly those qualities of body, and 
whatever other qualities there may be, we shall 
see that there are all in fact passive and there 
is nothing active in them which can in any way 
be understood as the source and principle of 
motion. [DM p 215). 
This is the same point Berkeley made ten years earlier in 
the Principles: 
All our ideas, sensations, or the things which 
we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be 
distinguished, are visibly inactive, there is 
nothing of power or agency included in them. So 
that one idea or object of thought cannot 
produce, or make any alteration in another. 
[Principles p 84.) 
So body is not the cause or origin of motion; what of 
mind? 
Besides corporeal things there is the other 
class, viz. thinking things, and that there is 
in them the power of moving bodies we have 
learned by personal experience, since our minds 
at will can stir and stay the movement of our 
limbs, whatever be the ultimate explanation of 
the fact. This is certain that bodies are moved 
at the will of the mind, and accordingly the 
mind can be called, correctly enough, a 
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principle of motion, a particular and 
subordinate principle indeed, and one which 
itself depends on the first and universal 
principle. [DM p 215f.J 
But whose mind is responsible for the observed events? 
Not mine, surely: 
Plato [affirms] that this corporeal machine, or 
visible world, is moved and animated by a mind 
which eludes all sense.... Cartesian 
philosophers recognize God as the principle of 
natural motions. And Newton everywhere frankly 
intimates that not only did motion orginate from 
God, but that still the mundane system is moved 
by the same actus. [DM p 217.] 
No doubt Plato, Newton and the Cartesians did say what 
Berkeley claims they did, but this appeal to authority is 
no argument - and indeed as far as de Kotu is concerned 
there is no argument for the conclusion that there must 
be a universal spiritual cause of motion, namely God. 
The argument can be supplied from the Principles; it is a 
variation of Berkeley's passivity argument: 
a) I, that is, my mind qua agent, did not bring 
about the phenomenal events I am now 
experiencing. 
b) The occurance of any phenomenal event must 
be brought about by some mind. 
Therefore, 
c) Phenomenal events are brought about by some 
mind other than mine. 
That this conclusion falls sadly short of Christian 
monotheism need hardly be stated. Berkeley in all 
probability did not seriously think that his conclusion 
required detailed comment: that God exists as universal 
agent was just a fundamental assumption of Berkeley's 
thinking; this was also a fairly wide spread assumption 
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anyway. So Berkeley's argument is in large measure an ad 
hominem argument: What need has God of intermediaries? 
None. In that case do not postulate them. Hence, forces 
or ~terial bodies do not exist as separate mind 
independent entities. It is interesting to note, in 
passing, that in the paragraphs of the Principles dealing 
with the passivity argument, the argument from design is 
also dealt with, though not fully. But it is extremely 
curious that that argument is not appealed to, or even 
alluded to, in de Notu as an argument for the existence 
of God. He may have thought that the argument was too 
obvious to need stating; that would be consistent with 
God's existence being a fundamental assumption. The 
passivity argument is not at all worked out in full 
because it proceeds via a refutation of material 
substance and was therefore hardly likely to win much 
support in France where the mechanical philosophy of 
Descartes was still very influential, and where 
Berkeley's idealism had already received an unsympathetic 
reception. 
But all we need to remember in this section is that 
motion requires an agent that must be a mind, and that 
objects cannot be initiators of motion. 
Section 16; The Origins of Our Knowledge. 
After Berkeley has discussed the cons~rual of scientific 
knowledge <part one of de Notu) and the origin of motion 
<part two>, he discusses what he calls the mechanical 
principles. In this part, Berkeley blocks the objection 
that what he has said hitherto entails that science must 
be rejected because it does not assign the efficient 
mechanical causes of events and cannot therefore explain 
those events. Berkeley now turns his attention to this 
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problem via a treatment of the origin of our knowledge 
about motion. In the Latin original, Berkeley makes a 
play on words, which is lost in translation: in 
"principium motus", "principium" means "origin or cause"; 
but in "principia mathematica physicae", "principia" 
means "principles". Berkeley is suggesting that 
explanations fundamentally rest on, originate with, the 
mechanical principles: 
in mechanical philosophy those are to be 
called principles, in which the whole discipline 
is grounded and contained, those primary laws of 
motion which have been proved by experiment, 
elaborated by reason and rendered universal. 
These laws of motion are conveniently called 
principles, since from them are derived both 
general mechanical theorems and particular 
explanations of the phenomena. [DM p 218.] 
I think it is clear that by principles Berkeley means 
Newton's three laws and the mathematical law about 
gravity <cf de Hotu, paragraph 69). 
Berkeley is anxious to rebut the Cartesian charge that 
Newtonian physics is not explanatory: gravity qua 
mathematical hypothesis simply cannot explain. According 
to Cartesians, mechanical explanation has to be given in 
terms of of efficient causation which involve knowing, by 
definit;i.on, what actually made the event take place; and 
so the extent to which Newtonian mechanics does not 
supply that knowledge is the extent to which it is not 
explanatory. Since it does not supply it at all, it must 
be rejected. Berkeley rejects this view on the grounds 
that it is not the business of science to give that sort 
of explanation in any case; such explanations are the 
province of metaphysics, theology and morality. The aim 
of science is to establish the rules of impulsion and 
attraction, that is, the fundamental laws of motion with 
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which particular events can be explained. The phrase 
"primary laws of motion, which have been proved by 
experiment, elaborated by reason and rendered universal" 
echoes something Newton wrote in the General Scholium: 
In this philosophy particular propositions are 
inferred from the phenomena and afterwards 
rendered general by induction. [Newton <1729), 
p 547.] 
And note the very next sentence: 
Thus it was that the impenetrability, the 
mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and 
the laws of motion and.of gravitation, were 
discovered·. [Newton (1729), p 547.] 
So much for the Cartesian view that mechanics is an a 
priori science! 
Section 17: Cause and Explanation. 
It is clear that Berkeley does not believe that only so-
called causes can explain; he also believes that non-
causal reasons can explain. But now Berkeley does 
something rather clever by introducing, by implication at 
least, his notion of a cause as thing that signifies an 
effect <the thing signified): 
A thing can be said to be explained mechanically 
. . . when it is reduced to those most simple and 
universal principles.... For once the laws of 
nature have been found out, then it is the 
philosopher's task to show that each phenomena 
is in constant conformity with those laws, that 
is, necessarily follows from those principles. 
In that consists the explanation and solution of 
phenomena and the assigning their cause, ie, the 
reason why they take place. [DM p 218f.l 
Hence, a particular event bas been explained when it bas 
been reduced to the fundamental mechanical principles and 
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shown to be in agreement with them. Interestingly, 
"reduco", here translated as "reduce", means "to lead or 
take back to origins". From this it follows that a 
scientific explanation can go no further than the 
mechanical principles; for an explanation of them one has 
to go outside physics- the scientist's job is merely to 
demonstrate that each phenomenon is in strict accordance 
with the mechanical principles. 
Berkeley has reached this point very quickly; the 
business of science is not to discover the efficient 
causes of things but to formulate the the fundamental 
laws or axioms of mechanical science with which physical 
events accord. By using these mechanical laws or axioms, 
mechanics locates not the efficient cause of an event, 
but the sign that signified it. In order to explain, 
that is, to give reasons why an event took place, an 
appeal is made to fundamental scientific laws or axioms; 
from these, a non-causal explanation is derived. This 
derivation makes it possible to isolate a specific item 
or event as the reason for the occurance of some other 
item or event; this specific event or item is called, by 
the vulgar at least, a "cause". In other, Berkeleyan, 
words, it is the sign that signified the event. To give 
a "causal" expanation means to isolate the sign that 
signifies; but a scientific explantion involves knowledge 
of the fundamental laws or axioms. 
Berkeley is here expanding his theory of causation to 
accommodate those aspects of mechanics not dealing with 
impulsive causation, ie, gravity. <He will make some 
critical remarks about impulsion in the last paragraphs 
of de Motu. ) His next step is to show how science has 
come to be thought of as explanatory: 
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The human mind delights in extending and 
expanding its knowledge; and for this purpose 
general notions and propositions have to be 
formed in which particular propositions and 
cognitions are in some way comprised, which 
then, and not till then, are believed to be 
understood. EDM p 219.] 
The phrase "are believed to be understood" is surely 
significant; coupled with what he has already said about 
inferring to the best expalanation and what he says 
towards the end of de Hotu, he draws an interesting 
conclusion: 
The scientist studies the series or successions 
of sensible things, noting by what laws they are 
connected, and in what order, what precedes as 
cause, and what follows as effect. And on this 
method we say that that body in motion is the 
cause of motion in the other, and impresses 
motion on it, draws it also or impels it. EDM p 
227.] 
Again, surely the phrase "And on this method we say that 
the body in motion is the cause" is significant. 
Berkeley is drawing our attention to the fact that we use 
the word "explanation" in two ways. On the one hand, we 
think of scientific theories and concepts as explanatory 
because specific phenomena are shown to be in accord with 
increasingly general concepts, that is, shown to be 
examples of a general rule or law of nature; this is just 
a fact about the way we use language and about the way we 
use the word "explanation". This is the point of the 
remark about human understanding requiring general 
concepts. In this connection note what he wrote in the 
Principles: 
EThe] mutual tendency towards each other, which 
[the philosopher] denotes by the general name 
attraction, whatever can be reduced to that, he 
thinks justly accounted for. [Principles p 
109.] 
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Note that Berkeley does not write "is justly accounted 
for", but "thinks justly accounted for". But the truth 
or falsity of scientific theories need not arise, and 
indeed Berkeley will say that this is because they are 
not capable of being true or false. Part of the reason 
why such an explanation will satisfy a questioner is that 
there is about such expalanations an air of necessity; 
but it is a gross mistake to think that this necessity is 
anything more than verbal necessity or that there is 
anything in the world corresponding to this necessity, 
which makes events themselves inevitable. 
On the other hand, there is a sense of explanation - and 
this is thinking with the learned - that does involve an 
appeal to efficient causation, principally in connection 
with God being the true and efficient cause of the 
regular succession of phenomena which we see. But 
efficient causation is not the province of science but of 
metaphysics, theology, and morality. <By "morality" I 
take Berkeley to mean not only the collection of 
principles that guide our actions, but also the treatment 
of the relationships between the will of a spirit and the 
associated bodily actions, what we would now call "action 
theory".) 
Section 18: A Linguistic Model. 
So far Berkeley has discussed several important concepts: 
explanation, making intelligible, understanding, 
assigning causes, giving reasons why, laws, and a number 
of other related concepts. 
Berkeley's thoughts on these topics can be made clearer 
if we use his language-model of physical reality: 
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... I think we may fairly conclude that the 
proper objects of vision constitute an universal 
language of the Author of Nature, whereby we are 
instructed how to regulate our actions in order 
to attain those things that are necessary to the 
well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid 
whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. 
It is by this information that we are 
principally guided in all the transactions and 
concerns of life. [NTV p 51f.] 
As a sentence unfolds according to syntactical 
principles, so phenomena develop according to special 
syntactical ones: the mechanical philosophy. Prose is a 
web of syntactical relations, while the whole of 
phenomena is a web of relations capable of being 
described in the language of mechanical science. 
Berkeley is suggesting that science does not need hidden 
entities to account for phenomena but can give a 
perfectly adequate account by establishing an inferential 
pattern among events. These patterns are not the result 
of an underlying causal mechanism, any more than the 
inferential pattern of, say, ancient Greek is the result 
of an underlying causal mechanism. This is the 
importance and relevance of the language model in 
Berkeley's conception of science: science is just the 
description or verbal embodiment of the set rules or laws 
according to which a wise and benevolent spirit directly 
produces ideas in us. 
Berkeley's model can be amplified as follows. A passage 
of Greek written in Plato's time would have been written 
entirely in capitals with neither gaps between the words 
nor any form of punctuation. There would be no words in 
this passage until they were read into it; this is to 
say, there would have been no already individuated 
linguistic units because there would be no gaps in the 
text to indicate the beginning and end of the words. 
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Suppose we have such a text before us now; then unless we 
can read the language we will not be able to individuate 
the words; our knowledge of Greek will help us to chop up 
the text into its various linguistic units, and show how 
the verbs, adverbs, nouns, clauses, etc relate to each 
other in a coherent and structured whole. Likewise, the 
mechanical philosophy will enable us to chop up physical 
reality into its individual units and discover what each 
unit's role is in the coherent and structured whole we 
call reality. We do not say that these units must 
actually exist, rather we say that they represent the 
most convenient way to chop up reality. The knowledge 
required to understand the Greek text is a knowledge of 
Greek grammar expressed in a suitable technical language; 
to explain is to show the relation between the individual 
word <the explanandum> and the remainder of the passage 
via the grammar of the Greek language. For the purpose 
of Berkeley's analogy, the semantics of ancient Greek is 
irrelevant; it is enough that a word can be shown to be a 
noun or a verb, etc. 
If a particular word is out of place - it makes no sense 
where it is - we have the linguistic equivalent of a 
rogue phenomenon. We can, by appealing to the grammar, 
say why, and what sort of word should have been used and 
'Why; aided by our knowledge of the grammar we can point 
to specific syntactical features of the passage and point 
to specific clues, or, as Berkeley might have said, to 
signs which make the replacement word the correct sort to 
use. All this we can do because we have a fairly precise 
knowledge of Greek grammar expressed in a suitable 
technical language. To make the parallel perfect, the 
grammar would need to be axiomatized. Berkeley could not 
be aware of the difficulties that have been encountered 
in trying to axiomtize natural languages: we can see that 
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while "brittle yolk" is not ungrammatical, it is still 
not good English and it is difficult to see how a purely 
axiomatic approach to grammar could generate, without 
reference to semantics, only good English. This problem 
need not be fatal to Berkeley's intention, indeed, it may 
have just the opposite effect: I take this problem to be 
parallel to the problem of the empirical import of 
Newton's three laws. 
Berkeley is saying that mechanics is the expression in a 
suitable technical language of the grammar of the 
universe; that the way God goes about ordering phenomena 
embodies the mechanical principles and even that his will 
is identical to these basic principles. This throws 
further light on some of the problematic passages which 
seem to identify reason and cause, namely de Xotu, 
paragraphs 36 and 71; this is consistent with the belief 
that Berkeley was influenced by Malebranche who came to 
the same conclusion. 
Berkeley's language model gives him the basis of his 
account of a law's nomic necessity. Just as a sentence 
develops according to grammatical rules, so phenomenal 
events unfurl in accordance with Newtonian mechanics; 
certain events ought to happen or not to happen, that is, 
we can derive as conseqeuences of Newtonian mechanics, 
descriptions of certain events and these we say could 
happen; other descriptions cannot be so derived and these 
we say cannot happen. So, in ancient Greek we can say 
that a certain word ought to have been used or ought not 
to have been used, that is, we can derive as consequences 
of Greek grammar <hopefully axiomatized by now) certain 
words and sentences and these we say make good sense and 
preserve the text's intelligibility; other words and 
-
sentences cannot be so derived and these we say make no 
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sense in this context or at all. I do not deny that 
there are ways in which nature fails to be a language; 
there is, as has already been observed, no semantics, 
except in as far as nature speaks as a whole of its 
author. But it is a legitimate move to construct a model 
suitable to the immediate task and preserve those 
features that are useful and discard those that are not. 
There are a number of ways in which gases fail to be 
ideal, yet much of thermodynamics is an attempt to bring 
data into agreement with equations based on the ideal gas 
model. 
What does Berkeley mean when he writes "assigning their 
causes, ie, the reason why they take place"? [DM p 219.] 
A cause is a reason for an event taking place but it does 
not follow from this that all reasons are causal. It is 
easy to see how, in the case of tides, the moon may be 
thought of as being a reason for tidal phenomena, because 
these phenomena can be reduced to the fundamental laws of 
Newtonian mechanics and the inverse square law. This 
being so, we are able to to pick out the moon as the most 
significant feature in the matrix of events that admit of 
a mechanical description. This is how we have come to 
think of the moon as a cause of tidal phenomena. But 
this is not thinking with the learned, this is talking 
with the vulgar. Causes, properly so called, are the 
provenance of metaphysics, not physics; secondary causes, 
such as the moon, can be thought of as causes because the 
mechanical principles pick them out as the most 
significant; it can do this because the mechanical 
principles are founded on regularities. To point to the 
moon as a cause is to make a tacit appeal to these 
regularities as the validating basis of mechanics; to 
this extent and only to this extent are mechanical 
explanations true (cf de Hotu, paragraph 71). 
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But if the assumption made earlier is correct and 
Berkeley does identify the fundamental laws or axioms 
with God's most general volitions then there is an even 
stronger sense in which reason and cause are identified. 
This identification is not damaging to Berkeley's anti-
necessitarian position; all it means is that having 
decided to make a world that can be understood by us, God 
must do things in a settled and regular manner - he is, 
of course, under no obligation to do so. 
this view can be seen in the Principles: 
Something of 
. . . though the fabrication of all those parts 
and organs be not absolutely necessary to the 
producing any affect, yet it is necessary to the 
producing of things in a constant, regular way, 
according to the Laws of Nature. [Principles 
p 95.] 
Section 19: "Force" as Metaphor. 
I mentioned earlier Berkeley's suggestion that the word 
"force" when used of corporeal objects is used in a 
metaphorical sense: I am now going to elaborate 
Berkeley's rather meagre hints and try to establish what 
exactly he means by "metaphorical". And from the outset, 
I would like to aknowledge my indebtedness in what 
follows to Lawrence Mirarchi [Mirarchi <1982)]. 
If force in all its guises is neither an essential 
attribute of matter, nor a primary quality of objects, 
nor some occult mechanism, then what is it and how is the 
word "force" to be construed? One part of the answer is 
to construe "force" in the instrumental sense of what 
Berkeley, following Newton's usage in the Principia, 
called a "mathematical hypothesis": 
Force, gravity, attraction, and terms of this 
sort are useful for reasonings and reckonings 
about motion and bodies in motion, but not for 
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the understanding the simple nature of motion 
itself. [DM p 214. J 
In other words, the above terms, when given an 
appropriate mathematical expression, are useful for 
making inferences and predictions, but this is not the 
same as understanding or explaining in the full blown 
sense described earlier. Later in the same paragraph, 
Berkeley says that Newton himself introduced attraction 
"not as a true, physical quality, but only as a 
mathematical hypothesis". Later, in the third part of de 
Motu <paragraphs 35 to 42), when dealing with mechanical 
principles, Berkeley tells us what the physicist is doing 
when he uses such hypotheses: the physicist, 
. . . makes use of certain abstract and general 
terms, imagining in bodies force, action, 
attraction, solicitation, etc which are of first 
utility for theories and formulations, as also 
for computations about motion, even if in the 
truth of things, and in bodies actually 
existing, they would be looked for in vain .... 
[ DM p 219. J 
Whether the terms "force", "attraction", etc name any 
existent other than motion is quite irrelevant to their 
instrumental use: science describes the motions given in 
direct experience and describes them as simply as 
possible in rules or formulas, and it may be useful to 
refer to "force", etc as elements in calculations based 
on such rules or formulas, but then, 
. . . we are not able to separate the action of a 
body from its motion. [DM p 213.] 
Yet this account of "force", etc can only partially 
exhaust the meaning of such terms. 
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Berkeley has spoken of "imagining in bodies force"; I 
take this to indicate the metaphorical sense of force 
mentioned in de Xotu, paragraph 3, and the manner in 
which force is to be attributed to bosies in conformity 
with the definition of "mathematical hypothesis" that 
Berkeley gives. 
This procedure of attributing force to bodies suits the 
instrumental purpose of mechanical science, that is, it 
is a methodological convenience, but it is not to be 
supposed on the strength of that, that scientific 
theories are the sort of thing capable of being true or 
false, except in as they deal with observed and know 
regularities. What follows is an attempt to work out the 
metaphorical ascription idea, hinted at in de Xotu, more 
fully than Berkeley did. 
In de Xotu, paragraph 39, Berkeley draws our attention to 
the fact that scientific terms have two functions: first, 
they facilitate calculation about motion; and, second, 
they facilitate the construction of scientific theories. 
The first I have dealt with; regarding the second: if new 
theories are to be developed then they must make or 
include some reference to experience, since it is only 
through the reconstruction of elements of experience that 
new theories can be developed. Hence terms such as 
"force", ie, those that name mathematical hypotheses, 
must have some reference to experience if they are to 
have more than a purely instrumental function. There 
must therefore be some further sense of "force"; the clue 
to what it is is found in de Xotu, paragraph 4: 
While we support heavy bodies we feel in 
ourselves, effort, fatigue, and discomfort. [DM 
p 211.] 
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This inner experience of force is an experience of action 
exerted or of resistence felt. If Newton's second law is 
viewed as only a mathematical hypothesis it would amount 
to only a stipulative definition, and the relation, F = 
ma, would be analytic. If the law is only analytic, it 
is difficult to see what its value to physical science 
could be. More importantly, if it does not have some 
empirical consequences, it is arguable that it lacks a 
necessary condition of meaningfulness within natural 
science. (cf Hanson (1965a>, p 13.1 
So, since a law of nature must make some empirical claim, 
the term, "force", or the symbol, "F", on the left hand 
side of the equal's sign must have some empirical 
referent that differs from the acceleration symbolized by 
the "a" on the other side. The only empirical referent 
that Berkeley admits is the above mentioned inner 
experience of force; but this force belongs properly only 
to sentient beings, not to inanimate objects. The 
relation between such an inner experience and a visually 
observable acceration is an association of heterogeneous 
signs. The general idea of acceleration stands as a 
sign, and the thing it signifies is a potential inner 
experience of force. The visually observable signs do 
not contain the forces, that is, the forces are nothing 
over and above motion itself, they merely signify the 
forces that we are to experience. This is translated 
into the signs of an artificial language by introducing 
the signs, "F" for force, "a" for acceleration, and, "~' 
for a numerical factor that quantifies the relation F = 
ma; but heterogeneity of signs stops the process here. 
The problem now becomes how to relate a variable 
representing a tactual quality with one representing a 
visual quality in a mathematically functional way. 
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Robert Hooke's Lectures de Potentia Restitutiva provides 
the answer: 
The Power of any Spring is in the same 
proportion with the Tension thereof: That is, if 
one power stretch or bend it one space, two will 
bend it two, and three will bend it three, and 
so forward. [Hooke <1678), p 333.] 
The solution offered by Hooke is to replace the inner 
experience of force with another associated visual 
concept: we can, for example, express the force as a 
function of a visual position. So, if the force is due 
to a stretched piece of elastic, then the force can be 
assumed to be proportional to the displacement, x, of the 
elastic from its stretched position when unstretched. If 
the function, F = kx, is introduced, where "k" is a 
numerical factor and "x" is the displacement, then a new 
empirical relation, kx = ma, has been established. 
Acceleration and position are visual signs of a natural 
language that admit of translation into the mathematics 
and geometry of Newton's mechanics. 
Hence, the mechanical philosopher is involved in a search 
among objects of experience for syntactical relations of 
natural signs given to us in the natural language of 
phenomena. The relations of signs and things signified 
are then translated into the relations of artificial 
signs, that, in conjunciton with the mechanical system, 
constitute the artificial language of the mechanical 
philosopher. The physicist no longer deals with the 
phenomena but deals with artificial signs manipulated 
according to the rules of mechanical philosophy. 
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Section 20; What is Motion? 
In the fourth part of de Notu, that is paragraphs 43 to 
66, Berkeley concerns himself with the nature of motion 
and considers among other things, the question of 
absolute space, but he first repeats a point central to 
de Notu; 
Motion never meets our senses apart from 
corporeal mass, space, and time. [DM p 220.] 
Motion is not therefore some certain, simple and abstract 
idea, separate from all things; but the desire to see 
motion as such an idea has resulted in absurdities such 
as the definitions of "Aristotle and the Schoolmen" who 
defined "motion" as the act, 
'of the moveable in so far as it is 
moveable, or the act of a being in potentiality 
in so far as it is in potentiality•. [DM p 220, 
and cf Aristotle <1984), 201•, 10-201b, 15.] 
And such as asserting that, 
'there is nothing real in motion except that 
momentary thing which must be constituted when a 
force is striving towards change'. [DM p 220 
and cf Aristotle <1984>, 202•, 12-18.] 
These definitions are absurd because they are attempts to 
understand motion apart from every consideration of time 
and space, and to do this, Berkeley rightly contends, is 
impossible. And further, there are those who compound 
these absurdities by attempting to separate from one 
another the parts of motion themselves and to conceive of 
each as though it were a distinct entity. As an example 
of this, Berkeley draws our attention to those, 
who distinguish movement from motion, 
looking on movement as an instantaneous element 
in motion. [DM p 220.] 
--115--
Berkeley's de Hotu Martin Fearnley 
This is a criticism of Descartes and Newton both of whom, 
it will be recalled from Section 2 of The Scientific 
Background, believed that it was impossible to 
distinguish actual motion from the status of motion. 
According to them, a body in motion had at every instant 
a rectilinear tendency, regardless of whether its actual 
motion was rectilinear or curvilinear. Berkeley is again 
making the point that because something is a 
methodological convenience is no reason to suppose that 
that something is in any sense true. 
There are those who would even, 
... have velocity, conation, force, and impetus 
to be so many things differing in essence, each 
of which is presented to the intellect through 
its own abstract idea separated from all the 
rest. [DM p 220.] 
And finally there are those who, 
. . . define motion by passage, forgetting indeed 
that passage itself cannot be understood without 
motion, and through motion ought to be defined. 
[DM p 220.1 
Berkeley's contention here is that a definition throws no 
light on those things we perceive by sense; believing 
that it could has resulted in philosophers ensnaring 
their minds in unnecessary dificulties and saying with 
Aristotle that motion, 
'is a certain act difficult to know' .... 
[DM p 221 and cf Aristotle <1984), 201b, 4.] 
Berkeley has attacked the foregoing views in the ususal 
Berkeleyan manner, that is, he has reproached those who 
would separate the truly inseparable, those who would 
deal in abstract ideas, and those who land themselves in 
a muddle by allowing themselves to become victims of the 
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language they employ. And Berkeley, it should be noted, 
has spent 42 paragraphs out of a total 72 discussing his 
general metaphysical position; it is not until paragraph 
43 do we get any detailed remarks about motion. In 
paragraph 47, Berkeley makes the following remark: 
... it has become usual to confuse motion with 
the efficient cause of motion. Whence it comes 
about motion appears, as it were, in two forms, 
presenting one aspect to the senses, and keeping 
the other aspect covered in dark night. [DM 
p 221.] 
Berkeley, however, spends most of his time in this part 
<ie, paragraphs 43 to 66) dealing with views then current 
about motion; an important aspect of these views is the 
need to distiguish between absolute and relative space. 
Absolute space is postulated as being measureless, 
immovable, insensible, permeating and containing all 
bodies; it is what would be left if all bodies were 
destroyed. Because all its qualities are privative or 
negative, it seems a mere nothing; yet it is extended and 
that is a positive quality. Berkeley considered the 
notion that absolute space is something extended very 
dubious b1ecause what sort of extension is it that can 
neither, 
be divided nor measured, no part of which 
can be perceived by sense or pictured by the 
imagination? [DM p 222.] 
Berkeley concludes that absolute space is a mere nothing; 
it is at this point that Berkeley mentions that, 
all things which we designate by means of 
names are known qualitites or relations.... [DM 
p 222.] 
Having successfully dealt with the qualities of absolute 
space - it has none - Berkeley now turns his attention to 
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its relations, and comes to the same conclusion: space 
devoid of all bodies is the pures idea of nothing. We 
are sometimes duped because we imagine that our bodies 
would still remain when every thing else had gone and 
that we are able to move our limbs freely on all sides; 
but the truth of the matter is that space is a construct 
made out of the objects already existing, without which 
there could be no space. Understandably, Berkeley refers 
us to the Priciples where he has already dealt with 
nature of space. Here, he points out that we need not 
hesitate to accept his arguments; the fact that many 
important theorems in mechanics are based on the 
distinction between absolute and relative space is 
certainly no reason because the mechanics based on this 
distinction will work just as well without it. He 
devotes much of the remainder of this section of de Motu 
to establishing this conclusion. It is clear that he had 
to do so in a work whose ostensible purpose is to make 
the concept of motion clear, but it is Berkeley's evident 
intention to do so while preserving what is good and 
useful in Newton's Principia. Clearly, this must be done 
in such a way that the mathematics of the Principia 
remains intact: a substitute for absolute space must be 
found. 
Section 21: A Substitute for Absolute Space. 
Berkeley now develops his positive account of motion. 
All motion is relative, that is, motion is always motion 
in some direction and that requires that there are other 
objects because "up", "down", "left", "right" etc express 
some relation and necessarily indicate that there is some 
body other than the body in motion; hence, if there were 
only one object, no motion could be ascribed to it. 
if there are two objects we cannot conceive of them 
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revolving around a common centre; that would require some 
third object and this is supplied in reality by the so-
called fixed stars: 
... let two globes be conceived to exist and 
nothing corporeal besides them. Let forces then 
be conceived to be applied in some way; whatever 
we may understand by the application of forces, 
a circular motion of the two globes round a 
common centre cannot be conceived by the 
imagination. Then let us suppose that the sky 
of the fixed stars is created; suddenly from the 
conception of the approach of the globes to 
different parts of the sky the motion will be 
conceived. [DM p 224] 
The moral is: No relation can be given without an 
appropriate correlation. This example of two objects 
spinning around a common centre is a reference to a 
similar example in the Principia [Newton (1729), p 12]; 
Berkeley, however, continues with the more famous example 
of the bucket whirling around on the end of a cord 
[Newton <1729), p 10f]. 
The purpose of Newton's bucket experiment had been to 
establish the existence of absolute space. Unfortunately 
the experimental facts do not support Newton's case: 
there is no reason, except habit or convenience, for 
considering the parabolic shape of the water's surface 
deformed; it is just as conceivable that the surface of 
the water when it is level is deformed. What we in 
effect do is just assume that the water in the bucket is 
absolutely accelerated because the equations for the 
motion receive a simple and invarient form when we assume 
that a parabolic shape is the deformed shape. The 
fundamental point is that even if the water in the bucket 
is declared to have an acceleration when its surface is 
parabolic, it is still not necessary to conclude, as 
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Newton did, that this rotation takes place with respect 
to absolute space. 
But if one does not accept Newton's association of 
inertial forces and absolute acceleration with the 
existence of absolute space, 
... one must still account somehow for this 
important lawlike association of inertial forces 
with observable states of relative motion. 
[Sklar <1977), p 190.] 
Berkeley argues that the frame of the fixed stars would 
make a perfectly adequate frame of reference, and would 
form the basis of just such an account. 
These comments sum up Berkeley's general critique of 
absolute space and motion. In paragraph 60, a difficulty 
is encountered; this paragraph is worth quoting in full: 
As regards circular motion many think that, as 
motion truly circular increases, the body 
necessarily tends ever more and more away from 
its axis. This belief arises from the fact that 
circular motion can be seen taking its origins, 
as it were, at every moment from two direcitons, 
one along the radius and the other along the 
tangent, and if in this latter direction only 
the impetus be increased, then the body in 
motion will retire from its centre, and its 
orbit ~ill cease to be circular. But if the 
forces be increased equally in both directions 
the motion will remain circular though 
accelerated - which will not argue an increase 
in the forces of retirement from the axis, any 
more than in the forces of approach to it. 
Therefore we must say that the water forced 
round in the bucket rises to the sides of the 
vessel, because when new forces are applied in 
the direction of the tangent to any particle, in 
the same instant new equal centripetal forces 
are not applied. From which experiment it in no 
way follows that absolute circular motion is 
necessarily recognized by the forces of 
retirement from the axis of motion. Again, how 
those terms corporeal force and conation are to 
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be understood is more than sufficiently shown in 
the foregoing discussion. [DM p 224.) 
Berkeley's argument appears to be this: 
a) many people believe that absolute circular 
motion reveals itself in the deformity of the 
rotating water; 
b) this belief is explained by noting that 
circular motion is a compound of two other 
motions, tangential and centripetal; 
c) if forces in both directions are increased, 
the motion will remain accelerated, but because 
there bas been no movement relative to the axis 
there has been no increase in force, since force 
is known only through motion; 
d) if force is increased in only one direciton, 
namely tangentially, the water will travel up 
the side of the bucket. 
Therefore, 
e) it does not follow from the experiment that 
absolute circular motion is recognized by the 
deformation of the water. 
The truth of e) is, owing to the work of Mach, well 
established. The difficulty is this, Does e) follow from 
b), c) and d)7 It is not immediately clear that it does; 
reading between the lines a little his argument would 
' 
seem to be this: 
f) many people believe that absolute circular 
motion reveals itself in the deformation of the 
water {from a)); 
g> if the deformation is constant we must say 
that there is no third force acting, since force 
is known only through motion {from c)}; 
h) it follows at once {from g)} that there is 
no force to be explained, and therefore no 
acceleration: hence the question of acceleration 
in this case simply does not arise; 
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i) if, on the other hand, the deformation is 
not constant but is increasing or decreasing, 
this is explicable by reference to an increase 
or decrease in tangential forces {from d)}; 
j) it follows at once {from i) and from what 
Berkeley has said already in this part of de 
Notu} that tangential forces are explicable -
being nothing over and above motion along a 
straight line - in terms of relative motion. 
Therefore, 
k) it does not follow from the experiment that 
absolute circular motion is recognized by the 
deformaton of the water {from h) and j)}. 
In the following paragraph, Berkeley points out that 
although thinking of a circle as made up of an infinity 
of straight lines is a useful convenience in geometry, 
the convenience itself corresponds to nothing in the 
physical realm. Likewise, a circular motion can be 
thought of as resulting from the integration of an 
infinite number of rectilinear directions which is again 
a useful convenience in mechanics; but it must not be 
supposed that this means that it is true. To be useful 
is one thing; to be true is quite another. This seems to 
have suggested to Berkeley's mind the thought that 
because any motion, including a curvilinear one, is 
, compounded of, say, the motion of the earth's daily 
revolution, of its and the moon's monthly revolution 
around common centre of gravity and of the earth's annual 
orbit around the sun, we cannot say with certainty that 
the motion of the water in the bucket is circular. This 
does not amount to a proof; Berkeley is saying tht the 
onus of proof is still on those who believe that absolute 
space exists. More importantly, Berkeley considers only 
the circular motion of the water particles, which is 
strictly speaking irrelevant, when he ought to have 
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considered the deformation which is important even if 
static. 
John Earman would probably say that the whole of the 
above is irrelevant because Newton's concept of absolute 
space is not the only one available to us. 
example say, 
We could, for 
Space and time are absolute in the sense that 
for any pair of points of [Newtonian space-time] 
there is a uniquely defined spatial separation 
and a uniquely defined temporal separation. 
[Earman <1970), p 290.] 
This, however, seems hardly fair. Berkeley was arguing 
against a particular account of absolute space and cannot 
be criticized for failing to take into consideration the 
scientific theories of the twentieth century! 
In paragraphs 63 and 64, Berkeley again discusses his 
phenomenalistic creed: motion can be recognized through 
sensible things only, and since absolute space does not 
affect the senses, it follows that it cannot be employed 
for determing motion whether absolute or not. And 
Berkeley again makes the point that the frame of the 
fixed stars would do since relative space cannot be 
distinguished from absolute space by any feature or 
effect. Berkeley has missed something here, namely that 
the difference between relative space and absolute space 
is a logical one and not, as he seems to think, an 
empirical one. The point I am trying to make can be best 
made with the help of an analogy. Perfectly straight 
lines, perfectly true triangles, infinite space are all 
requirements of Euclidean geometry; but it is no where 
suggested that this geometry is unworkable or 
inconsistent if there are no actual and perfectly true 
triangles, no perfectly straight lines. All that 
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geometry can do is to establish the criteria the world 
would have to meet if the theorms, etc were to give 
mathematically exact results regarding the world. 
Likewise, absolute space is a theoretical requirement of 
Newton's physics; Newton is saying that if the world were 
to embody his theory perfectly, it would need to be 
exactly as his theory says it is. Of course, the world 
is not a perfect realization of either Euclid's geometry 
or Newton's mechanics; but neither is inconsistent or 
rendered unworkable by the world's failure to be a 
perfect realization of either of these sciences. 
Berkeley may have had an inkling of this <see de Motu, 
paragraph 61); he has certainly no wish to show that 
Newton's mechanics is a failure. But perhaps Newton is 
saying that absolute space is more than a theoretical 
requrement of his science; perhaps he is saying that for 
experience to be intellectually manageable absolute space 
is required and that space devoid of all objects is a 
real possibility. In this case, Berkeley's remarks in de 
Motu, paragraph 63 are very much to the point if they are 
taken to mean that absolute space is a logical 
impossibility as well as being both undetectable 
empirically and .theoretically unnecessary: 
No motion can be recognized or measured, unless 
through.sensible things. Since then absolute 
space in no way affects the senses, it must 
necessarily be quite useless for the 
distinguishing of motion. Besides, 
determination or direction is essential to 
motion; but that consists in relation. 
Therefore it is impossible that absolute motion 
should be conceived. [DM p 225.] 
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Section 22: Berkeley's Methodological Rules. 
In de Notu, paragraph 66 <the last paragraph of the 
fourth section) Berkeley briefly states his anti-realist 
manifesto for the philosophy of science in the form of 
four rules, each of which summarizes a conclusion reached 
in the preceding four parts of de Notu. Was Berkeley 
thinking of Newton's "Regula Philosophandi" when he 
formulated these rules? I have no way of knowing, but 
the parallel is quite striking. The first rule is, Do 
not confuse mathematical hypotheses whith the nature of 
things, that is, it must not be supposed that there are 
in the world real, mind-independent entities that 
correspond exactly, or even approximately, to our 
theoretical terms. The second rule is, Beware of 
abstraction; this caveat is aimed at those who thought it 
possible to remove from individual ideas of motion all 
that is particular, believing that what remained was the 
abstract general idea of motion, and that the word 
"motion" referred to this idea. A principle target would 
be Locke. Another target would be Newton who thought 
that absolute space would be left if all the objects in 
it were annihilated. The third rule is, Understand 
motion as either a perceivable or, at least, an 
imaginable phenomena. In other words, motion is neither 
more nor less than what it is perceive~ to be; it is not 
some obscure nor some difficult to understand object of 
intellection - it is as intelligible as it is 
perceivable. The fourth rule is, Accept that there is no 
need for absolute space in the new mechanical philosophy. 
In other words, it is not a theoretical requirement that 
an object's motion be considered as other than its change 
of space relative to some other object or objects, eg, 
the sphere of the fixed stars. 
--125--
Berkeley's de Xotu Martin Fearnley 
A striking feature of Berkeley's rules is the development 
and interrelation clearly discernable among them. 
The first rule reveals Berkeley's general 
intention, ie, to argue against the reification 
of scientific terms; it finds expression in the 
remaining three. 
The second rule concerns the reification of 
a) abstract general terms, which must be 
understood to include theoretical terms as 
well; and, 
b) absolute space. 
The third rule emphasizes a), and the fourth 
emphasizes b). 
If these rules are observed, two chief benefits will 
accrue: first, the theorems of mechanics which have made 
more precise our knowledge of the interrelatedness of 
phenomena and which have been given precise mathematical 
form will still serve to provide a basis for explanations 
and predictions about phenomena; and, second, science 
will be rid of all metaphysical haze. 
But why did Berkeley write this recapitulation here? Its 
final sentence really does smack of finality: 
And let these words suffice about the nature of 
motion. (DM p 225.] 
Yet Berkeley now precedes in the next paragraph to begin 
a discussion of the communication of motion; it is this 
mix of finality and restart that convinces me that the 
remaining paragraphs are an afterthought. 
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Section 23; Berkeley Attacks Descartes' Paradigm. 
If the conclusion reached at the end of Section 25 is 
correct, this question immediately arises: Why did 
Berkeley feel the need to add a short section dealing 
with impulsive causation? In answering this question it 
must be remembered that Berkeley wrote de Notu with a 
continental audience in mind: and what, he would have 
asked himself on re-reading the first 66 paragraphs, will 
the Cartesians think of all this? The Cartesians, he 
continues in his speculations, will think that this is 
nonsense. This seems to me to be Berkeley's most likely 
conclusion: How, they will ask, can any explanation be a 
genuine explanation if it does not involve impulsive 
causation. And in this context, this must mean that they 
would think that Berkeley's conception of causation was a 
fraud, especially so since no attempt is made to supply 
the force of gravity with a workable physical model. 
According to the Cartesians, all explanation was causal 
explanation and the only acceptable reason for an event's 
happening was a causal agent; hence, a tacit appeal to 
known regularities, no matter how general the basic 
axioms were, was considered an insufficient basis for the 
validation of an explanation. Berkeley's achievement was 
to demonstrate that even the Cartesian paradigm of 
explanation shares important formal features with the 
concept of explanation with which they took issue. The 
important formal feature common to both sorts of 
explanation is that both make an implicit appeal to known 
regularities. Berkeley is saying that this is true even 
when implusive causation is involved. Hence the causal 
net, at whatever level, is whatever structure of 
relations causal language describes; and with respect to 
explanation, impulsive causation does not have a 
priviledged position. The scientist must always refer 
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back to the known regularities those theorems and axioms 
that explain the regularities; the theorems and axioms 
alone cannot tell us what will happen - that requires 
statements of fact also - but what sort of events are 
possible and what sort impossible, ie, what sort are 
consistent with and what sort inconsistent with 
mechanics. The result is a possible causal net. But for 
the scientific enterprise, the all important facts are 
the regularities be they called "gravity" or "inertia". 
This brings us to another interesting problem in the 
dispute between the Newtonians and the Cartesians, namely 
did Newton's theory of gravity involve action at a 
distance? 
How, it was very properly asked, can a thing act where it 
is not? Newton, as we have seen, never said that gravity 
was a real entity, only that it was a real phenomena or 
effect whose cause was unknown to him. Newton seems to 
have been placed in a dilemma by his critics: either he 
was postulating action at a distance or his theory fails 
to explain the very phenomena it sets out to explain. 
Unless therefore one posits some causal mechanism Cof the 
sort hypothesized by Descartes) between objects said to 
be mutually exerting gravitational influence, one cannot 
properly be said to be offering a mechanical explanation. 
Nor indeed can it be said that objects exert a 
gravitational influence which is mutual. The demand was 
for something like a Cartesian vortex; Newton vigorously 
eschewed that hypothesis because it failed to fit the 
facts. In part the issue was about what could count as a 
mechanical explanation: the only thing that can determine 
another object to move is another moving object, only 
this can make movement inevitable. Berkeley's response 
is to show that even causal explanations involving 
impulsion are just as problematical as those made 
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possible by the Principia; and if the former are not 
problematic, then neither are the latter. Both types of 
explanation are validated by an appeal to already known 
regularities, not to obscure forces, substances, 
qualities or essences somehow knowable independently of 
any consideration of their effects. Hence according to 
Berkeley, immediate causation properly understood does 
not involve the belief that the causal relation is a 
relation of necessity, which result is not surprising 
given the sources of Berkeley's inspiration. 
Berkeley's first step is to draw our attention to what 
every one believes- mistakenly in Berkeley's view-
about impulsive causation, 
Most people think that the force impressed on 
the movable body is the cause of motion in it. 
However that they do not assign a known cause of 
motion, and one distinct from the body in motion 
is clear from the preceding argument. [DM p 
225.] 
Berkeley now points out that force is not a determinate 
thing because great men such as Newton, Borelli, and 
Torricelli advance mutually exclusive views about it; but 
this is not important because each view is internally 
consistent and each explains as well as the other. 
Berkeley accounts for this as follows: 
For all forces attributed to bodies are 
mathematical hypotheses just as are attractive 
forces in planets and sun. But mathematical 
entities have no stable essence in the nature of 
things, and they depend on the the notion of the 
definer. Whence the same thing can be explained 
in different ways. [DM p 226.] 
Again, it can be seen that Berkeley is relativizing 
explanations involving secondary causes: forces 
attributed to bodies are mathematical hypotheses; but how 
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we use mathematics to describe phenomena is arbitary and 
conventional - the mathematics is not so to speak peeled 
of phenomena. The nature of our mathematical physics 
depends on how we decide to carve up phenomena in the 
first place. How we carve up the world may depend on 
certain objective constraints, eg, the state of our 
mathematics; but that sort of constraint is not a feature 
of the world we are trying to describe. 
Section 24: The Nerye of Berkeley's Argument. 
In paragraph 68, Berkeley begins his argument about 
causal explanations making a tacit appeal to known 
regularities: it does not matter whether we say that a 
body remains at rest or in motion because of inertia, or 
moves because of the force it receives when it is struck 
- the difference is only verbal. Likewise it is only a 
verbal problem deciding whether the motion caused is 
numerically the same as the effecting motion or is 
genera ted anew. No matter how we convey our meaning, it 
amounts to the same thing, namely, that, 
one body loses motion, and another acquires 
it, and, besides that, nothing. [DM p 226.] 
"Motion", "moved", "moving" and "rest" are among the 
basic concepts that form the basis of our descriptions of 
the physical realm; the others, eg, "gravity", "inertia", 
etc involve the attribution of forces to objects; the 
latter type of term is used to "abbreviate" <Berkeley's 
term) more complex descriptions using the former type of 
term. Hence the latter type of term is the type 
predominately used in mechanics; they are the ones to be 
clarified by philosophers using the former type of term. 
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Berkeley, after pointing out that God is the true cause 
of both motion and its communication, makes the central 
point of this section: even in cases involving impulsive 
contact the explanation, prediction, calculation etc will 
still make an appeal, tacit or otherwise, to the 
fundamental laws or axioms of mechanics. As Berkeley 
said: 
a thing is explained ... by showing its 
connecton with mechanical principles, such as 
action and reaction are always opposite and 
equal. [DM p 226.] 
It is surely significant that Berkeley quoted Newton's 
third law as an example of a relevant mechanical 
principle; any case of physical contact, ie, of Cartesian 
impulsion, would involve reference to this law. 
concludes that, 
Berkeley 
From such laws as from the source and primary 
principle, those rules for the communication of 
motion are drawn.... [DM p 226.] 
What Berkeley means by "as from the source_ and primary. 
principle" is not immediately clear; "source and primary 
principle" could mean the three basic laws of Newtonian 
mechanics, or it could be a further statement of 
Berkeley's relativization of explanation thesis; or 
perhaps it looks forward to a puzzling remark in 
paragraph 71: 
. . . even the primary axioms of mechanical 
science can be called causes or mechanical 
principles, being regarded as the causes of the 
consequences. [DM p 227.] 
It is not the first alternative because the Latin 
"principia" can only mean "God" in this context -
"principia" being in the singular means "cause" or 
"origin", not "principle". So, the phrase can only mean 
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"first cause'', ie, "God". Strangely enough, this points 
us in the right direction; I will postpone further 
discussion of this until I come to discuss paragraph 71. 
Returning to paragraph 69, we can see that Berkeley is 
saying that even events involving immediate causation 
must make, if they are to be explanatory, at least a 
covert appeal, via the laws of mechanics, to the known 
regularities of phenomenal events. Saying something 
happened is parasitic upon what is aready known to 
happen. Finding out what does happen and extending 
language to express these findings is very much the 
business of physicists when they study the order of 
sensible events, formalize, generalize and provide 
precise descriptions; one of the events is described as a 
"a causal relation". It is clear only on this basis that 
we are able to say, "Event A is the cause of event B." 
Berkeley's strategy is perfectly clear: since even those 
cases which involve impulsive causation make a tacit 
appeal to precisely described regularities they must be 
just as non-explanatory as the Newtonian system 
criticized for its inability to to offer genuine, ie, 
impulsive, causal explanations. But, if it is still 
insisted that impulsive causation is explanatory, then 
Newton's mechanics as a whole must be accepted as 
explanatory.' 
Section 25; A Possible Obiection. 
It might be objected against Berkeley that he excluded 
too much; the Cartesians probably thought so. The 
dispute can be seen as a dispute over what the locus of 
necessity is: is it in the realm of objects with their 
essential properties guaranteeing precisely describable 
events and outcomes; or is it a characteristic of 
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language and therefore related to argument, logic and 
inference? Berkeley, believing that we can know nothing 
about the way phenomenal events take place prior to our 
having experience of the world, opted for the latter. It 
matters little if you work outward to laws, etc or inward 
to the so called essential properties; you will always 
start from the facts of experience. Berkeley's 
epistemological arguments against the latter mean that he 
must accept the former; postulating the unknowable as 
true does not help at all. I do not think that Berkeley 
believed that Newton's Principia was in any sense 
definitive; he may on occasion seem to to assert that 
Newtonian mechanics is the last word, he is doing so to 
block an attack from Cartesian doubt. Berkeley is well 
aware that scientific theories, including Newton's, are 
underdetermined <see de Notu, paragraph 67). 
Section 26: An Apparent Failure of Nerve. 
Yet despite all this, Berkeley's nerve does seem to fail 
him because he does try - so it seems - to accommodate 
Cartesian scruples; after taking necessity out of 
causation he tries to put causation into both verbal 
necessity and his theory of explanation. This bring us 
to paragraph 71 and its already quoted phrase. This 
paragraph is worth quoting in full: 
In physics sense and experience which reach only 
to apparent effects hold sway; in mechanics the 
abstract notions of mechanics are admitted. In 
first philosophy or metaphysics we are concerned 
with corporeal things, with causes, truth, and 
the existence of things. The physicist studies 
the series or successions of sensible things, 
noting by what laws they are connected, and in 
what order, what precedes as cause, and what 
follows as effect. And on this method we say 
that the body in motion is the cause of motion 
in the other, and impresses motion on it, draws 
it also or impels it. In this sense second 
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corporeal causes aught to be understood, no 
account being taken of the actual farces or the 
active powers or the real cause in which they 
are. Further, besides body, figure, and motion, 
even the primary axioms of mechanical science 
can be called causes or mechanical principles, 
being regarded as the causes of the 
consequences. [DM p 227.) 
In this pargraph, Berkeley sums up same of what he has 
already said: mechanical science deals with only those 
effects that can be given mathematical expression, it 
does nat deal with the efficient cause of phenomena as a 
whole - this is the province of metaphysics which deals 
with incorporeal things, causes and truth. All that the 
physicist does is observe the way things happen, frame 
laws which classify, sum up, abbreviate, present in as 
general a way as possible, his observations; he will 
always attempt to reduce these laws still further to 
axioms or fundamental principles. This will be the basis 
of our ability to assign causes; cause and effect as far 
as mechanical science goes is just another sort of 
regularity that can be observed, and impressed force is 
another. The passage already quoted from paragraph 69 
and the final sentence of the above quoted paragraph add 
weight to the claim that scientific explanation is 
explanation in only a limited relativised sense: it is 
relative to certain human conventions, one of which is 
that we do as a matter of fact accept science as 
explanatory; but that is a fact about the way in which we 
use the ward "explain" and its cognates, not about 
explanation as understood by the theologically scrupulous 
Berkeley. A further interpretation that can be placed on 
the final sentence of paragraph 71 is that it' refers to 
the accasionalist belief that the fundamental laws of 
physics are identical with God's general volitions. 
Perhaps Berkeley meant that as the scientific laws 
--134--
Berkeley's de Xotu Martin Fearnley 
formulated by Newton depend on convention, so the laws 
embodied in God's will depend on his determining to use 
them, if the world is to be intelligible at all. This 
may be the insight Berkeley is struggling to make clear 
in the passages quoted from paragraphs 69 and 71. 
Section 27; The Limits of Science. 
In paragraph 72, Berkeley delimits science and 
metaphysics; particularly to be noted is that the 
concerns proper to the latter are not the proper concern 
of the former. Berkeley's main concern had been to show 
which discipline is involved in the pursuit of truth; he 
concluded that it is metaphysics, morals, and theology. 
Regarding our use of causal language, we can either speak 
with the vulgar, or think with the learned - so long as 
we know which it is that we are doing. In the 
descriptive part of his analysis, Berkeley showed us what 
the mechanical philosopher is as a matter of fact up to 
when he gives what he calls an explanation. This is 
speaking with the vulgar and it is not true, metaphysical 
explanation because such explanation involves by 
definition reference to necessity whereas a scientific 
explanation does not. A metaphysical explanation - the 
only genuine explanation accepted by Berkeley - does 
involve necessity because it involves the productive 
origins of motion, that is , it involves God. This 
necessity is not absolutely necessity; as already noted, 
it is a necessity dependent upon God's intention to 
create a world intelligible to its inhabitants. But 
this, indeed, is thinking with the learned. 
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Section 28; Conclusion. 
Berkeley's chief point, which lay behind everything he 
wrote in de Notu, is that individual scientific terms 
need not always name individual things; to suppose that 
they do will generate all sorts of obscurities. For 
example, "force" is just such a term for it does not name 
some discrete entity, and is nothing over and above 
motion itself. 
Berkeley used this principle to good effect in his 
discussion of the force of percussion, less successfully 
in his discussion of the conservation of vis viva, and 
extensively in his treatment of gravity. 
"Gravity" is just a general term for a particular class 
of phenomena which obey a particular law. Or, to put it 
the other way round: phenomena obeying the inverse square 
law are called "gravitational". Berkeley warns us to 
beware of confusing cause with effect. It is easy to 
slide from thinking of gravity as an effect <eg, an 
object's falling the cause of which we still seek) to 
thinking of it as the cause of gravitational phenomena 
itself. This slide is the result of the mistaken beliefs 
that if a theory explains, it must be true; and that all 
explanation i~ causal. Berkeley's reply to this is 
predictably straightforward: a theory does not have to be 
true in order to explain - questions of its truth or 
falsity do not arise - nor does an explanation have to be 
causal. Berkeley makes the same point when he observes 
that the source of our understanding is one thing, the 
cause of the understood events is quite another. This 
perhaps reinforces his contention that causal explanation 
is not the only sort of explanation. In order to be 
explained an event must be shown to be in conformity with 
--136--
Berkeley's de Hotu Martin Fearnley 
the general principles of physics and this is the case 
even with impulsive causation. Newton's Principia gives 
an adequate account of all explanations, including causal 
ones; infact the Principia offers a wider notion of 
explanation since it can be used to explain tidal 
phenomena whereas there is no causal explanation for it. 
Newton's theory being more general is to be preferred 
because being more general it is more powerful. 
This basis of scientific explanation is the observed 
orderliness of the universe. The explanation of this 
orderliness is the divine mind which makes things happen 
as they do. No event can be truly said to make an other 
event inevitable, only God can do that. 
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Section 1: Introduction. 
While Berkeley could - quite reasonably - expect his 
readers to be familiar with the early eighteenth century 
science and philosophy required to understand de Motu, I 
cannot do so, and have therefore spent a fair portion of 
this thesis trying to make clear just what the science 
and philosophy presupposed in de Motu is. This done, it 
became possible to make clear exactly what Berkeley's 
arguments in de Motu are. And now, finally, I am in a 
position where I can compare and contrast Berkeley's 
philosophy of science with that of more modern philosophy 
of science, especially that of Karl Popper who has 
written about Berkeley's philosophy of science on two 
occasions. My strategy in this final section will be to 
see who of Popper and Berkeley has the philosophy more 
deserving of our our assent; it must be admitted at once 
that Popper does not emerge from this debate at all well. 
However, it should be conceded that this is not perhaps 
Popper's fault: in the last twnty-five years since he 
last wrote about Berkeley, there have been certain 
critical advances in the philosophy of science which were 
not therefore available to him. Berkeley himself does 
not emerge untouched: there have been some advances since 
his day too. 
Popper wrote two articles two articles of interest in 
this connection: "Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge" 
[Popper C1961)J and "A Note on Berkeley as a Precursor of 
Mach" [Popper (1953/4)]. The first deals with 
essentialism, instrumentalism, and conjectural realism 
but is not primarily concerned with Berkeley - he is 
simply lumped together with the other instrumentalists. 
None the less it is of great importance as it reveals 
some interesting philosophical errors about Berkeley. 
--139--
Berkeley's de Notu Martin Fearnley 
The second deals with Berkeley directly in as far as his 
ideas prefigure those of Mach; this article is also of 
great importance since it reveals more of Popper's errors 
and confusions about Berkeley's conception of science. 
Section 2: Popper's Position. 
Popper's general strategy in "Three Views Concerning 
Human Knowledge" is this: first, he accepts the 
instrumentalist critique of essentialism, that is, he 
rejects the view that, 
the truly scientific theories describe the 
'essences' or the 'essential natures' of things 
- the realities which lie behind all appearnces. 
Such theories are neither in need of, nor 
susceptible of, further explanation: they are 
ultimate explanations, and to find them is the 
ultimate aim of the scientist. 
[Popper <1961), p 366.J 
His criticism of essentialism complete, Popper uses what 
remains of essentialism both to criticise instrumentalism 
itself and to form the basis of what he calls the "the 
third view": 
The scientist aims at finding a true theory or 
description of the world (and especially of its 
regularities or laws), which shall also be an 
explanation of observable facts. 
[Popper <1961), p 366.J 
But a scientist cannot, says Popper, succeed finally in 
establishing the truth of his theories beyond all 
reasonable doubt; this doctrine he thinks needs 
correction. What is needed is conjectural realism and 
falsificationism: 
All the scientist can do, . . . is to test his 
theories, and to eliminate all those that do not 
stand up to the most severe tests he can design. 
But he can never be quite sure whether new tests 
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( ... ) may not lead him to modify, or even 
discard, a theory. In this sense, all theories 
are, and remain, hypotheses - conjectures 
(doxai) as opposed to indubitable knowledge 
<episteme). [Popper <1961), p 366. J 
In other words, we accept a theory as long as it remains 
unfalsified by the most severe test that the scientist 
can devise. Theories are either true or false, but we 
can only know when they are false. But the truth of the 
unrefuted theory remains conjectural. The only arguments 
which should be employed in science are those in which 
the premisses entail the conclusion; to advance premisses 
that do not entail the conclusion, but which incline one 
to think it reasonable to believe it, is to indulge in 
inductivism. 
According to Popper inductivism is unacceptable because, 
... it is far from obvious, from a logical point 
of view, that we are justified in inferring 
universal statements from singular ones, no 
matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in 
this way may turn out to be false: no matter how 
many instances of white swans we may have 
observed, this does not justfy the conclusion 
that all swans are white. [Popper <1980), p 
27. J 
If induction is to be justified it must be done,by some 
principle which must either be a purely logical principle 
whose truth is self-evident, or a synthetic statement. 
Regarding the first: the problems associated with this 
are legion; none the less if such a principle could be 
found then the problem of induction would be eliminated. 
Regarding the second: in this case the problem re-emerges 
because the principle of induction must itself be a 
universal statement. Hence, to justify the principle we 
would have to employ inductive inferences, and to justify 
these we would have to employ a further principle, but of 
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a higher order. To justify this principle further 
inductive inferences would have to be employed, but these 
in their turn would need the justification of same 
further principle. There would be no end to this 
process: 
Thus the attempt to base the principle of 
induction on experience breaks down, since it 
must leads to to an infinite regress. 
[Popper Cl980), p 29.] 
But note that Popper is from the outset a realist -
though perhaps a sceptical one - that is, he assumes, 
almost takes it for granted in the articles under 
discussion, that a theory must be true or false. 
Section 3: Instrumentalism - What is it? 
But true or false about what? Being true or false about 
sensible effects was treated by Popper as a reason far 
saying that a theory is true or false about the 
unobservable realm. Berkeley did not agree: science 
deals with sensible effects only; see, for example de 
Notu, sections 4 and 6. It is Popper's realism which 
separates him from Berkeley and his falsificationism 
which separates him from traditional realists. But was 
Popper entirely fair to Berkeley? There is, I think, a 
good deal wrong with his interpretation of Berkeley. 
The source of Popper's errors was his identification of 
Berkeley's philosophy with instrumentalism. True, there 
are interesting similarities, but it is also true that 
there are significant differences between the twa 
philosophies. The principle difference is with regard to 
explanation - about which more later, but until I have 
made it clear what the difference is I will continue to 
refer to Berkeley as an instrumentalist. 
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By way of definition, Popper offers the following 
quotation taken from Osiander's Preface to Copernicus' de 
Revol uti oni bus: 
'There is no need for these hypotheses to be 
true, or even to be at all like the truth; 
rather, one thing is sufficient for them - that 
they should yield a calculus which agrees with 
the observations.' [Popper (1961>, p 358.] 
We should notice at once that this is an example of what 
Newton-Smith calls epistemological instrumentalism, this 
is to say it is admitted by those adopting such an 
instrumentalism that a scientific theory is either true 
or false but denied that there is a way of determining 
which [Newton-Smith <1981), p 30]. Berkeley, being more 
radical, did not admit even that much: he denied that it 
makes sense to say that a scientific theory is true or 
false in the sense that there is an unobservable realm of 
which the theory could be true or false. Berkeley's 
instrumentalism is, again adopting Newton-Smith's 
terminology, semantic [Newton-Smith <1981), p 30]. The 
main point to note is that a scientific theory must save 
the phenomena; a theory is, to use Popper's own 
definition, "a convenient instrument for the calculation 
and prediction of phenomena or appearances" [Popper 
(1961)' p 358] . Finally, and most importantly, according 
to instrumentalism scientific theories do not, indeed 
cannot, explain. Instrumentalists have this in common: 
They all assert that explanation is not the aim 
of physical science, since physical science 
cannot discover 'the hidden essences of things'. 
[Popper <1961), p 366.] 
Compare this with what Duhem said about explanation: 
To explain ( ... ) is to strip reality of the 
appearances covering it like a veil, in order to 
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see the bare reality itself. 
7.] 
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[Duhem (1954), p 
The sort of explanation which Popper was attacking is 
what he called "ultimate explanation", that is, theories 
that are "neither in need of, nor suseptible of, further 
explanation." [Popper <1961), p 366.] This sort of 
explanation, which Berkeley also criticised, is the 
causally efficaceous type whose existence is, it was 
claimed, demonstrably true. Berkeley thought that such 
things were not the concern of science of metaphysics, 
theology and morality, (cf de Hotu, paragraph 42). Yet 
the essentialists had spotted something important: 
explanation must stop somewhere. Berkeley too spotted 
this: according to him, explanation finally stops in the 
divine mind. 
Both Berkeley and Popper are in agreement that this sort 
of explanation is not possible for science; but this 
denial does not mean that they are denying that 
explanation of any sort is possible. Berkeley, just as 
much as Popper, asserted that science can and does 
explain; their beliefs differ with respect to what it is 
in science that does the explaining. Popper appealed to 
underlying mechanisms; Berkeley denied this and appealed 
to laws - if a productive mechanism is sought it can only 
be discovered by metaphysics or theology. 
Section 4; Explanation and Instrumentalism. 
Two questions immediately arise: Was Berkeley an 
instrumentalist? And, Did he give a persuasive account 
of explanation? The answer to the first is, pace Popper, 
that he is not an instrumentalist as understood by Popper 
because - and this answers the second question - Berkeley 
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does allow that science can explain, and gives a 
persuasive account of explanation. In fact he gives two 
accounts of explanation: one normative and one 
descriptive. It is because Berkeley said that science 
can explain, that he is not an instrumentalist as 
understood by Popper. Berkeley is certainly a scientific 
anti-realist; that is, he consistently maintains that 
theoretical terms do not refer to theoretical entities, 
but he nowhere said that scientific theories cannot 
explain. But he is neither a phenomenalist nor a 
positivist; there is behind the observable the activity 
of the divine mind and to this extent he is not a 
precursor of Mach. <The parallels that do exist between 
them relate rather to their arguments regarding space and 
time - though Berkeley is much more obscure and less 
effective than Mach.) Popper's view of instrumentalism 
is that it is able to give only the feeblest of accounts 
that can possibly be given without giving up the claim to 
be explanatory all together; perhaps it cannot do even 
that much. 
Now, according to Popper a scientific theory has 
explanatory power. According to Popper the aim of the 
scientist is, 
... to find explanatory theories (if possible, 
true explanatory theories); that is to ~ay, 
theories which describe certain structural 
properties of the world, and which permit us to 
deduce, with the help of initial conditions, the 
effects to be explained. [Popper <1980), p 61.] 
For reasons he does not make evident - at least not in 
these articles - Popper thinks that a causal explanation 
appealing to underlying mechanisms is more persuasive 
than a non-causal explanation appealing to regularities 
observed to bold among phenomena. It is a great shame 
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that Popper did not address himself to this question; all 
the more so as Berkeley offers, in the closing paragraphs 
of de Motu, a critique of the belief in the priority of 
causal explanation. Yet despite Popper's braketing 
Berkeley with the instrumentalists, Berkeley shares the 
view that a scientific theory has explanatory power; they 
differ about the source of this power. Popper's remarks 
suggest that he thought that Berkeley denied that a 
scientific theory could explain because he denied that a 
scientific theory could give what Popper calls an 
essentialist explanation. 
We would expect Berkeley to have a problem with so called 
action at a distance; an appeal to either impulsive 
causation or occult qualities has already been ruled out. 
Berkeley is obliged to say that the explanation of such 
basic regularities is not the business of science but of 
metaphysics and theology; science can only accept these 
basic regularities and use them as the basis of an 
explanatory theory. But Berkeley is not obliged to give 
up explanation, but only causal explanation as understood 
by Popper; by appealing to the three laws of Newtonian 
mechanics, Berkeley could say that a theory gives 
reasons, and that to this extent can give an explanation. 
This will be Berkeley's descriptive account of 
explanation. 
Section 5: Popper and a Muddle about Forces. 
In order to make Berkeley's position on explanation 
clear, I must first consider what Popper said about 
Berkeley's treatment of both force and "force"; some 
muddles will have to be cleared up. 
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According to Popper, Berkeley's strongest argument 
against theoretical entities is based on his nominalistic 
theory of language: 
... the expression 'force of attraction' must be 
a meaningless expression, since forces of 
attraction can never be observed. What can be 
observed are movements, not their hidden alleged 
'causes•. [Popper <1961), p 373.] 
Berkeley never said that such terms are meaningless 
because a force of attraction could never be observed. 
Berkeley admits that such terms do not help in, 
. . . the understanding of the simple nature of 
motion itself or for indicating so many distinct 
qualities. EDM p 214.] 
About the meaningfulness of such terms, Berkeley said 
that they are, 
. . . useful for reasonings and reckonings about 
motion and bodies in motion. EDM p 214.] 
Hardly an accusation of meaninglessness! 
It seems that Popper thinks that the basis of Berkeley's 
instrumentalism is his account of how we classify 
particulars, which account is used to demonstrate that 
forces are nothing over and above motion itself. This is 
a confusion. Whether or not a force is some causally 
efficacious quality/entity over and above motion is a 
question quite irrelevant to the question ·of how we 
classify objects. The basis of Berkeley's nominalism is 
its rejection of abstract general ideas, not the 
rejection of the objects classified by using, per 
impossible, the appropriate abstract general idea. An 
argument against the existence of an abstract general 
idea of treeness is not an argument the existence of 
trees. Popper employs a similar argument in a "A Note On 
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Berkeley As A Precursor Of Mach": here he tells us that 
Berkeley's "ultimate argument" for instrumentalism is 
that, 
we know that there are no entities such as 
these because we know that the words professedly 
designating them must be meaningless. to have 
meaning a word must stand for an 'idea' .... Now 
the words here in question do not stand for 
ideas. [Popper (1953/54), p 32.] 
The entities Popper has in mind are "occult substances 
and qualities, physical forces, structures of corpuscles, 
etc. absolute space, and absolute motion". In this 
connection, physical forces are of special interest: 
Popper seems not to have understood Berkeley's argument; 
"to have meaning, a word must stand for an idea" is not 
part of Berkeley's philosophy, rather it is the part of 
Locke's philosophy he was anxious to criticise. 
for example, the following, 
Note, 
in truth, there is no such thing as one 
precise and definite signification annexed to 
any general name, they all signifiy 
indifferently a great number of particular 
ideas. [Principles p 73.] 
Of physical phenomena, Berkeley has this to say: 
... when it is said the change of motion is 
proportional to the impressed force, or that 
whatever has extension is divisible; these 
propositions are to be understood of motion and 
extension in general, and nevertheless it will 
not follow that they suggest to my mind thoughts 
an idea of motion without a body moved, or any 
determinate direction and velocity, or that I 
must conceive an abstract general idea of 
extension, which is neither line, surface nor 
solid, neither great nor small, block, white, 
nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. 
It is only implied that whatever motion I 
consider, whether it be swift or slow, 
perpendicular, horizontal or oblique, or in 
whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds 
equally true. As does the other of every 
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particular extension, it matters not whether 
line, surface or solid, whether of this or that 
magnitude or figure. [Principles p 69.] 
It is true that Berkeley did not believe that there is a 
universally present entity called "gravity" resonsible 
for certain aspects of planetary motion, but it is not 
true that he thought this because he thought such terms 
as "gravity", "force", etc were meaningless- he simply 
did not believe that "gravity" was the name of a single 
determinate entity. If it does not refer to something 
like this, then what does "gravity" mean? Of gravity, he 
writes: 
a philosopher, whose thoughts take a larger 
compass of nature, having observed a certain 
similitude of appearences, as well in the 
heavens as in the earth, that argue innumerable 
bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each 
other, which he denotes by the general name 
attraction, whatever can be reduced to that, he 
thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains 
the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous 
globe towards the moon, which to him doth not 
appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular 
example of a general rule of Nature. 
[Principles p 109.] 
But Berkeley nowhere said that "force of attraction" or 
"gravity" is a meaningless term because forces of 
a~traction cannot be observed. He said of such terms 
that they signify nothing but the effects; discovering 
the cause of such effects is not aimed at in physics: 
I do not perceive that anything is signified 
besides the effect itself; for as to the manner 
of the action whereby it is produced, or the 
cause which produces it, these are not so much 
aimed at. [Principles p 108.] 
According to Berkeley, then, any idea of an object 
falling would do to classify a group of events as 
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gravitational phenomena. We nate as our comprehension 
graws that all these phenomena obey the inverse square 
law. The ward "gravity" does nat suggest any special 
idea of motion without a body moving in a determinate 
direction and with a determinate speed. It is only 
asserted that whatever gravitational event is considered 
the same law holds equally true. 
This discussion is nat irrelevant to my main concern 
because according to Berkeley, classifying, mare than 
anything else, is the basis of our ability to explain. 
Section 6; Mare About Force. 
Briefly, Berkeley's argument is this: We observe objects 
falling to earth, tidal behaviour, the movements of the 
planets, of comets, etc; each has its appropriate idea. 
Or, to quote Duhem an the subject: from, 
Among the physical properties which we set 
ourselves to represent we select those we regard 
as simple properties, sa that the others will 
supposedly be groupings or combinations of them. 
[ Duhem, p l9f. J 
The scientist, however, is able to see analogies and ways 
of abbreviating and generalizing these ideas and is able 
to reduce them to ideas of mass and distances; in ather 
wards '"gravity" means the product of twa masses divided 
by the square of the distance; the tendency of the 
objects to gravitate towards one another is given a 
precise mathematical farm, namely <K1 x K2>1D2. Duhem 
made the same paint when he said that by employing 
appropriate methods of measurement, the above mentioned 
combinations are made to correspond to certain groups of 
mathematical symbols, numbers and magnitudes. 
Furthermore, it seems that Papper has confused meaning 
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with reference. True, "force of attraction" does not 
refer to any stuff existing between two objects, 
emanating from them and causing them to to tend towards 
each other's centres; but this, as we have seen, 
not entail that the term "force of attraction" is 
does 
meaningless. It was not Newton's view, at lea9t in the 
Principia, that gravity is some etherial stuff whose 
mechanical operation brings about the movement of the 
objects according to the inverse square law. This 
confusion is apparent in Popper's remarks about 
Berkeley's treatment of Absolute Space and Absolute Time: 
it is not clear if Popper thinks that Berkeley thought 
that these ought to be rejected because they are false or 
because they are meaningless. This muddle is evident in 
the Popper quotes de Motu, paragraph 66: 
'the study of motion will be freed from 
thousand pointless trivialities, subtleties, and 
[meaningless] abstract terms.' [Popper 
(1953/54), p 28; the translation is Popper's 
own. J 
The words between the brackets in this quotation is not 
in the original; nor should it be. It is not a property 
of abstract ideas that they should be meaningful; that is 
a property of words - abstract ideas either do or do not 
exist. If they do not, and there is no alternative 
account explaining how we are able to use general terms, 
then general terms would, indeed, be meaningless. 
Berkeley of course has an alternative view and is not 
therefore obliged to think that that general terms such 
as "force" are meaningless, and nor is he suggesting as 
much in de Motu, paragraph 66. But I think it is pretty 
clear from Popper's insertion of "[meaningless]" that he 
thinks that it was Berkeley's intention to suggest just 
that. Berkeley's intentions are quite contrary to those 
Popper imputes to him; Berkeley is keen to show that 
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"force" has a meaning, but that it involves nothing over 
and above the names of sensible effects, especially 
"motion" - "speed", "mass", and "direction" are also 
involved in giving meaning to the term "force". "Motion" 
gets its meaningfuless by being made the name of an idea 
of a particular motion, 
... which considered in itself is particular, 
becomes general, by being made to represent or 
stand for all other particular ideas of the same 
sort. [Berkeley <1710), p 70.] 
And it may be noted in passing that: 
it is not necessary (even in the strictest 
reasonings) significant names which stand for 
ideas should, every time they are used, exite in 
the understanding the ideas that they are made 
to stand for. [Berkeley <1710), p 73.] 
Berkeley draws a parallel between the way words are used 
in writing and speech and the way letters are used in 
algebra: 
in which though a particular quantity be 
marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it 
is not requisitie that in every step each letter 
suggest to the thoughts, that particular 
quantity it was appointed to stand for. [Ibid, 
p 74.] 
The idea here is one that Berkeley first conceived in "de 
Ludo Algebraico" [DLA pp 214-230] where he likens algebra 
to a game by showing that the rules of algebra permit 
certain inferences in very much the same way as game-
rules permit certain moves. The meaning of the rules is, 
in both cases, exhausted by what they entitle a player to 
do. Of themselves they signify nothing. this is as 
thorough-going a conventionalist view as anything found 
in Wittegenstein. 
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Popper's confusion crops-up in a most interesting and 
suggestive way in a discussion of the physical world 
behind the world of appearences: 
But such a world cannot be described: for such a 
description would be meaningless. [Popper 
(1953/54), p 30.] 
Granted such a description would be false if constructed 
literally because it would say, among other things, that 
there was such a world to be described; but such a world 
could be imagined by scientists as a methodological 
convevience - according to Berkeley it typically is. <Cf 
de Motu, paragraph 39.) Such a convenience might be 
atomism; atoms can be imagined as existing - it is at 
least logically possible that they do - and the scientist 
may attribute forces to them as Newton's theory of 
gravitation requires them to do. Berkeley argues against 
the existence of atoms on epistemological grounds; but 
there is nothing in the conception of an atom that 
obliges us or obliged Berkeley to say that it is self-
contradictory or illogical. Berkeley's contention here 
is only that atoms are otiose. 
In any event it seems misguided to claim that Berkeley 
believed the atomistic theory to be meaningless; rather 
he thought it ,was a very useful methodological tool which 
enabled the scientist to produce precise results about 
the world. This led many to believe that the theory was 
true, and hence that atoms really did exist. We have 
seen how Berkeley resisted this move. He thought, not so 
much that the theory was false if construed literally, 
but rather that there was no unobservable micro-structure 
for the theory to be true or false of. In other words 
the question of its truth or falsity does not arise. 
However, this question does arise: How are true 
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consequences about phenomena to be derived using truth 
preserving rules of inference when the theory, it is 
claimed, is incapable of being true or false? What lies 
behind this question is the law of the excluded middle: 
either a proposition is true or its negation is; and 
hence any sentence in a theory must be either true or 
false - the very conclusion Berkeley wanted to deny. One 
way out of this is to deny the law of the excluded middle 
and adopt intuitionist logic. I do not think that 
Berkeley would have taken quite this way out: he would 
have said that theories are just elliptical ways of 
stating facts about the world. In other words, being 
meaningful does not entail being true or false about any 
micro-structure but about the experimental and 
observational consequences of the theory. Berkeley does 
talk of Newton's theory being true- indeed few could 
have been unimpressed by the success of Newtonian 
mechanics - but it can only be of the observable 
phenomena that a theory can, in the end, be true. 
Berkeley is not attacking Newton or the Principia, but 
those who gave a realist construal of the Principia. 
Popper is quite right, then, to say: "What can be 
observed are movements" [Popper C1961), p 373] -after 
all this is the view of both Newton and Berkeley. At 
bottom the Newtonian method is this: a particular kind of 
regularity is observed to hold, which is given a precise 
mathematical expression. This expression figures in 
reasoning about celestial and terrestial mechanics; 
acting as a sort of non-formal rule of inference, it 
makes possible proofs, predictions, calculations and 
explanations regarding a multitude of mechanical 
phenomena. 
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But the phrase just quoted continues: "not their hidden 
alleged 'causes'." Berkeley is very critical of talking 
about hidden causes and warns us against doing so (de 
Xotu, paragraphs 4 and 26). If we catch a falling 
object, or allow it to strike a stationary one we will 
either feel a force and our hand will move, or the 
stationary object will move. This makes force a 
consequence of motion. From this perfectly true 
proposition, we slide to the belief that this cause must 
be real because causes elsewhere are. This is popularly 
called "gravity". Berkeley's reply is this: Causes 
elsewhere are not real, even though they do involve 
impulsion because the real cause of motion is the divine 
mind; we think of them as real because our ability to 
predict an effect given the cause is rarely, if ever, 
seen to err. What lies behind impulsion, as much as 
behind celestial mechanics, is Newtonian mechanics with 
its three laws. Popper was not suggesting in the above 
remark that we can observe hidden causes only that we can 
have conjectural knowledge; but does it make sense to 
talk like this? I will return to this question later. 
Section 7; Berkeley and Explanation. 
In the Principles, Berkeley takes a straight forwardly 
covering law view of explanation: 
a philosopher, . . . having observed a certain 
similitude of appearences, as well in the 
heavens as in the earth, that argue innumerable 
bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each 
other, which he denotes by the general name 
attraction, whatever can be reduced to that, he 
thinks justly accounted for. [Principles p 
109.] 
This view is elaborated in de Xotu; an event is explained 
when, 
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it is reduced to those most simple and 
universal priciples, and shown by accurate 
reasoning to be in agreement and connection with 
them. For once the laws of nature have beed 
found out, then it is the philosopher's task to 
show that each phenomena is in constant 
conformity with those laws, that is, necessarily 
follows from those principles. In that consists 
the explanation and solution of phenomena and 
assigning their cause, ie the reason why they 
take place. [DM p 218f.J 
In the Latin original, the last sentence is, 
id quod est phaenomena explicare & solvere, 
causamque, id est rationem cur fiant, assignare. 
[ DML p 20. J 
If "id est" were translated as "or rather" the result 
would be less awkward; the result of this substitution 
would certainly be consistent with Berkeley's views. I 
suggest that this awkwardness is further evidence of 
haste in the composition of de Kotu; but this, as we 
shall see later, is by no means the end of the story as 
far as this passage is concerned. 
The phrase "thinks justly accounted for" in the first of 
the two Berkeley passages just quoted is surely 
significant, since it indicates that Berkeley is dealing 
with explanation as understood by the vulgar, be it lay 
or scientific. In other words, he is analysing our 
everday concept and activity of explanation, telling us 
what, as a matter of fact, we are doing when give what we 
call an "explanation". There is, it seems, no great 
mystery in trying to understand explanation: it is 
something language users do with language with its 
implicit appeal to classificatory schemes. It is 
especially something they are able to do with their 
scientific languages, which are an extension of natural 
languages, and which make the implicit appeal explicit in 
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that that they provide basic principles that can be used 
to generate all the formed sentences of the language. 
The similarity between Berkeley's views and Hempel's is 
striking: 
... explanations may be conceived, ... as 
deductive arguments whose conclusion is the 
explanandum sentence, E, and whose premiss-set, 
the explanans, consist of general laws, . . . and 
of other statements, . . . which make assertions 
about particular facts .... 
Explanatory accounts of this kind will be called 
explanations by deductive subsumption under 
general laws, or deductive-nomological 
explanations. The laws invoked in a scientific 
explanation will also be called covering laws 
for the explandum phenomenon, and the 
explanatory argument will be said to subsume the 
explanandum under those laws. [Hempel <1966), p 
51.] 
The explanandum phenomenon in such an explanation may be, 
... a uniformity expressed by an empirical law 
such as Galileo's or Kepler's laws. Deductive 
explanations of such uniformities will then 
invoke laws of broader scope, such as ... 
Newton's laws of motion and of gravitation. 
[Hempel (1966), p 51.] 
These are the fundamental laws or axioms of Newtonian 
mechanics; a fact is said to be explained if and only if 
it can be shown that it is a consequence of thses 
fundamental laws or axioms - which in their turn are 
validated by the known regularities. 
This is also similar to Popper: 
To give a causal explanation of an event means 
to deduce a statement which describes it, using 
as premises of the deduction one or more 
universal laws, together with certain singul~r 
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statements, the initial conditions. 
[Popper C1980), p 59.] 
Martin Fearnley 
Although Popper does sometimes, as here, express 
allegiance to a straight forward covering law law view of 
explantion, he does not accept - at least not in these 
articles- Berkeley's views about explanation; in this 
context, Popper's quest is for underlying causal 
mechanisms. Nor would Pierre Duhem in The Aim And 
Structure Of Physical Science C1954) have accepted 
Berkeley's views. 
as stripping, 
In the Aim Duhem defined "explanation" 
... reality of appearences covering it like a 
veil, in order to see the bare reality itself. 
[Duhem <1954), p 7.] 
This definition is surely both essentialist and too 
restrictive, and even though it is perfectly in order for 
a philosopher to be normative, Duhem's definition 
excludes too much that ordinarily and rightly passes for 
explanation. Duhem goes on to add what Berkeley agrees 
with and what Popper does not: 
The observation of physical phenomena does not 
put us into relation with the reality hidden 
under the sensible appearences, [Duhem 
( 1954) • p 7. ] 
Duhem says elsewhere that, 
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is 
a system of mathematical propositions, deduced 
from a small number of principles, which aim to 
represent as simply, as complet.ely, and as 
exactly as possible a set of experimental laws. 
[Duhem <1954), p 19.] 
Berkeley while accepting the second sentence would most 
certainly not have accepted the first. B~rkeley would 
accept that a scientific theory is an abbreviated way of 
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stating what would otherwise be an unwieldy complex of 
observed facts. Duhem's great mistake was to consider 
explanation something special and irreducible: 
explanation is not the aim of science, only metaphysics 
can do that. And, according to Duhem, science and 
metaphysics are wholly different enterprises. But 
Berkeley, being an empiricist and not a rationalist, 
would have accepted Duhem's remark that, 
... no metaphysics gives instruction exact 
enough or detailed enough to make it possible to 
derive all the elements of a physical theory 
from it. [Duhem 0954), p 16.] 
This is precisely Newton's complaint against Descartes, 
already noted in "The Scientific Background", Section 2. 
Duhem's attitude to explanation helped to foster the very 
view he was anxious to overturn: the "because" in 
explanations must denote some mysterious necessary 
relationship, and hence science must involve the attempt 
to attain something beyond the observable phenomena, 
namely determining causal relationships. Berkeley had 
seen what Duhem and Popper missed, namely that when a 
scientist is asked to explain something the information 
he uses is of the same kind as that used when he gives a 
description. The mistake was to see explanation as 
having a relationship to the phenomena like the one 
description has, ie a relation between only theory and 
fact. 
But explanation requires a context and a person to do the 
explaining; hence Berkeley, in his descriptive treatment, 
repeatedly refers to what people accept as explanations. 
In this treatment, Berkeley held that a successful 
explanation - as far as informat~on goes - involves 
nothing over and above a simple, general and informative 
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description; this is why he said that force is nothing 
over and above motion itself. Berkeley sees the danger 
of being too restrictive and excluding too much from 
one's definition of explanation. 
Section 8: Dispositions - An Ambiguity. 
What is to be made of the following remark? 
I cannot but think that it is a mistake to 
denounce Newtonian forces <the causes of 
accelerations) as occult, and try discard them 
(as has been suggested) in favour of 
accelerations. [Popper (1961), p 386.] 
My understanding of the matter is that the view which 
Popper thought was a mistake is the very view adopted by 
Newton himself who dealt with effects and tied his theory 
ultimately to the way things do in fact happen -
according to Newton a force was nothing more than the way 
objects tended to act, though perhaps conceived 
differently, that is, as a change in velocity; but it is 
still nothing over and above the change in velocity 
itself. Popper's response to this immediately follows 
the passage just quoted: 
For accelerations cannot be observed any more 
directly than forces;... [Popper (1961), p 
386.] 
Popper's remark is surely false; that a body is moving 
faster now than it was a moment ago is something I can 
perceive directly - pulling away at traffic lights is 
something we have all experienced at some time or other. 
And what does it mean to say that accelerations are just 
as dispositional as forces? In a sense, of course, it is 
true; Newton defined a force in terms of change of 
velocity, ie, he wedded the concept of force to that of 
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acceleration. But is not clear to me that Popper's 
analysis gave him what he wanted because as it stands the 
remark is ambiguous between semantics and a causal basis 
for the disposition. If Popper was doing semantics, then 
he was surely not entitled to derive ontological 
consequences. If he was giving a causal account, then it 
is not clear that he has succeeded because he must say 
either that force is the result of the activity of bodies 
- which is not really an account, or that force is an 
entity - which is precisely what he was arguing against. 
In a sense, of course, Popper's criticisms of the 
instrumentalist position were beside the point with 
regard to Berkeley; he, after all, believed that behind 
phenomena lay the reality of the divine mind and its 
volitions which are to be identified with the basic 
principles of mechanical science. 
Popper seems to have thought that dispositional terms are 
descriptions of some reality or at least imply such a 
description; this issue is merely the realism/anti-
realism debate revisited - it is hardly true therefore to 
call this the most "interesting difference" since it is 
the same difference. 
According to Popper something is real if and only if a 
statement describing it is true. What has to be 
described truly to make a disposition real? Presumably a 
causal basis. But even here a description would involve 
dispositional predicates of the sort for which an 
explanation is sought - this seems to make dispositions 
alarmingly similar to occult qualities. I will not 
pursue again Popper, explanation, and realism; we have 
been here before. 
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Section 9: Realism About What? 
I have suggested that Berkeley thought it unreasonable to 
reify the theoretical terms of science. Popper thought 
it was not only reasonable, but a demand of true science: 
The scientist aims at finding a true description 
of the world <and especially of its regularities 
or 'laws'), which shall also be an explanation 
of the observable facts. [Popper <1961), p 
366.] 
If all that Popper meant by this was that science aims at 
increasingly general descriptions of events, then the 
remark is quite innocuous. But this is not all that 
Popper meant and the question now becomes: Of what is a 
theory true? 
According to Popper a theory is true of the unobservable 
events and micro-structures postulated by science, of 
whose existence we can be conjecturally sure: 
[the scientist] can never know for certain 
whether his findings are true, although he may 
sometimes establish with reasonable certainty 
that a theory is false. [Popper <1961), p 182.] 
This is the basic ingredient of Popper's conjectural 
realism. Berkeley's reply to this is that failing to 
survive a critical test means merely that the theory is 
inadequate; and it if survives, we need need not say that 
its postulated entities exist, but only that the 
phenomena are as the theory as the theory says that they 
are. <Cf de Kotu, paragaph 38.) Questions of truth and 
falsity do not arise. That a theory survives a critical 
test in no way obliges me to believe that science 
describes unobservable entities and micro-structures. 
Nor does its failure - conjectural realism or no 
conjectural realism. That Popper thought it an important 
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function of science to explain, is clear from the adverse 
comments he made about instrumentalism's failure to give 
an account of explanation. Since he did not accept the 
instrumentalist view of the matter, and ignored 
Berkeley's, it must be presumed that he was seeking to 
make scientific explanations causal: he believed that 
every observed regularity needs some further 
(unobservable) causal regularity to explain it. But this 
is just the premiss that distinguishes the realist from 
the anti-realist. Berkeley accepted the major thrust of 
this argument: there must be some power responsible for 
the existence of phenomena. Berkeley's view differed 
form Popper's in that Berkeley did not believe it was the 
business of science to describe this power. Although, 
it is most true that the investigations of 
nature every where supplies the higher sciences 
with notable arguments to illustrate and prove 
the wisdom, the goodness, and the power of God. 
[DM p 218.1 
Berkeley believed that it is the business of theology and 
metaphysics to tell us about this power. But the only 
knowledge we can have of this type of power is, he 
believed, the knowledge one has of one's own mind, and 
our own ability to determine the occurance of certain 
mental acts or events. Hence, the cause of observable 
motion is going to be the volitions of the divine mind. 
This would have enabled Berkeley to avoid the charge that 
he cannot give a causal explanation of the observable 
regularity of physical events, that they must be some 
vast cosmic coincidence. This is a charge that Hume 
cannot easily resist, and certainly not as Berkeley did. 
It is not clear why we must accept, as Popper seemed to 
think we must, that the aim of science is to give a true 
description of the reality underlying phenomena. 
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Popper's reasons seem either unconvincing or to count for 
his opponents' views as much as for his own. What is 
required is a direct means of verifying the claims of 
science, which would enable to know these things other 
than by their effects. What is required is a direct 
means of verifying the claims of science. At this point 
Popper remarks that he does not think that the direct-
indirect dichotomy will get us very far; this seems to 
amount to saying that the observable is at one end of a 
spectrum of observability whose other end terminates in 
the unobservable realm of scientific entities, and that 
no clear and unequivocal line can be drawn between them. 
Hence the viability of Berkeley's concept of direct but 
passive perception is thrown into doubt. This being so, 
a theory of truth that works for the directly observable 
must also work for the indirectly observable. Popper's 
theory of truth - "A state of affairs is real if and only 
if the statement describing it is true" - begs the 
question because it presupposes that the statement is 
capable of being true or false in the first place. Why 
should the above mentioned spectrum end with the 
theoretical entities? What this sort of contention needs 
is some direct but independent means of establishing the 
claims of science. Berkeley was aware of this; yet it is 
a frequent criticism of his philosophy that the arguments 
that he used against the existence of theoretical 
entities would be equally effective against a belief in 
God's existence. This is not so, because Berkeley used 
empirical arguments to establish the legitimacy of this 
or that entity's claim to be real; but he used a priori 
arguments to establish that there must be some means of 
producing phenomena. Popper's rejoinder is that there 
must be such a reality because if there were not, 
theories could not be falsified: 
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if [the theory] is false, then it 
contradicts some real state of affairs < ..• ). 
Moreover, if we test our conjecture, and succeed 
in falsifying it, then we see very clearly that 
there was a reality - something with which it 
could clash. [Popper <1961), p 384.] 
This is true, but not in the way Popper intended it; 
theories are falsified, not by comparing their claims 
about, say, micro-structures directly, but by noting 
whether the observable consequences of a theory are as 
the theory says they should be. We cannot move from the 
correctness of a prediction based on a theory to the 
theory's truth; that would involve committing the fallacy 
of affirming the antecendent. There would be no fallacy 
and no circular argument here, if the means of 
determining whether the postulated entities of science 
did in fact exist were independent of determining whether 
a theory explains the phenomena. 
one thing; their causes, another: 
Sensible effects are 
As for gravity we have already shown above that 
by that term is meant nothing we know, nothing 
other than the sensible effect, the cause of 
which we seek. [DM p 215.] 
And, again: 
We must ... admit that no force is immediately 
felt by itself nor measured other than by its 
effect. [DM p 213.] 
Popper might say that 
that a theory is true 
true until falsified. 
he is not claiming categorically 
but only that it is conjecturally 
But of what is it true or false? 
I cannot agree with Popper that it is a, 
grave mistake to conclude from [the view 
that we should call a state of affairs 'real' if 
and only if the statement describing it is true] 
that the uncertainty of a theory, ie, its 
hypothetical or conjectural character, 
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diminishes in any way its implicit claim to 
describe something real. [Popper (1961), 
p 384.] 
Berkeley's objection is that this claim is simply 
unjustified because it begs the question whether there is 
something for science to describe. The critical test 
could be seen quite properly as a test of the theory's 
adequacy, and since this makes the weaker ontological 
claim, it is to be preferred. It is one thing to 
demonstrate that a theory is true; it is quite a 
different thing to to demonstrate that it explains. Yet 
Popper persited in confounding these two issues by 
assimilating the first to the second. 
While it is fair to describe Berkeley as scientific anti-
realist it is not fair to describe him as an out and out 
anti-realist; in fact it would be plain false. He had 
some views about metaphysics which were decidedly 
realistic, and to a consideration of these I now turn. 
Section 10: Berkeley's Realism. 
I mentioned earlier that Berkeley had two accounts of 
explanation: one normative, and the other descriptive. 
The descriptive one has already been dealt with; what 
' Berkeley's normative account of explanation is will 
emerge by considering the realism that underpins much of 
the philosophy of de Motu. 
Scientific realism, whatever its shortcomings, has one 
advantage over instrumentalism, namely it does provide us 
with a means of production expressed in terms of 
constituents or causes; this role is filled in realism by 
the theoretical entities of physical science. Denying 
that science provides such causes was the conclusion 
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Berkeley argued for; mere human beings, he seems to say, 
with their finite intellectual powers cannot hope to 
discover alone such causes. This sort of knowledge, if 
it is possible at all, is revealed and it involves 
knowledge of God and his will. So Berkeley - the supreme 
theological realist - is forced to postulate causes or 
constituents other than those required by a realistic 
construal of science; in this case they are the volitions 
of the divine mind. <Cf de Hotu, paragraph 3.) Berkeley 
was conceding something both to the scientific realist 
and to those would infer to the best explanation: to the 
first he conceded that a causal basis is required for a 
genuine understanding of why an event happened; to the 
second he conceded that it is proper to infer to the best 
explanation - once it is clear what is meant by "best 
explanation". Berkeley disagrees about what can ~ke 
something else happen and about what the best explanation 
is. An object, being entirely passive, cannot make 
anything happen, and accordingly, since our experience of 
something making something else happen is a mind, we 
ought therefore to infer that a mind must be resposible 
for the occurrences we see. Berkeley had to say that 
the best explanation is the divine mind and that a true 
cause is a volition of the divine mind. In the case of 
the human mind, its volitions can only bring about the 
occurrence of mental episodes, not the movement of a 
limb. The relationship between my mind and the ideas 
constituting my body is contingent, but the relationship 
between my mind and its volitions is a necessary one 
since they are, in part, constitutive of what my mind is 
- I cannot be said to cause them; but, the relationship 
between the will of God and the ideas constituting the 
physical realm, including my body, is a necessary one 
because God causes them to be manifest to the senses. 
All this he brings about with a few basic volitions. The 
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nearest science can come to the discovery of these 
volitions is to formulate basic axioms and laws as found, 
for example, in Newtonian mechanics. 
But do we have volitions, and, if we do, what are they? 
Wittegenstein asked in the Investigations, 
. . . what is left over if I subtract the fact 
that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise 
my arm? [Wittgenstein <1953), p 161.] 
The answer is, 
What is left over is whatever a paralytic does 
when he tries to lift his arm and fails. 
It will not do to say that moving an arm is a basic 
action unanalysable into anything else, because this 
implies that the paralytic discovers that he cannot move 
his arm by intending to raise his arm at t,, and noting 
at tz that it did not move. This is surely false because 
it makes the paralytic's knowledge of his own state 
inferential. 
What are volitions? We can say that there is a class of 
conscious occurrences that are or express propositional 
attitudes, and the members of this class have the 
following in property: e~ch has a tendency to cause an 
event that satisfies or fulfils its proposiitonal 
content. 
All this tells us a great deal about what Berkeley meant 
by explanation that involves an appeal to "the nature of 
things": this is what expalanation means when one is 
thinking with the learned and saying what actually brings 
about the phenomena we see. 
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Since Berkeley traced all explanation of physical events 
to the volitions of the divine mind it cannot be objected 
against him- as it can against instrumentalism- that he 
cannot give any account of the means by which particular 
phenomena are produced. This objection clearly does not 
hold because Berkeley held that divine volitions are the 
only genuine causes. 
Section 11: Theories And Computation Rules. 
Popper is muddled and wrong about what he said about 
Berkeley: he told us that Berkeley's arguments depend on 
a certain philosophy of language which "hinges on the 
problem of meaning". As we saw, Berkeley's nominalism 
has no bearing whatsoever on his philosophy of science, 
the aim of which was to demonstrate that it is more 
reasonable to believe that there are no physical entities 
in the world named by the terms of physical theory. 
Berkeley's arguments against the reification of such 
terms are neither linguistic nor logical, but 
metaphysical and epistomological. Popper's arguments 
against Berkeley's nominalism are beside the point. 
I think it is now clear that we should call Berkeley a 
"scientific anti-realist", in preference to 
"instrumentalist" because that term has a number of 
misleading connotations. Doing this is even more 
preferable than calling him an "empiricist" since Ayer, 
when calling Hume "a more consistent empiricist than 
Berkeley", made the remark sound like a criticism which 
it is not. Ayer's accusation sounds very much like an 
attempt to make terms do the work of an argument. 
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I want now to consider the significance for science of 
experimental tests, which subject touches on Berkeley's 
concerns in de Motu. 
Popper said that, because instrumentalism construes 
science as a set of computation or inference rules, it 
could not therefore give an adequate account of the 
difference between high level theories and the more 
mundane, technologically oriented, applied sciences such 
as navigation. Popper believed - in my view, 
unjustifiably - that this failure is enough to bring 
about the collapse of instrumentalism, and, a fortiori, 
Berkeley's anti-realism also. Popper explained this the 
difference between science and a technologically 
oriented, applied science as follows: 
The way in which computation rules are tried out 
is different from the way in which theories are 
tested. (Popper <1961), p 377.] 
This is perfectly true, but it does not count against 
Berkeley; navigation rules are tried out and high level 
theories are tested - but why could not Berkeley say 
exactly the same? Of course Berkeley could not have said 
that a theory is tested for its truth or its falsity, but 
he could have said that a theory is tested for its 
adequacy, generality and applicability. I,n other words, 
the only question that need have concerned Berkeley is 
extent to which a theory saves the phenomena: 
The human mind delights in extending and 
expanding its knowledge; and for this purpose 
general notions and propositions have to be 
formed in which particular proposiitons and 
cognitions are in some way comprised, which 
then, and not till then, are believed to be 
understood. CDM p 219.] 
Theoretical terms serve this end: 
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And just as geometers for the sake of their art 
make use of many devices which they themselves 
cannot describe nor find in the nature of 
things, even so the mechanician makes use of 
certain abstract and general terms, imagining in 
bodies force, action, attraction, solicitation, 
etc. which are of first utility for theories and 
formulations, as also for computations about 
motion, even it in the truth of things, and in 
bodies actually existing, they would be looked 
for in vain. [DM p 219.] 
Berkeley was well aware that two contradictory theories 
could still explain a given phenomenon: 
But although Newton and Torricelli seem to be 
disagreeing with one another, they both advance 
consistent views, and the thing is sufficiently 
well explained by both. [DM p 226.] 
It must not be supposed that Berkeley was therefore 
sympathetic to factitious explanations. At various 
points in paragraphs 16 to 35 of de Notu, Berkeley 
briefly surveys a number of conceptions about motion and 
comments that some are held by people who have "said 
something rather than thought it", and that such theories 
are "as difficult to explain as the very thing [they are] 
brought forward to explain"; they are all "too abstract 
and obscure." Realising that "of the unkown it is 
profitless to speak" and that he would be "ashamed to 
linger long on subtleties of this sort" he concludes 
that, 
to employ a term and conceive nothing by it 
is quite unworthy of a philosopher. [DM p 217.] 
We have been warned! 
In de Notu, paragraph 36, we are told that a principle is 
something "in which the whole discipline is grounded and 
contained," [DM p 218J; in paragraph 38, we get this: 
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In mechanics . . . notions are premised, ie 
definitions and first and general statements 
about motion from which afterwards by 
mathematical method conclusions more remote and 
less general are deduced. CDM p 219.] 
Berkeley continued by making a comparison between the 
method of geometers and that of scientists, and concluded 
by pointing out that just as geometers are able, by 
applying geometrical theorms to measure the size of 
individual bodies, 
... so also by the application of the universal 
theorems of mechanics, the movements of any part 
of the mundane system, and phenomena thereon 
depending, become known and are determined. [DM 
p 219.] 
And leaving us in no two minds about the matter, he 
concludes: 
And this is the sole mark at which the physicist 
must aim. CDM p 219.] 
Berkeley found the above mentioned explanations 
unacceptable because they derive from theories whose 
advocates lack a genuine understanding of the scientific 
enterprise. Hence a theory is properly constituted if 
and only if it is the result of observing, generalizing 
and formulating powerful axioms and principles; these 
activities are the basis of any well-formed theory. This 
is a bow from Berkeley in the direction of Newton and 
Bacon. The significance of this is clear: Berkeley had 
little sympathy with factitious, obscure and ad hoc 
arguments; in cases where there are two properly 
constituted but underdetermined theories, their 
undeterminatiorn is evidence of the further work that 
needs to be done before one or other Cor neither) can be 
-accepted as a genuine theory. 
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All this flies in the face of Popper's contention that 
Berkeley's ideas must prevent the advancement of genuine 
science because instrumentalism is a device whose role is 
to rescue contradictory theories which, having forgone 
all claim to veracity, still facilitate prediction, 
calculation, etc in their own limited sphere of 
applicability. Nor does this square at all well with the 
further related contention that genuine theories are 
testable and are not therefore mere computation rules; 
and only what is capable of being true or false, Popper 
implies, is capable of being tested. According to 
Berkeley, a scientific theory cannot be truthful about 
theoretical entities - they do not exist; about the 
world, then - this is doubtful because the "human mind 
delights in extending and expanding its knowledge" which 
means that we will always be revising or even discarding 
our theories, and if a theory is true, there can never be 
any grounds for discarding it. So, given that Berkeley 
is right and scientific theories are not capable of being 
true or false in the first place, then the claim that 
theories cannot be verified or falsified is trivial. 
Popper's argument is making a covert appeal to the very 
premiss Berkeley sought to call into question; Popper is 
merly supposing the truth of his own position. The sort 
of test Berkeley could have advocated would be exactly 
the same as those that Popper would advocate; there would 
be no difference whatsoever, and a Berkeleyan could claim 
to predict not just new phenomena but new types of 
phenomena: 
in mechanical philosophy those are to be 
called principles, in which the whole discipline 
is grounded and contained, those primary laws of 
motion which have been proved by experiment, 
elaborated by reason and rendered universal. 
[DM p 218.] 
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And "rendered universal" is not the language of someone 
who was peddling a philosophy of science whose sole aim 
is to rescue ad hoc theories. Popper failed to see this: 
A theory is tested ... by applying it to very 
special cases for which it yields results 
different from what we should have expected 
without the theory, ... In other words, we try 
to select for our tests those crucial cases in 
which we should expect the theory to fail if it 
were not true. [Popper (1961), p 378.] 
Change the last word of this quotation to "adequate", and 
Berkeley would have been very pleased to accept it. 
Section 12: Testing For Truth Or Applicability. 
Popper was quite right when he said that if 
instrumentalism is true, theories cannot be refuted; if 
truth or falsity is not claimed as a characteristic of 
theories in the first place, then the truth of Popper's 
remark is guaranteed. Of course there is nothing 
strictly corresponding to the attempt to refute a theory 
- and for the same reason as the one just given. 
Nonetheless a theory can still be tested for its 
applicability, and steps taken to render it universal; we 
can still reject a theory, not because its theoretical 
entities do not exist, but because the observational and 
experimental consequences of the theory are not as the 
theory says they should be. 
If a theory is found wanting because it fails some test, 
we may not be forced to reject it qua instrument; it may 
still be of some use, and though of limited 
applicability, we may continue to use it until the 
scientists provide us with a better, ie, more general, 
theory. However, _in these circumstances we are forced 
to reject it as a scientific theory and await the advent 
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of an adequate theory because only theories "rendered 
universal" can be genuine theories. Theories incapable 
of being rendered universal must be give up their claim 
to explain phenomena. Here is the reason why navigation 
is not to be thought of as a scientific theory. Yet, I 
can imagine a situation in which it could be accepted as 
a scientific theory: suppose it represents the entire 
body of scientific and theoretical knowledge known to a 
particular sea-faring community; then ex hypothesi there 
is nothing more general it can be deduced form, and hence 
no higher level scientific theory with which it can be 
unfavourably contrasted. It would be a scientific theory 
in its own right; it would be used to predict, calculate, 
and explain - if any one thought it poor science, the 
onus would be on the critic to improve or replace it, 
perhaps by giving it a theoretical basis composed of 
axioms and a model which interpreted the axioms. 
Section 13: Obscurantism. 
Popper's final complaint against Berkeley was to accuse 
him of being obscurantist: 
by neglecting falsification, and stressing 
application, instrumentalism proves to be ... 
obscurantist .... · For it is only in searching 
for refutations that science can hope to learn 
and to advance. [Popper <1961), p 360.] 
About what we "can hope to learn" I have already dealt 
with; I want now to deal with Popper's remarks about the 
obscurantism of Berkeley's position; it is, I hope, clear 
by now why Berkeley neglected falsification. If he 
stressed application at the expense of every other aspect 
of a theory, then Popper's suggestion was quite true. 
But as we have seen, Berkeley did not stress application. 
exclusively; he wanted physical science to be both 
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rendered universal and free of any hindrance, obscure or 
otherwise, that would impede its advancement. For, as 
Berkeley points out in a passage I have quoted before: 
The human mind delights in extending and 
expanding its knowledge; ... [DM p 219.] 
After giving his four methodological rules in de Hotu, 
paragraph 66, Berkeley wrote that if these rules are 
followed, 
... all the famous theorms of the mechanical 
philosophy by which the secrets of nature are 
unlocked, and by which the system of the world 
is reduced to human calculation, will remain 
untouched. [DM p 225.] 
These are just not the words of someone advocating 
obscurantism in science. 
Section 14: Conclusion. 
In this section of my thesis I have compared and 
contrasted Berkeley's anti-realism with Popper's realism. 
Popper from the outset assumed that a theory is capable 
of being either true or false; that instrumentalism 
cannot explain; and that instrumentalism is obscurantist 
- charges which Berkeley's philosophy can resist,_ .even if 
instrumentalism cannot. 
Popper's attack on Berkeley is not quite the attack that 
he thought it was. Popper berates instrumentalism for 
its inability to explain; this, though true, is beside 
the point since Berkeley demonstrates that science does 
explain. They disagree about what can count as 
explanation in science: Popper argued for underlying 
causal mechanisms, whereas Berkeley argues for the 
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fundamental laws of Newtonian mechanics. Berkeley 
believed that science could give no convincing reason to 
suppose that the theoretical entities of physical science 
did exist; all we can ever know are the effects "the 
cause of which we seek". True, there is nothing in 
Berkeley's view corresponding to falsifying a theory, but 
that is because a theory is not capable of being true or 
false in the first place. At the bottom of our ability 
to explain lies our ability to classify in increasingly 
general ways. Berkeley, aware that explanaton must stop 
somewhere, and that he must defend himself from the 
cosmic coincidence objection, is in the end a realist: he 
believed that God is the causal basis of the observed 
phenomena; precisely put, he believed that the basic laws 
of physical science are identical to the basic volitions 
of the divine mind. 
To be a genuine scientific theory, a theory must be all 
embracing; it is this which distinguishes it from 
computation rules which are only of limited 
applicability. This also enables Berkeley to resist the 
charge of obscurantism. Popper said that instrumentalism 
allowed scientists to stop attempting to achieve 
increasingly general theories - Berkeley argued for the 
opposite. Theories are tested, not for their truth or 
falsity, but for their general~ty and applicability. 
Berkeley's philosophy resists Popper's criticisms very 
well, especially with regard to explanation; and in this 
regard Berkeley showed himself not to be an 
instrumentalist. 
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We have seen the science and philosophy presupposed in de 
Hotu, seen the arguments and conclusions drawn in de 
Hotu, and finally we have seen what Berkeley has to offer 
the modern philosopher of science. But apart from that -
pretty obvious it is, too - what is left to write in this 
conclusion? 
One possibility is to speculate on further applications 
of the principles Berkeley elaborated in de Hotu. We 
might, for example, apply his results to the social 
sciences. I am sure he would have undertaken that 
enterprise with relish; the determinism of these sciences 
and their failure to keep matters of fact separate from 
matters of method, their naive realism about such terms 
as "society", ''social pressure", etc are ideal targets 
for his anti-realist construal of scientific terms. The 
notion of a person's behaviour being determined by 
external social factors would have been anathema to him -
Berkeley always maintained that people are free, moral 
agents and that to suppose otherwise is to suppose we are 
made in a way that frustrates God's purpose in creating 
us in the first place. Our moral confusions would, I am 
sure, have angered and alarmed Berkeley. 
Another possibility is to speculate more generally about 
Berkeley's likely reaction to our attitude towards 
science: I am sure that our childlike faith in science 
and technology would have been treated by him with a 
mixture of amazement and contempt; he would have thought 
that we were little better than mediaeval catholics. As 
a convinced advocate of free-thinking in philosophical 
matters, he would have been sure to encourage us to think 
for ourselves. 
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What, as another possibility, would Berkeley have said 
about philosophers of science more modern than Duhem and 
Popper? What, for example would he have made of Newton-
Smith's contention that the demand that science be 
rational is best met if we accept scientific realism? 
Berkeley would have been mystified. He would have been 
more sympathetic towards Van Fraassen, though he would 
have denied that a scientific theory is capable of being 
true or false. But the notion of a scientific theory 
being adequate would have been very congenial. 
But the most interesting question is: Why did Berkeley's 
views have such little impact on the science of his day? 
Part of the answer is the very success of the Principia, 
which made radical discussions of its fundamental tenets 
likely to be met with deadly silence; or more likely such 
a discussion would not have been heard above the tumult 
of success. The remainder of the answer - the more 
important part - lies with Berkeley himself, who, for all 
his criticism of the metaphysics of the Pricipia, leaves 
untouched the content of the physical system: it had 
after all been his contention that we do not need to be 
scientific realists about the theoretical terms of 
Newtonian physics. It could stand well enough without 
that. But the apparent anti-Newtonianism could have been 
contributed to the lack impact de Notu had, as could the 
lack of an English translation of de Notu. Physics' 
growing indifference to metaphysical scruples has created 
yet another buffer between philosophy and physics. So 
would the changing atmosphere in the eighteenth-century 
with its increasing confidence, success, progress and 
optimism; an age with these characteristics would have 
been impatient with conceptual niceties. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that.the 
various possibilities that become available once absolute 
space is denied, were not appreciated; no one spotted the 
significance and so no one investigated the matter 
further. Conceptual reformulation - prompted by 
metaphysical and theological interests - ran ahead and 
prevented a fertile contact with the basis of Newton's 
system. Berkeley's attitude is in very marked contrast 
to that of Kant and Hume, both of whom took Newton for 
granted. Although Berkeley was writing before the full 
impact of Newton was appreciated, this in no way 
diminishes the fact that Berkeley was one of the last 
people not to be over-awed by Newton. 
Inevitably, Berkeley's views- via Mach- influenced 
modern physics; Einstein's theory is a specific 
interpretaton of Berkeley's general relativity principle. 
This shows that there is a looseness of fit between the 
general conclusions obtained from a metaphysical inquiry 
and those conceptual investigations into the fundamentals 
of the science which become pressing in a time of 
revolution. The moral is that we cannot predict, before 
the event, what the relevance of some philosophical 
theory will be to science. And that is the importance of 
philosophy and the reason why we do it. 
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Key To Berkeley References. 
Throughout the thesis I have adopted the following 
conventions when referring to works by Berkeley. 
DM = de Notu, English translation by A A Luce, 
in Berkeley, Philosophical Works, 
Including the Works on Vision, (ed M R 
Ayers), 1975. I have used the 1983 
reprint. 
DML = de Notu, Latin text in The Works of George 
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, <ed A A Luce 
and IE Jessop), Volume IV, 1951. de Notu 
was first published in 1721. 
Principles = 
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Hu~n Knowledge in Berkeley, Philosophical 
Works, Including the Works on Vision, <ed M 
R Ayers), 1975. Reprinted with minor 
revisions, 1983. Principles was first 
published in 1710 
PC = Philosophical Co11JJ11entaries in Berkeley, 
Philosophical Works, Including the Works on 
Vision, (ed M R Ayers), 1975. Reprinted 
with minor revisions, 1983. Philosophical 
Co11JJ11entaries was written in 1707-8 and 
first published in 1871. 
NTV = An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision in 
Berkeley, Philosophical Works, Including 
the Works on Vision, <ed M R Ayers), 1975. 
Reprinted with minor revisions, 1983. New 
Theory of Vision was first published in 
1709. 
TVV = Tbe Theory of Vision Vi ndi ca ted and 
Explained in Berkeley, Philosophical 
Works, Including the Works on Vision, <ed M 
R Ayers), 1975. Reprinted with minor 
revisions, 1983. The Theory of Vision 
Vindicated was first published in 1733. 
DLA = "de Ludo Algebraico11 in The Works of George 
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, <ed A A Luce 
and I E Jessop>, Volume IV, 1951. .. de Ludo 
Algebraico11 was first published in 
Berkeley's Nfscellena Nathe~tica, 1707. 
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